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Abstract 
This thesis investigates Deleuze-Guattari's notion of stratification through 
a series of investigations into their material on language. Stratification is 
their term for the process by which matter-energy comes to assume the 
relatively stable historical formations of our social world, and in particular 
the relationship between subjects, objects and words. The complex 
notion of the order-wordlpassword is proposed as key to this process, 
with its role in the articulations of the strata (as order-word) and in 
movements of creation and escape (as password). I explore this 
apparatus from a variety of angles, in order to present an account of 
Deleuze-Guattari's pragmatics that demonstrates both its basis in 
philosophy and its connections with the world. 
I begin by introducing the notion of 'difference in itself', through 
Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari's critique of representation and their account 
of subjectification, the creation of the subject in space and time (in 
relation to Bergson and Kant) - and then feed this material through an 
encounter with Judge Schreber, in the process filling out our account of 
the subject. The resulting diagram of stratification is further explored 
through a dialogue with two other key thinkers of language - 
Wittgenstein, in relation to his social conception of meaning as use, and 
Derrida, in relation to his critique of Austin and Searle's Speech Act 
theory - in either case, demonstrating important connections and 
contrasts with Deleuze-Guattari. I then examine the specifics of 
stratoanalysis through an examination of the related zones of the formal, 
the abstract and the incorporeal, bringing this to bear on Deleuze- 
Guattari's appropriation of the linguist Hjelmslev, and to the criticisms of 
Ruthrof. The final step is to relate this apparatus both to linguistic and 
everyday understandings of language, connecting this pragmatics of the 
order-word with the notion of an 'art of living' through a consideration of 
standardised language and 'verbal hygiene'. 
6 
Table of Abbreviations 
AL Bolinger, Aspects of Language, New York: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Inc., 1975 
AO Deleuze-Guaftari, Anti0edipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, tr. 
Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R. Lane, London: 
Athlone 1984. 
B Deleuze, Bergsonism, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habbedam, New York: Zone Books, 1991 
cc Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical tr. Daniel W. Smith and 
Michael A. Greco, London: Verso 1998 
CE Dennett, Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin, 1993 
CEv Bergson, Creative Evolution, tr. Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry 
Holt & Co., 1911 
cm Bergson, The Creative Mind, tr. Mabelle L. Andison, New York: 
The Wisdom Library, 1946 
CPR Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith, London: 
MacMillan, 1964 
DB Ruthrof, 'Deleuze and the Body: Eluding Kafka's 'Little Death 
Sentence", South Atlantic Quarterty 96: 3, Summer 1997, 
563-578 
DP Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, tr. Alan Sheridan, 
London: Penguin 1991 
DR Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, tr. Paul Pafton, London: 
Athlone 1994 
F Deleuze, Foucault, tr. Se6n Hand, London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988 
7 
GIVI Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, tr. Carol Diethe, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994 
HH Nietzsche, Human, all too Human, tr. Marion Faber and Stephen 
Lehmann, London: Penguin, 1994 
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. Anscombe, 
Oxford: Blackwell 1998, Parts I and 11 
K Deleuze-Guattad, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature, tr. Dana 
Polan, Minneapolis: Unversity of Minnesota Press, 1986 
KL Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use, 
London: Praeger 1986 
Ll Pinker, The Language Instinct, London: Penguin, 1994 
LT Carruthers and Boucher, ed., Language and Thought: 
Interdisciplinary Themes, Cambridge University Press, 1998 
LR Chornsky, Language and Responsibility, tr. John Viertel, Sussex: 
Harvester Press 1979 
LP Honey, Language and Power, London: Faber. & Faber, 1997 
LS Deleuze, The Logic of Sense, tr. Mark Lester with Charles 
Stivale, London: Athlone, 1990 
Ltd Derrida, Limited Inc., tr. Alan Bass and Samuel Weber, 
Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press 1993 
M Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness, tr. Ida Macalpine and 
Richard A. Hunter, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1988 
MM Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modem 
Art, Literature and Thought, London: Harvard University Press, 
1992 
8 
MP Derrida, Margins of Philosophy, tr. Alan Bass, Bdghton: 
Harvester Press 1982 
MPG Santner, My Own Private Germany. Daniel Paul Schrebees 
Secret History of Modernity, Princeton, NA: Princeton 
University Press, 1996 
N Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, tr. Martin Joughin, New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1995 
P Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1981 
SB Ruthrof, Semantics and the Body. Meaning from Frege to the 
Postmodem, Melbourne University Press 1997 
SS Guattari, Soft Subversions, tr. David L. Sweet and Chet Wiener, 
New York: Serniotext(e), 1996 
T1 Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and The AntiýChrist tr. R. J. 
Hollingdale, London: Penguin, 1990 
TP Deleuze-Guaftad, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, tr. Bdan Massumi, London: Athlone, 1987 
VH Cameron, Verbal Hygiene, London: Routledge, 1995 
WCE Phillips Griffiths, ed.: Krittgenstein Centenary Essays, Cambridge 
University Press, 1991 
WD Staten, Wittgenstein and Derfida, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985 
Words Austin, How to Do Things with Words, Oxford University Press 
1976 
WP DeleuzeýGuattari, What Is Philosophy?, tr. Graham Burchell and 
Hugh Tomlinson, London: Verso 1994 
9 
Introduction: The Visible and the 
Articulable 
[I]t is in vain that we say what we see; what we see never resides in what we 
say. ' 
This thesis concerns what Foucault calls the 'infinite relation' (OT 9) 
between words and things - or more accurately, the seen and the said, 
the visible and the articulable, since 'words' and 'things' are but vague 
2 approximations of these two poles or forms of a single stratum. Indeed 
(as we will see in Chapter 6) Deleuze-Guattari, drawing on Hjelmslev, 
propose taking the poles he called expression and content to ever more 
abstract levels, the foldings of matter-energy, (or differenciations from 
virtual to actual), always mappable in terms of this double articulation 
3 (matte r/f unction). In each case, there is neither correspondence nor a 
common nature to these two levels. They intertwine in a relation of 
mutual presupposition, forming at any given point a single stratum, a 
particular physico-chemical, or biological, or historical formation. Despite 
the astonishing breadth of Deleuze-Guattari's account, it is only the last 
of these with which we will be concerned. These two intertwined levels 
are not equal, however: the level of the articulable (expression) is 
1 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (hereafter OT), tr. Alan Sheridan, London: 
Routledge, 1970: 9. 
2 For this reason, the original title of The Order of Things, Les Mots et les choses (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1966), was intended by Foucault as ironic, as Deleuze reports (Gilles 
Deleuze, Foucauft (hereafter F), tr. SecAn Hand, London: University of Minnesota Press, 
1988: 52). 
3 Louis Hjelmslev, Prolegomena to a Theory of Language, tr. Francis J. Whitfield, 
Madison, Milwaukee and London: University of Wisconson Press 1969, hereafter PTL 
The relations between 'virtual' and 'actual' are examined in Chapter 1; Deleuze-GuattaN's 
relation to Hjelmsfev is examined in Chapter 6; their use of 'abstract machinery and the 
theme of double articulation run throughout the thesis. The present paragraph 
summarises what the rest of our study will make clear. 
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determining, while that of the visible (content) is the determinable, and the 
'agent' of the determination is the order-word. 4 Our method is one of 
tracking these processes, and in particular, the dual tendencies of this 
central element: on the one hand, towards the order and regularity of the 
strata - where visible and articulable are clearly and distinctly distributed, 
and on the other, towards creation, disruption and change, the plane of 
the inarticulable and unrecognisable. 
Deleuze-Guattari designate their shifting method with a variety of names: 
'RHIZOMATICS = SCHIZOANALYSIS = STRATOANALYSIS = 
PRAGMATICS = MICROPOLITICS, 5 , an open-ended series to which 
Justin Barton has added INTENSIVE CARTOGRAPHY, and I will add, as 
appropriate, SCHIZOPRAGMATICS and MATERIAL SEMIOTICS. 6 
Though their 'system' could be seen as an'anti-systeM,, 7 I hope to show it 
to be an apparatus that not only avoids the more harmful trappings of 
totalising philosophy, it also serves to connect philosophy with living - in 
particular, in the present context, with linguistic (and metalinguistic) 
practices. 
In more conventional terms, then, the focus of this study is language, but 
language considered from a point of view from which it is impossible to 
isolate it from the rest of the worlds with which it is always intertwined. 
While Deleuze-Guattari have the taste never to talk about language in 
isolation, and to express their weariness with language-centred 
4 This relation of determining to determinable is taken up in relation to Kant's critique of 
Descartes in Chapter 1, while also referring to Deleuze's account of the priority of the 
statement in Foucault (F 47-69). 
5A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (hereafter TP), translated by 
Brian Massumi, London: Athlone, 1987: 22. (Originally published as Mille Plateaux, 
Paris: Minuit, 1980) 
6 Justin Barton, Thought, Bodies and Intensive Cartography: Departures from A 
Thousand Plateaus, unpublished manuscript, 2000 
7 as Robert Maggiori notes, in Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations 1972-1990 (hereafter N), tr. 
Martin Joughin, New York* Columbia University Press 1995: 31 
II 
philosophy, this thesis will attempt to explore from various angles the role 
of language in their conceptual machinery, as a means both of laying out 
crucial aspects of that machinery, and of shoring up its importance as 
antidote to the fixation on language of much recent philosophy. The level 
of expression or the articulable, the appropriate area of study for 
Isemiotics', encompasses for them more than language as generally 
understood (as, for example, human speech and writing). It encompasses 
more, because it is always intrinsically related to the other plane, that of 
content or the visible, though the specificities of that relation cannot be 
determined in advance, and must be approached through a consideration 
of both levels at once. It is never simply a matter of signs, still less of 
signifiers, but instead one of shifting relationships between regimes of 
signs and formations of power, collective assemblages of enunciation and 
machinic assemblages of bodies, their actions and passions. 8 
What, then, are the aims of this investigation? It must be admitted that the 
thesis is primarily critical rather than positive, in that its bulk is involved 
with challenging a number of specific constraints on thought, rather than 
exploring the uncharted waters that are opened up by such moves. 9 In 
this respect, it is an unpacking and application of Deleuze-Guaftari's 
engagement specifically with language in A Thousand Plateaus (in 
particular, 'Postulates of Linguistics), drawing also on material from 
Anti0edipus and Deleuze's Difference and Repetition and The Logic of 
Senselo. Deleuze-Guattari have argued that they were really more 
8 These two pairs of terms are from TP: 63 & 88 respectively. 
9 It is far from clear, in any case, that the form of doctoral thesis would lend itself to such 
explorations. 
10'November 20,1923: Postulates of Linguistics', TP 75-110. 
Deleuze-Guattari, Anti0edipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (hereafter AO), tr. Robert 
Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen R Lane, London: Athlone, 1984 (originally published as 
L'Anti-Oedipe, Paris: Minuit, 1972). Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (hereafter DR), 
tr. Paul Patton, London: Athlone 1994 (originally published as Difference et Rdpdtition, 
Paris: Presses Universitaires de France: 1968). Deleuze, The Logic of Sense (hereafter 
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concerned With other zones such as music, and have noted their lack of 
(competence' in linguistics, " and there is no doubt that theif w0flK Can be 
approached through any number of different zones (such as 
psychopathology, economics, history, biology, art, music, literature - 
some of which muill be touched on here). Neverfhaince, there are 
compelling reasons for dealing With Deleuze-Guattari through questions of 
language. 
The first is the relation between language and the subject. On an 
everyday level, our speech plays an enormously important role in defining 
who we are, from what we say (and therefore do through saying), to the 
way we say it (and thus betray - or manage to disguise - our class, 
education and regional origin, as well as our mood and intentions). To this 
end, Chapter 4 discusses speech -acts, while Chapter 7 looks at the notion 
of 'verbal hygiene'. On a deeper level, the relation between language and 
the subject involves the extent to which language determines thought, or 
thought language - raising the questions, 'Is thought possible without 
language? ' and 'Can you change the language without changing the 
thought? ' 
In keeping with our attempt to demystify language, to 'reduce it upwards', 
it will be argued that thought is independent of language, but that neither 
language nor thought are independent of the assemblage in which they 
occur - i. e. that the real question in the case of both language and 
thought is their role in the flows of detenitorialisation and 
refteriftorialisation that characterise the assemblage. To this end, the 
notion of the 'between' in the title is intended to point in two directions ý 
LS), tr. Mark Lester with Charles Stivale, London: Athlone, 1990 (originally published as 
Logique du Sens, Paris: Minuit, 1969). 
11 '1 don't think we, for our part, are particularly competent to pronounce on linguistics. 
But then competence is itself a rather unclear notion in linguistics' (N 28-29). We turn to 
Chomsky and his notion of competence in Chapter 7. In any case, as Deleuze writes, 
13 
firstly to the common sense opposition between words and things, and the 
supposedly straightforward relationship between them, which we have just 
seen Foucault call into question. Secondly, the 'between' points to the 
process of division itself, and to a 'before' where the obviousness of such 
a division is no longer apparent; where objects, letters, signs and symbols 
all circulate on the same Plane, interacting in an unlimited variety of ways. 
'Prior to', or indeed 'after, the dominance of the human subject (who, it is 
presumed, is responsible for most of the seeing and saying 12), it is 
possible to glimpse, or even engage with, this Plane. 
That this is carried out in language, as opposed to an already more fluid 
medium such as music, both restricts us and aids us in our task. It 
restricts us, because one limit-point of the present approach would be the 
refusal to speak or write any more, the abandonment of language 
altogether, an effectively Self-defeating move akin to suicide. Instead, we 
are forced despite our reservations, to remain entirely complicit with the 
restrictive mechanisms of representation, perpetuating the same old game 
('We already have this [written down]'13). On the other hand, it aids us, as 
the resultant interplay between partial escape and recapture is precisely 
the map of material life we are drawing: we are always already in the 
middle of this interplay; escape on one level can always mean recapture 
on another (and vice versa); absolute escape and absolute capture are 
both equivalent to death. 
To bring these points together (in short, the extent to which we are 
determined by discourses 14 of the human, and the extent to which it is 
'How else can one write but of those things one doesn't know, or knows badly? It is 
precisely there that we imagine having something to say' (DR )0d). 
12 where to see is understood as to recognise and to say, to mean. 
13 the phrase Judge Schreber would hear repeated, every time a thought reoccurred to 
him (see Chapter 2). 
14 As we will see, discourse here can only be understood as one uneven half of the 
story, the other being the actions and passions of bodies, and their discipline and 
14 
therefore possible to recast the relation between 'us' and 'language'), we 
need to summarise both method and targets. The targets are not, for the 
most part, individual philosophers, groups or institutions, but rather are 
received ideas that things have to be this way. The 'transcendental 
illusion' or 'regulative ideal' of necessity, the naturalistic fallacy, is one 
facet of the broader problematic of stratification, the processes by which 
engagements between bodies are blocked or hypostatised - in other 
words, the machineries of domination. For Deleuze-Guattari, this is God, 
as master of the disjunctive syllogism, the overarching principle of 
judgement and order, whose principal domain is grammar. 15 Our many- 
monikered method, then, is that of opening up a set of ways of talking 
about and understanding language which are both more abstract and 
more concrete than representational approaches. More abstract, in that 
they expose patterns and relations in the interzone between words and 
things that remain invisible to representational accounts. More concrete, 
because this invariably involves a turn away from empty or pernicious 
generalities (the types of 'abstraction' based on invented constants and 
standards), and towards the singularities of particular, real situations. 
Is it to overstate the case that the limits of what can be expressed in 
language mark the limits of what it is possible to experience? It has 
already been indicated, and cannot be emphasised enough, that 
language, while of course central to human experience as we know it, is 
nevertheless only one faculty or mode of engagement with the world, and 
one whose control over all the others (on the accounts provided not only 
by much language- and ling u istics-based philosophy and semiotics, but 
control. Stories which would give 'discourse' or 'text' an originary position are in profound 
opposition to the present approach. 
15 'Grammar' here is not simply the stuff of textbooks, but rather, the homeostatic social 
machinery of normalisation, as elliptically staked out by Wittgenstein (see chapter 3) - 
which must be understood in tandem with Iraining'. The couple 'grammar-training', which 
corresponds to 'discourse-discipline' or 'collective assemblage-machinic assemblage', 
forms the single machine that produces 'this complicated form of life'. All this will be 
fleshed out in future chapters. 
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also to a large extent by representational common sense, as we will see 
in Chapter 1) is the stranglehold this investigation aims to break. 
Therefore the answer is undoubtedly 'yes': nonrepresentational modes of 
engagement are in progress everywhere and at all times, both within and 
outside language use. However, the overcoding of these engagements by 
representation - while not to be seen as 'evil' in some facile sense - are 
what need to be criti qued, both on philosophical and on everyday, 
practical levels. 
Before tackling the intricacies of the order-word itself, our first task must 
be to lay out what is meant by representation, and why it can no longer 
suffice as our guide to understanding thought and language. This task 
takes us through Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattad's account of the philosophical 
problem as a subset of the creativity of matter through the interplay of the 
actual and the virtual. I contrast this with the restrictions imposed by what 
Deleuze calls the Image of Thought, the presuppositions of representation 
that have tended to govem philosophy, and which make it impossible to 
reach an understanding of the human and its outside. Finally, we bring 
these threads together in a discussion of the three syntheses, material 
operations that take both representational and nonrepresentational forms, 
to show how the former, rather than being primary (as the Image of 
Thought would have us believe), are actually dependent upon the latter. 
The result, it is hoped, will be a grounding for the rest of the thesis, with 
regard to the nature of the real, the possibility of philosophy and the role in 
both of language. 
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1. An Image -Held -Us -Captive 
1.1 The Role of Philosophy 
This chapter lays the groundwork for the investigations that follow, taking 
a number of our key preoccupations in turn. The first, and most important 
(while at the same time being the most general) is the overriding concern 
with the struggle between creation and change on the one hand, and 
stability, control and order on the other. This seemingly simplistic 
opposition will turn out to be central to the role of philosophy, and to our 
71 co 
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particular concerns with language, consciousness, and socia ntrol 
The two key figures for this chapter are Bergson and, later, Kant, who 
(along with Spinoza and Nietzsche) are perhaps the most important 
canonical reference-points for Deleuze. It is in his work BergsoniSM17 that 
Deleuze first mentions the notion of the order-word (although in a less 
sophisticated form than it will later appear in his work with Guattari, as we 
will see in later chapters), and he mentions it in a context that could hardly 
be less central to the present work - that of the formation of 
philosophical problems. " 
In order to explain why the opposition mentioned should play a role in 
questions of the nature of philosophy, it is necessary to examine 
Bergson's accounts of what metaphysics is, and what it should be. 
Bergson, often dismissed as a mystic because of the misunderstood 
16 or in AnfiOedipus' phrase, the system of 'social repression-psychic repression' (AO 
113). 
17 Gilles Deleuze, Bergsonism (hereafter B), tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara 
Habbedam, New York: Zone Books, 1991. 
18 A society's order-words '"set up" ready-made problems, as if they were drawn out of 
Othe city's administrative filing cabinete, and force us to 'solve' them, leaving us only a 
thin margin of freedom', whereas 'true freedom lies in a power to decide, to constitute 
problems themselves' (13 15). In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze reiterates: 'As if we 
would not remain slaves so long as we do not control the problems themselves, so long 
as we do not possess a right to the problems, to a participation in and management of 
the problems'(DR 158). 
17 
notion of the 8ian Vital, sought change through philosophy in several 
ways, not simply because he saw change (as opposed to unity, 
permanence and totality) as the underlying fact of existence, and hence 
as a necessity for any approach interested in what is actually there. 19 If 
there is an element of mysticism in his work, it is in the notion that through 
a heightened attention to the Real (via the rigorous method he names 
'intuition'), we can reach absolutes of existence, absolutes with 
implications for how we live our lives. Philosophy is not a 'simple game' - 
'it can be a preparation for the art of living 20 . An ethics/aesthetics of living 
in this sense must be strenuously distinguished from morality or moralism 
- the two are opposites, the latter a commitment to transcendent rules of 
behaviour (the archetype of which is the abstract form of morality itself in 
Kant's categorical imperative), the former a shedding of rules, of received 
ideas, and an immersion in, and submission to, the immanence of the 
Real. As we will see, this commitment to the real is the attempt to 
examine, not merely the conditions of possible experience, but the 
conditions of real experience, where the conditions are found to be 
entirely immanent to the conditioned (as opposed to forming some 'other 
world' of transcendent cause(s) of the visible world). 
In order to make clear the connection with Deleuze-Guattari in this regard 
(for it is their accounts of such an ethics with which we are concerned 
throughout much of the following - in terms that will be clarified below, 
the pragmatics of the order-word is at once an ethics of the password), 
the idea of an 'art of living' appears in Foucault's Preface to their 
19 t1an Vital is introduced in Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (hereafter CEv), tr. 
Arthur Mitchell, New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1911. In Deleuze's terms (which we Vill 
examine presently), it'is always a case of a virtuality in the process of being actualized, 
a simplicity in the process of differentiating, a totality in the process of dividing up: 
Proceeding Oby dissociation and division', by *dichotomr, is the essence of life' (B 94, 
quoting CEv 99-101). 
20 Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind., An Introduction to Metaphysics (hereafter CM), tr. 
Mabelle L. Andison, New York: Citadel Press, 1946: 106. 
18 
Anti0edipus. Foucault proposes reading the book not simply as ethics, 
but as 'an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life', where fascism is 
not only historical fascism, the fascism of Hitter and Mussolini - which was 
able to mobilize and use the desire of the masses so effectively - but also 
the fascism in us all, in our heads and in our everyday behaviour, the 
fascism that causes us to love power, to desire the very thing that 
dominates and exploits us (AO xiii). 
Of course, Foucault's rhetorical use of the term 'fascism' in this context 
borders on the fatuous, which, were it to be combined with our initial 
opposition between creation and order, would imply that order and control 
are intrinsically fascistic, intrinsically about domination and exploitation. 
The line taken here, however, is that the world we inhabit is precisely this 
interplay between order and control, the processes Deleuze-Guattari call 
stratification, and those of escape and change. We begin already 
necessarily embedded within the strata, and rather than it being a 
question of gesticulating rebelliously at the 'fascists', it is instead one of 
mapping or diagramming stratification, the immanent processes by which 
our world is formed and arranged, and attempting to discover whether 
there is any possibility of things being otherwise. To this end, we will now 
examine the way Deleuze refigures the notion of the possible. 
1.2 Possible/Real versus Actual/Virtual 
Another problem to signpost at the outset is that of the risks in proposing 
a guiding light for philosophy in the Real - in what ways is this different 
from its previous illustrious guarantors, such as the Good and the True? 
This question opens the terrain of immanence and transcendence, and 
gives us an initial approach to the problem of representation. What 
Deleuze-Guattari call 'the magic formula', 'PLURALISM=MONISM' (TP 20 
- inscribed elsewhere as 'Nietzsche=Spinoza', e. g. N 135) is central to 
this question. The notion of immanence is the notion of 'a' real in which 
we are always already immersed. It is opposed to the notion that there is 
another, better world somewhere else, whether this world is Heaven, the 
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realm of Platonic forms, or the True or the Good that we must always do 
our best to approximate - such notions are illusions of reason, yet this is 
not to say that there is therefore a world of illusions that exists in parallel 
to this world. As Bergson suggests in The Creative Mind, the problem is 
mistaking more for less: in setting up an opposition between the 
immediately given world of our perceptions, intuitions and intellections, 
and something else we, imagine might be lying behind _or above 
it. Having 
been convinced by this dream of a beyond as distinct from the immediate, 
we then find ourselves having to explain the immediate. The question 
Bergson wants us to ask is: Why should this idea of a beyond be so 
compelling, that it leaves us forever oscillating between the two poles of 
immediate and beyond, subjective and objective, phenomena and 
noumena, mind and matter? 
The reason is to be found in the very nature of life, which, in Deleuze's 
words, 'is essentially determined in the act of avoiding obstacles, stating 
and solving a problem. The construction of the organism is both the 
stating of a problem and a solution' (B 16). To see life in terms of 
problems, and to consider them as something 'stated' and 'solved', is not 
to be read as exporting a linguistic or philosophical model back to the 
origins of the organism. By 'stated' is meant 'actualised, or called into 
existence, not 'uttered' though as I will try to show in the chapters to 
follow, utterances or statements are themselves instances of actualisation 
in exactly this sense. Problems are sets of relations or engagements in a 
state of turmoil or conflict; solutions are the crossing of thresholds which 
retroactively affect the whole. The philosophical problem, is, on one level, 
not essentially different from the problem of the creation of oxygen 
through photosynthesis in the primeval soup, or of relieving subterranean 
pressure build-up through a volcanic eruption - they are each moments 
in the play between the actual and the virtual, terms we will explain 
momentarily. 21 
21 The question of the boundaries of life (necessarily carbon-based? necessarily 
cellular? ) is not one that can be dealt with directly in this thesis, as our investigation of 
20 
'Reality, ' writes Bergson, 'is global and undivided growth, progressive 
invention, duration: it resembles a gradually expanding rubber balloon 
assuming at each moment unexpected forms' (CM 96). We may quibble 
that there is no incontrovertible ground for assuming that this invention is 
sprogressive' in a strong sense (i. e. getting nearer to some perceived ideal 
or goal), but the weak sense of progression (where what is meant is 
insofar as we can pick out abstract states, we can see that consecutive 
states are intimately and intrinsically connected with one another) is an 
entirely plausible, and perhaps necessary, claim. Indeed, the error of the 
intellect that Bergson diagnoses in the traditional problems of 
metaphysics, is to assume there is some backdrop, a void or empty 
space, against or within which the balloon of reality inflates. Having 
posited Nothingness, we are then trapped in the unanswerable question 
of why anything should eAst at all. But this Nothingness, insofar as it 
drives us off on the endless search for causes and causes of causes, is 
an illusion. Bergson writes, 
*Nothing" is a term in ordinary language which can only have meaning in 
the sphere, proper to man, of action and fabrication. *Nothing" designates 
the absence of what we are seeking, we desire, expect. Let us suppose 
that absolute emptiness was known to our experience: it would be limited, 
have contours, and would therefore be something. But in reality there is no 
vacuum. We perceive and can only perceive occupied space. One thing 
disappears only because another replaces it. Suppression thus means 
substitution. We say Osuppressiono, however, when we envisage, in the 
case of substitution, only one of its two halves, or rather the one of its two 
halves that interests us; in this way we indicate a desire to turn our 
attention to the object which is gone, and away from the one replacing it. 
(CM 97) 
order-words neither depends upon nor directly concerns it. May it suffice to say that 
while Bergson no doubt would have reservations about this, for Deleuze-Guattari and 
myself, 'life' goes aff the way down, while differing vastly in terms of complexity and 
duration (or 'relative speeds and slownesses', amording to Defeuze-Guaftari's 
Spinozism). 
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This tendency, to hang onto what was or what will be in the face of what 
is, is entirely appropriate for most of our daily dealings, propelling us to 
struggle to maintain or create what we want. However, when applied to 
metaphysics, the tendency to conceal from ourselves the nature of this 
operation (whereby we concentrate on the no-longer-there or the still-to- 
come rather than what is) means we imagine that the very notion of 
nothing somehow makes existence itself in need of explanation. Bergson 
shows firstly that this 'nothing' is the intellect's attempt to suppress 
everything; secondly that all suppression is necessarily a substitution; and 
therefore that Nothing (as a substitution which is somehow not a 
substitution) is logically self contradictory, and psychologically a matter of 
self-deception. 
In other words, this so-called representation of absolute emptiness is, in 
reality, that of universal fullness in a mind which leaps indefinitely from part 
to part, with the fixed resolution never to consider anything but the 
emptiness of its dissatisfaction instead of the fullness of things (CM 98). 
The Nothing is simply the All with the addition of this act of will or 
operation of thought (it is more rather than less than the All). 
This mistake appears again in the notion of the possible, which Deleuze- 
Guattari wish to supersede with the opposition of actual and virtual. This 
pair is to be understood in contrast to possible/real, where the former pair 
exhaustively comprise the Real, while the latter pair posits an outside to 
the real - but one which is nevertheless modelled on it - an abstraction 
by the mind that is some aspect of the Real plus the mental operation of 
displacing it in time, back to before it appeared, or forward to where it is 
yet to appear. Again, we mistake this 'more' for the 'less' of the 
supposedly non-existent or not-yet-existent, and imagine we then have a 
problem of 'why this rather than that possibility? ' In contrast, the actual 
and virtual are both entirely real. Insofar as certain relations or 
engagements can be said to be virtual, they are not to be taken to be 
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eAsting on a plane other than that of reality. There is but the real, and 
every (conceivable and inconceivable) element or relation subsists within 
it. The notion of possibilities, of possible worlds or events, is refigured as 
unactualised worlds or events which are distinguishable at all only insofar 
as they have real effects in this world (whether in the domains of fiction, 
dreams and speculation, or in those of ontogenesis, thermodynamics or 
quantum mechanics). 
What does it mean, then, to say that certain organic mutations, certain 
social formations, certain chemical bonds are possible or impossible? If 
we recognise them as possible (using the resources of the appropriate 
discipline) it means that we recognise their possibilities (whether ever 
actualised or not) as aspects of the relevant processes - virtual (i. e. 
unactualised) relations or processes the reality of which can be 
demonstrated by experiment, or testified to by history. If we argue for their 
impossibility, it is most likely we are talking about processes so extremely 
unlikely or difficult to countenance that it would obviously be a waste of 
time expecting them to happen, and in this respect we may turn out to be 
mistaken, or we may be protecting our interests by preventing them. In 
any case, even to get as far as declaring something impossible is already 
to have posited a relation on the level of the operations of thought, and 
hence to have actualised it on that level (if on no other) - and the relation 
can therefore be seen as virtual insofar as its reality (as impossibility) 
serves in guiding research programmes, allocating funding and so on. 22 
22 There remains the problem of the deeply ingrained everyday uses of 'possible' and 
'impossible' - words it is often difficult to avoid, and still more difficult to adequately 
translate into the language of actual and virtual. This is a problem that will recur below, 
and which we will deal with on a case-by-case basis, in the process effecting a shift 
towards a complex Deleuzian ontology. 
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1.3 True and False Problems 
What was said above about the 'stating and solving of problems' being a 
pertinent description of what matter does, of what the Real consists in, 
can now be clarified. All problems are not alike; indeed the discussions 
above of the possible, or of Nothing, testify to the existence of false 
problems. The falsehood of such problems bears not simply on their being 
blind alleys down which metaphysics has been led, due to its confusion of 
the practical and the intuitive (a confusion we will explore more deeply 
shortly). Another key example of a false problem is that of Oedipus, 
which, far from being a cul-de-sac we can simply reverse out of, is an all- 
pervasive and powerful myth the strength of which can be seen in every 
appeal to the importance of the Family and of Normal sexuality and 
behaviour. Deleuze-Guattari show that the oscillation between Oedipus- 
as-structure and Oedipus-as-crisis is not simply one of Freud's many 
errors or flights of fancy, any more than the importance of Christ can be 
reduced to the texts of the Gospels. Just as Christian Messianism had 
precursors in a variety of religions, the Oedipus of Freud (in its various 
forms) and of his successors served to articulate (in far from 
homogeneous fashion) a set of demands on the human individual to 
become-subject in certain limited, predefined ways, and served also to 
unite the bourgeois values of the Family and the discourses on madness 
and sanity. 23 
The way in which Oedipus can be seen as a false problem is instructive, 
because it shows how discerning true problems (for example, an0edipal 
notions of subjectification) is a radical project which can disrupt 
overarching structures, or at least shore up the means by which they 
23 Deleuze-Guattan approvingly cite Foucault's account of this development in Madness 
and Civilisation: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason, tr. Richard Howard, London: 
Routledge 1995 (AO 93). 
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protect and maintain themselves. It also allows us to trace a path through 
the first half of Anti0edipus, showing how it relates on the one hand to the 
picture of matter, the actual and the virtual (with respect to the question of 
the subject), and on the other to the opposition between creation/change 
and stability/control. Finally, it lays out a space in which to examine the 
issue of language more directly, and begins to show why approaches to 
language based on representation, information and signification, derive 
from false problems and present the dangers and restrictions for thought 
that this entails. 
1.4 The Image of Thought (Fig. 1, overleaf) 
False problems, and false problematics, need to be seen in two ways, the 
first being as 'pictures that hold us captive o24 - actual structures that 
restrict and delimit thought, presuppositions of common sense that must 
be challenged. Secondly, they are epiphenomena of real problems/ 
problematics: the task is to 'break open' the false problems and reveal the 
real problematics, which generate them. The most important sets of false 
problems for our purposes are those to do with the construal of language 
and thought in terms of representation. For both perspectives, the central 
texts of Deleuze are those on what he calls the Image of Thought, the 
intertwined ideas grounded in the Same and the Similar that infest 
common sense and good sense, and to which he opposes the notion of 
'thought without image' (DR 167). 
The key passage in this respect is Chapter 3 of Difference and Repetition, 
and it specifies as the location of the problem that which, supposedly, 
'everybody knows' (DR 129-130) - for example, Descartes' 
24 to paraphrase Wiftgenstein, referring in the Philosophical Investigations to his earlier 
position in the Tractatus. (We examine aspects of the later work in Chapter 3. ) Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness, 
London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974. Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell 1953 
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a naturally upright thought 
GOOD SENSE 
and the good sense that follows 
from this 'in principle'. 
'the norm of identity from the point 
of view of the pure Self and the form 
'the norm of distribution from the 
point of view of the empirical selves 
of the unspecified object which 
corresponds to it' (DR 133) 
and the object qualified as this or that 
kind of thing (which is why it is 
considered to be universally 
distributed)' (DR 133-4) 
'contributes the form of the Same' 
(DR 134) 
'determines the contribution of the 
faculties' (DR 134) 
The Form of RECOGNITION 
'harmony of the faculties grounded in the supposedly universal thinking 
subject and exercised upon the unspecified object' (DR 134) 
'What is recognised is not only an object but also the values attached to an 
object (values play a crucial role in the distributions undertaken by good 
sense). ' (DR 135) 
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presuppositions about what it is to think and to be, which allow him to 
present'l think therefore I am' as a basic proposition in need of no further 
explanation. As Deleuze argues, while apparently foregoing objective 
presuppositions (such as there is a world, there are bodies, etc), the 
philosopher merely substitutes them with subjective presuppositions 
(there is thought, there is existence). And 'Everybody knows, no one can 
deny, ' Deleuze writes, 'is the form of representation and the discourse of 
the representative' (DR 130), or more simply, it is the archetypal 
speaking-for, speaking-on-behalf-of, not one or several other individuals 
or groups, but for all humankind. This starting point for philosophy is 
precarious, however, because all that is needed to disrupt it is a lone 
voice 'with the necessary modesty not managing to know what everybody 
knows, and modestly denying what everyone is supposed to recognise' 
(DR 130). 
At first glance, this runs the risk of looking like a denial of the possibility of 
any such statements (there is thought, there is existence), which it is not. 
Deleuze is not denying what we could initially describe as the possibility of 
such objective statements; indeed, Deleuze-Guattad talk enthusiastically 
in Anti0edipus of the capacity of 'revolutionaries, artists and seers' to be 
content to be 'objective, merely objective' (AO 27). What the Image of 
Thought material is attacking is not philosophy's pretensions to objectivity 
over and above a subjectivity we are supposedly imprisoned in; rather, 
this very dichotomy is the problem, as is the idea that we must forever 
oscillate between these two poles. The problem with the 'objectivity' of the 
Image of Thought is not that it purports to be objective, but that it shapes 
and controls the type of objectivity available or desirable to us. It takes for 
granted that objectivity is necessarily a function of 'what everyone knows'. 
In contrast to this, the objectivity of revolutionaries, seers, visionaries and 
true philosophers, is a much rarer commodity, characterised not by 
whether everyone agrees with it, but by its consistency with a particular 
milieu, with the number of affective connections it begets/springs from 
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within and between milieUS. 25 The importance of the lone voice raised in 
opposition is that it can create/give voice to these connections, such as 
are closed down by the harnessing of thought to the Same and the 
Similar. 
What is the first thing at which such a voice would express bewilderment? 
It is the founding principle of common sense, the assumption of Cogitatio 
natura universalis, that the thinker is naturally upright and of pure 
intention, and that thought is a faculty with a natural affinity with the true 
(DR 131). This need not be explicitly stated; it is unquestioningly 
assumed, with the result that 
it matters little whether philosophy begins with the object or the subject, 
with Being or with beings, as long as thought remains subject to this Image 
which already prejudges everything: the distribution of the object and the 
subject as well as that of Being and beings (DR 131). 
Before philosophy has even gotten started, then, and regardless of 
whether it goes on to question whether truth is attainable or not, it has 
already perpetuated judgement (with respect to the True) and morality 
(with respect to the Good) as transcendent, guiding principles. And this is 
likely to be the case wherever common sense is not explicitly challenged 
and its presuppositions explicitly critiqued. 
In an echo of many other stages in Deleuze/Deleuze-Guaftad's thought, 
the point is not to set up an opposition between the pre-philosophical and 
the philosophical (as with pre-Oedipal and Oedipal, with pre-signifying and 
signifying, and so on), but rather to find an outside to the opposition from 
which both terms are shown to be poles of a false problem which can then 
be denounced as non-philosophical (DR 132) or illegitimate (AO 110). The 
bipolar structure common to false problems is what Deleuze-Guaftari call 
25 Both 'begets' and 'springs from', so as not to overemphasise the role of individual 
subjects (revolutionaries, seers, visionaries, etc. ) 
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double articulation, the 'double pincer movement from which it is 
necessary to find a diagonal that escapes both pregiven outcomes. 26 
How then to critique this in-principle element of common sense? It will 
not do merely to cite empirical examples of imbeciles or reprobates; it 
must be tackled on the transcendental level of the principle itself. It is 
necessary to spell out the model or map this principle carries with it, and 
this model is that of recognition, which Deleuze defines as 'the 
harmonious exercise of all the faculties [concordia facultatum] upon a 
supposed same object: the same object may be seen, touched, 
remembered, imagined, or conceived', giving the famous example of 
Descartes'wax (DR 133). 27 Thus, the unity of the subject (the harmony 
of the faculties) guarantees the identity of the object (common sense). 
This is the Image of Thought because it is thought contenting itself with 
its most banal instance (recognition), representing itself to itself as that 
which recognises. Its critique, therefore, must take the form of a 
demonstration that, despite the fact that 'thought and all its faculties may 
be fully employed therein', recognition 'has nothing to do with thinking' 
(DR 138). 'The form of recognition has never sanctioned anything but the 
recognisable and the recognised' (DR 134). 
1.5 Deleuze's Critique of Representation (Fig. 2, overleaO 
What form does this demonstration take? There are two principal sides 
to Deleuze's attack - on the one hand, his reformulation of the doctrine 
26 The term 'double pincer first appears in Anti0edipus (83), and is taken to great 
lengths in'10,000 B. C.: The Geologyof Morals'(TP 39-74), where it is declared that God 
(the God of the illegitimate syntheses of representation) 'is a lobster (TP 40). 
27 Horst Ruthrof, as we will see in Chapter 5 below, characterises this as 'intersemiotic 
corroboration', and it lies at the heart of his ill-fated attempt to restore the body to the 
theory of meaning. As I will argue, the theory of meaning has much more fundamental 
problems than the absence of the body, namely that it is intrinsically representational 
(based on recognition, the similar and t he Same), and it remains so despite Ruthrof's 
intervention. 
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Fiq. 2: The Form of Representation 
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'The 'I think! is the most general principle of representation' (DR 138) 
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'difference becomes an object of representation always in relation to 
a conceived an imagined ajudgedanalogy, oraperceived 
identity, opposition, sirnifitude. ' 
(DR 138) 
'Having discovered the superior or transcendent exercise of the faculties, Plato 
subordinated this to the forms of 
identity in the similitude in analogy in the [and] opposition in 
essence reminiscence Good the sensible' 
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of the faculties, and on the other, his account of what it is to think. From 
these two perspectives, we can home in on the crucial notion of intensity. 
First of all, his reformulation of the notion of faculties serves to make 
them function separately, each travelling to its limit, to the point where it 
is dissolved, rather than (as in the Kantian picture) having each resonate 
with the others under the principal faculty of thought in the unity of the 
Cogito. What are the faculties? For Kant, they consist in the trinity of 
imagination, reason and understanding. Kant offers three different ways 
in which these faculties resonate (corresponding to the three Critiques). 
In the first two cases, one faculty provides the form or model of the 
Same, with which the other two collaborate: understanding in the case of 
knowledge, reason in the case of moral sense. In the third case of 
aesthetics, the faculties attain a free accord, but without ever breaking 
with the rule of the appropriate variety of common sense. For Deleuze, 
Kant's account of the faculties is riven with problems because it traces 
them on empirical notions of thought. Instead, the list of faculties must be 
open-ended, and the behaviour of each must be the subject of detailed 
investigation, 'For nothing can be said in advance' (DR 143) - besides 
those such as thought, sensibility, imagination, there are those such as 
language 28 , vitality, sociability, and who knows how many more. 
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28 There are two aspects to the faculty of language: the 'diabolical faculty of the order- 
word', presented in A Thousand Plateaus and explored throughout this thesis, and that 
cited in Difference and Repetition: corresponding to the sensible which is also 
imperceptible, the memory which is also immemorial, and the imaginable that is also 
impossible to imagine, is the speech which would be 'silence at the same time' (DR 143). 
29 Another is the visionary faculty of tabulation, posited by Bergson in Two Sources of 
Morality and Religion, and cited by Deleuze-Guattari in What is Philosophy? (230nS). 
Henri Bergson, Two Sources of Morality and Religion, tr. R. Ashley Audra and 
Cloudesley Brereton with the assistance of W. Horsfall Carter, New York: Henry Holt & 
Co., 1935. Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari, What Is Philosophy? (hereafter WP), tr. 
Graham Burchell and Hugh Tomlinson, London: Verso 1994. 
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The point of the doctrine of the faculties, then, is as a focal point for 
transcendental empiricism, Deleuze's attempt on the one hand to pick up 
where Kant left off in the exploration, 'not of another world, but of the 
upper or lower reaches of this one' (DR 135) in other words, of the 
'prodigious domain of the transcendental' (ibid) and on the other hand, 
to do so through empiricism, considered not as 'a simple appeal to lived 
experience' but as 'the most insane creation of concepts ever seen or 
heard', where the concept is the 'object of an encounter, as a here-and- 
now, or rather as an Erewhon from which emerge inexhaustibly ever new, 
differently distributed 'heres' and 'nows" (DR xx; see also 285,333n7). So 
far, so inspiring and poetic, but can the notion of transcendental 
empiricism be expressed in more down-to-earth language? Indeed it can, 
and with particular regard to the faculties. The transcendental field for 
Kant was a zone accessible by critique, where could be found the 
conditions of possibility of experience; the fundamental structures 
necessary for existence of selves. However, he was content to trace 
these structures from the 'empirical acts of a psychological 
consciousness' (DR 135) (namely, his own), with the result that his own 
epistemological, moral and religious preoccupations are raised up to the 
level of the conditions of possibility of thought itself. 
In contrast, for Deleuze, the faculties are engagements with intensity. This 
difficult notion lies at the heart of Deleuze's philosophy - it is the 
repetition of difference and difference-from-itself of repetition; the 'internal 
genesis' of matter that constitutes the orders of 'extrinsic differences and 
intrinsic conceptual differences', where 'conceptual' pertains not to the 
level of concepts as Deleuze-Guattari will later formulate them (as 
multiplicities -see, for example, What is Philosophy? (127), where 
concepts and functions are distinguished as different types of multiplicity), 
but instead to the notion of representational concepts of the 
understanding. Intensity is 'pure difference in itself (DR 144, my 
emphasis) and it can only be intensity that can take the faculties to their 
limits, for anything other than pure difference in itself is somehow 
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mediated by the forms of the Same and the similar, and therefore pertains 
to an already established Image of Thought, or Doxa (modelling the 
nature of thought on the moral and political concerns of the age, rather 
than on the primal, prehuman encounters from which it begins). In 
contrast, then, to the in-principle organisations of common sense/good 
sense, Deleuze posits an in-principle difference that 'is both formal and in 
kind', between the new, the 'unrecognised and unrecognisable terra 
incognita' (DR 136), and all that is amenable to recognition. On this point, 
Deleuze cites Nietzsche as having shown that the new is never 
established: 'The new, with its power of beginning and beginning again, 
remains forever new, just as the established was always established from 
29 the outset... ' (DR 136). 
As long as we are content to understand the faculties as pertaining to 
already-established empirical relations between subjects and objects, 
subjects and subjects, subjects and ideas and so on, we continue to trace 
the transcendental on the empirical, making it not a 'prodigious domain', 
but a 'sterile double'. If we are to think difference in itself, or indeed the 
very possibility of creation; if we are to prevent thought being strangled by 
Doxa before it begins; if, indeed, we are to find a way through the 
compelling mysteries of existence (and distinguish true from false 
problems), we must pursue this notion of the new. It is for these reasons 
that the faculties must be thought at their very limits, their 'superior or 
transcendent exercise' (DR 143) rather than in their banal everyday 
exercise. In this way, the terms of the doctrine of the faculties, as the 
attempt to understand the manifold ways in which bodies can engage with 
one another, is transformed from those of psychological, anthropological 
accounts of what humans actually do, to the immanent criteria of real 
(rather than 'possible') experience. The superior exercise of the faculties 
29 Earlier in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze remarks that 'Repetition is never a 
historical fact, but rather the historical condition under which something new is 
effectively produced' (90). Repetition in this sense is the 'dark precursor' to which we 
will shortly return. 
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(the typology of which may be radically transformed in the process) is their 
unhinging through an encounter with the new, where the very hinge is 
common sense itself, as that which 'causes all the faculties to function 
and converge' (DR 141 ). 30 
To approach from the other side - that of what it means to think - is to 
flesh out the notion that recognition has 'nothing to do with thinking'. 
Instead, thinking is necessarily this involuntary encounter with the new, 
with the differential element or 'dark precursoe (DR 119). 31 It is through 
this notion that Deleuze frees thought from the human, since thought is 
redefined as the communication between series in a system, any system 
(where both 'system' and 'communication' are defined in terms of 
difference): 
A system must be constituted on the basis of two or more series, each 
series being defined by the differences between the terms which compose 
it. If we suppose that the series communicate under the impulse of a force 
of some kind, then it is apparent that this communication relates 
30 The apparent strangeness of suggesting that a faculty's superior exercise is in its 
'unhinging' from that which causes it to function is not accidental, and parallels 
AntiOedipus's assertion that 'Desiring-machines only work when they break down, and 
by continually breaking down' (AO 8). The point is that faculties (and desiring- 
machines) are constituted in their operation (in the connections they form) - there is no 
distinction between their form and function. It is only from the point of view of common 
sense that sees faculties or machines as constituted for a particular purpose, 
introducing a distinction between what they are and what they can do (they are x and 
their purpose is y). By collapsing this distinction, Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari strip 
faculties/machines of their teleological interpretation, and demand that both be 
understood through what they do, what they produce, rather than in terms of a 
predetermined order (such as that of human faculties or technological machines 
(gadgets)). 
31 As Badiou remarks, 'Let this be a warning to those who would see in Deleuze an 
apologia for spontaneity: whatever is spontaneous is inferior to thought, which only 
begins when it is constrained to become animated by the forces of the outside. ' Alain 
Badiou, Defeuze: The Clamor of Being, tr. Louise Burchill, Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2000: 86. 
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differences to other differences, constituting differences between 
differences within the system. These second-degree differences play the 
role of the 'differenciatorj - in other words, they relate the first-degree 
differences to one another (DR 117) 
The three stages, or syntheses, of this process, Deleuze here describes 
as 
adequately expressed by certain physical concepts: coupling between 
heterogeneous systems, from which is derived an internal resonance within 
the system, and from which in turn is derived a thrced movement the 
amplitude of which exceeds that of the basic series themselves (ibid). 
These three syntheses are covered in detail (but from quite different 
perspectives) in both Difference and Repetition and Anti0edipus, as we 
will see below. The central point here, however, is that it is through the 
notion of the 'dark precursor' ('difference in itself or difference in the 
second degree' (DR 120), the 'paradoAcal element or perpetuum mobile' 
(LS 66)) that Deleuze shows identity and resemblance (raised up to the 
highest position in the Image of Thought) are 'inevitable illusions - in 
other words, concepts of reflection which would account for our inveterate 
habit of thinking difference on the basis of representation' (DR 119) - 
themselves the effects of difference in itself. The key formula is 'only 
differences are alike' (DR 116), which, though it sounds similar, is the 
opposite of 'only that which is alike differs'. The latter makes difference 
subordinate to resemblance, the former makes resemblance an effect of 
difference. 
1.6 The Empty Form of Time 
How many of us have reached, as Deleuze-Guaftad appear to say of 
themselves in A Thousand Plateaus, 'not the point where one no longer 
says 1, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one 
says I' (TP 3)? Whether important to us or not, most of us indeed still say 




32 In their beautifully concise account in What is PhilosoPhY 
(29-32), Deleuze-Guattari claim that Plato founded everything on the 
realm of forms or Ideas (i. e. the only things which are what they are, as 
opposed to the things of our world which compete to particiipate in 
particular forms to a greater or lesser extent). Then Descartes' scepticism 
introduces the concept of the Cogito, removing Plato's pre-existent 
harmonious unity of the forms, and substituting it with the self-founding 
subject of 'I think therefore I am'. But Kant- reintroduces time into the 
Cogito, on the basis of the distinction between two sides of the I (the 'I 
think' and the 'I am, ). 33 'Kant therefore "criticiseso Descartes for having 
said 'I am a thinking substance, " for nothing warrants such a claim of the 
'T" (WP 31). The undetennined existence of the 'I am' as 'a passive and 
phenomenal self, an always affectable, modifiable and variable self (ibid), 
is deten77ined by the active self as the Other 
The cogito now presents four components: I think, and as such I am active; 
I have an existence; this existence is only determinable in time as a 
passive self; I am therefore determined as a passive self that necessarily 
represents its own thinking activity to itself as an Other that affects it. This 
is not another subject but rather the subject who becomes another (WP 31 - 
32). 34 
This progression is given a slightly different emphasis - turning, this 
time, on the role of time - by Deleuze in 'On Four Poetic Formulas That 
35 Might Summarize the Kantian Philosophy' . Kant's ucriticism' of 
32 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (hereafter CPR), tr. Norman Kemp Smith, 
London. MacMillan, 1964. 
33 Reintroduces, because a certain view of time, that of a kind of 'intensive movement of 
the soul' (CC 29), was present in ancient notions of the self, and was all but eliminated 
from Plato to Descartes. 
34 In a moment, we will examine Rimbaud's formula'I is another'. 
35 Gilles Deleuze, Essays Critical and Clinical (hereafter CC), tr. Daniel W Smith and 
Michael A Greco, London: Verso 1998. An earlier version appears in Gilles Deleuze, 
Kant's Critical Philosophy, tr. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habbeqam, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1984. 
36 
Descartes marks the former's transformation of the form-content relation 
of Plato, retained in Descartes, where there is an amorphous content (the 
Selo which is given form by the active principle of the 1. Rather than the I 
being the form instantaneously and unilaterally imposed on the self, 
seemingly making the statement 'I am a thinking substance' possible, 
Kant shows that a third term is required to explain the possibility of a 
relation between undetermined and determination. 36 This third term is the 
'medium' through which the cogito is constituted - namely time. This is 
not time understood in terms of movement or succession - to base time 
on these is to subordinate it to them. Instead, time as the form of inner 
sense is radically distinct from space: nothing but 
a thread, a pure straight line [ ... ] Everything that moves and changes is in 
time, but time itself does not change or move, any more than it is eternal. It 
is the form of everything that changes and moves, but it is an immutable 
form that does not change - not an eternal form, but precisely the form of 
what is not eternal, the immutable form of change and movement (CC 28- 
29). 
It is wrong, therefore, to see time as 'eternal' on this view, because 
eternity is only thinkable under the determination of time itself as empty 
form. Eternity as a notion ceases to make any sense there is only the 
finite, as determined by the immutable form of time. 37 
36 Deleuze makes the illegitimacy of Descartes' move clearer in his Kant seminar of 28 
March 1978 (published on the web at http: /twww. imaginet. fr/deleuze[W/ENG/ 
280378. htmi, translated by Melissa McMahon). Descartes' unjustifiable jump is from the 
determining I think' and the determined I am' to the statement that there is therefore a 
substance which thinks. Kant shifts the goalposts; from questions of substance 
(extended and unextended) to the question of form, in the process making it a relation 
of insurmountable division interior to thought (the significance of which we will see 
shortly), 
37 It should be noted at this point that this is time according to Deleuze's Kant For 
Deleuze himself, time is not this 'pure straight line' - its pure form is that of the Eternal 
Return (the difference-in-itself of repetition-for-itself). Following Nietzsche, Deleuze 
seeks to overcome both the oppositions temporal/non4emporal and historical/etemal, to 
deal only with the untimely (DR xxi). 'Eternal return' then, must be seen as productively 
37 
What distinguishes the subject, then, is the fact that it represents to itself 
this determination. For Kant, Descartes' formula tells the story of the birth 
of self-refleAvity - the 'me' is reflected at itself through thought, 
recognises itself as the thinking thing, and as the thing doing the 
recognising, and as the thing recognising the recognising (and so on to 
infinity), but at each twist, the mirror is time. Why, then, need this be the 
split running from end to end of the subject, that Deleuze-Guattari so need 
it to be? 
The key, as Deleuze argues, is in Rimbaud's formula 'I is another' (CC 29; 
cf. the seminar cited in fn38). 38 The critique of the Cartesian, self-founding 
cogito, if it is to make any difference, works by doing precisely that - 
making the difference between I and self, active and passive, determining 
and determined, a real and absolute difference. The self, as totally 
unsynthesised, unconditioned and passive, 'prior to its representation to 
itself by the 1, is constituted as self only in this act of representation, the 
affection of self by 1. Consciousness, or at least cognisance, can only 
occur 'in time' - i. e. consciousness of difference. If we attempt to think 
U11 purely spatially, as Descartes did, we have noway of explaining what 
on earth this thinking substance can be, except simply as a unity 
maintained through the benevolence of God. But by making time precisely 
the medium through which this affect of reflexivity occurs, we at once 
have an account of consciousness, the unity of the subject as that which 
continues or persists through time by representing its own thinking to 
itself. Kant, therefore, 'deduces' time as the condition of possibility of inner 
sense (self-affection or thought). 
oxymoronic: 'return' ostensibly entails a previous presence, its departure, then finally 
the return itself (which is of course defined by its difference from the initial presence). 
The fact that this Return is 'Eternal' undermines the notion of an original presence - if 
Whad-ahvays been Tet=ing, 4 bas never had time to be herein the first place I What 
we are left with is a paradoxical consistency without Sameness: the 'balance' proper to 
a refigured etemity. 
38 Arthur Rimbaud, Complete Works, tr. Paul Schmidt, New York. Harper & Row, 1975, 
letter to Georges lzambard, May 13,1871: 101. 
38 
It is this introduction of time as the form of inner sense into the subject 
that marks the emergence of the transcendental. The empty form of time 
for Kant is a necessary condition of all inner sense, that is, the capacity 
for the subject to be affected, to expenence and to represent itself 
experiencing to itself. The subject is already determined or conditioned, 
then, by a representational model of thought, for which this active thinking 
(as representing) is primary, and without which there can be no individual, 
no thought and no stability, only 'indifferent black nothingness' (DR 276). 
The empty form of time plays a key role in Deleuze's discussion of the 
three syntheses of time in Difference and Repetition, which we will 
examine in the next section. 
1.7 Repetition For Itself 
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze reformulates this fracture in the self 
to challenge the move by which Kant manages to 'resurrect' the self in 
spite of its split. His first move is to extend the notion of the passive self, 
to dissolve and disperse it across the whole of matter, and emphasise its 
primacy over the active self which inserts representation into the heart of 
being. This is Deleuze's formulation of the first synthesis of time, that of 
Habit. 
Underneath the self which acts are little selves which contemplate and 
which render possible both the action and the active subject. We speak of 
our uself only in virtue of these thousands of little witnesses which 
contemplate within us: it is always a third party who says 'me" (DR 75); 
At the heart of each contemplation is repetition, the repetition of 
difference, at each point, a certain 'questioning' of (if you like) being, 
which in turn sets up the problematic of the individUal. 39 
39 This 'questioning' of 'being' (which is precisely the 'stating and solving of problems' 
that we encountered in Section 1.2 above) makes most sense to me as nothing more 
cerebral than the continual feedback between these little, or larval selves, and their 
environment: insofar as there is a discemible individual, it is in continual interaction with 
39 
Deleuze's first point against Kant, then, is to argue that the passive 
component of the cogito is the multiplicity of larval selves, which 
themselves are nothing but the contractions-contemplations of matter - 
as opposed to being the purely unsynthesised and unconditioned mess 
that awaits the active synthesis of reason. For Deleuze, it is only on the 
basis of synthesis of contractions-contemplations that active synthesis 
can come about. This active synthesis, then, amounts to what Count 
Korzybski called 'time-binding 40 - the appearance of artificial signs 
through active synthesis, which allow representations of past and future in 
the present, as opposed to the natural signs of the passive synthesis, 
which refer 'only to the present in which they signify' . 
41 
- This synthesis, 
with its dual aspects of passive (questioning) and active (the problematic) 
can also be seen as chronogenesis, the immanent creation of time 
relative to these larval selves, and the immanent formation of the 
organism through the accretion of habit in this interaction between larval 
selves and environment. By showing how both time and the organism 
grow out of passive, molecular synthesis, Deleuze prevents the Subject 
becoming a cause or a goal of these material processes, but rather, 
makes it a side-effect or epiphenomenon. 
its milieu, continually reorienting itself and establishing or extending its fuzzy 
boundaries. This account in turn shows how misleading the notion of a single 'being' 
can be, if taken as referring to essential or intrinsic identity over and above the 
specificities or singularities of a particular milieu of individuation. 
40 Alfred Korzybski Science and Sanity: An Introduction to Non-Aristotelean Systems 
and General Semantics, Clinton, Mass.: Colonial Press, 1958. 
41 'One of the great strengths of Stoicism lies in having shown that every sign is a sign 
of the present, from the point of view of the passive synthesis in which past and future 
are only dimensions of the present itself. A scar is the sign not of a past wound but of 
'the present fact of having been wounded': we can say that it is the contemplation of the 
wound, that it contracts all the instants which separate us from it into a living presenr 
(DR 47). 
40- 
But, says Deieuze, there must be another time in which this first synthesis 
can occur. The first synthesis is indeed the foundation of time, or rather 
times, but this must be distinguished from its gr*ound. The ground of time 
is to be found in the second synthesis, that of memory, which (following 
Bergson) is of a completely different order to that of habit. Where the 
latter is material, contractions of past-present, the former is spiritual, the 
pure past that has never been present - it is the backdrop against which 
the vast array of contracted-past-presents of habit accumulate, coeAst, 
and communicate with one another, such that different lives can replay 
one another at different levels, 'as if the philosopher and the pig; the 
criminal and the saint, played out the same past at different levels of a 
gigantic cone' (DR'83). 42 
The key to these two characterisations of memory is the presence in the 
former of representation as hierarchical ordering of present over past, in 
contrast to the interplay between past and present -in the latter as 
comprising a 'block of becoming'. Once the ordering of present over past 
is dismantled, the pure past is refigured as an- active component of the 
present, which is nothing more than its moment of greatest contraction. 
The relation is not one of images recalled by the-self-reflexive subject, but 
rather one of contraction-dilation, speed and slowness. 
The first two syntheses of time, then, Deleuze names Habit and 
Mnemosyne, the latter relating to Plato's world of forms, since it must be 
accessed through the curious mechanism of 'reminiscence'; whereby the 
philosopher does not so much discover Truth as remember it. 43 Yet this 
synthesis, that of the pure past, is transformed by Deleuze via Bergson. 
42 The cone in question is of course Bergson's diagram of the passage of time, the 
contraction of the vast expanse of the past into the single point of the present (a 60; 
Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory, tr. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer, 
London: George Allen & Unwin Ud., 1911: 152). 
43 Deleuze draws parallels here with Freud, where in one sense the pure past is again a 
transcendent, mythical structure that governs what occurs in this world (DR 105). 
41 
Plato's forms, it could be argued, will always bear a striking resemblance 
to their inferior counterparts in this world - indeed, having established 
that everything from Justice to hair and dirt have their forms, we are left 
with the impression that the Platonic Idea is nothing but a mythical, 
sanitised abstraction from this world. This enormous error, the installation 
of a transcendent realm or supplementary dimension that is modelled on 
the empirical, is the key to the Deleuzian critique. Instead of Platonic 
reminiscence then, Deleuze posits the 'remembrance of lost time', again a 
passive (involuntary) synthesis, the recovery of a past that was never 
present, and once again, it is only on the basis of this passive synthesis of 
memory that the active synthesis of memory can occur. Again, it is the 
active synthesis which begets representation, in that (unlike involuntary 
memory) the active representation of the former present in the present 
necessarily involves the representation of the present in the present ('It is 
of the essence of representation not only to represent something but to 
represent its own representivity'). In contrast, Proustian memory testifies 
to the coexistence of the pure past and the present, of the entire past 
being in communication with the present as the virtual is to the actual. 
Bergson's cone (mentioned above in relation to the philosopher and the 
pig) takes what we could disingenuously refer to as a God's-eye view of 
the passage of time (as duration or real movement), with the present as 
the most contracted point on the cone. Involuntary memory occurring in 
this present is, then, the 'telescoping together' of present present and past 
present, with the proviso that this telescoping reduces it to neither present 
(an irreducibility that distinguishes memory and habit). 
In summary, then, Deleuze distinguishes (in terms that recall our 
discussion above of 'true and false problems') legitimate and illegitimate 
accounts of this synthesis. The illegitimate or representational account of 
the first synthesis (that of the past-present and present-present) is that of 
Kant, which makes the active synthesis primary and reduces the passive 
synthesis to undifferentiated sludge. To this Deleuze contrasts a 
foundational contraction-contemplation of the multiplicity of larval selves, 
42 
over which the transcendental self-consciousness of the active synthesis, 
the 1, is installed as ruler - although this rule is destructive (or 
conservative, depending on your viewpoint), in that it harnesses the 
dissolved self to the T of representation, an I which is, however, already 
fractured, already an Other. The second synthesis, of the memory or the 
pure past, has its illegitimate aspect in the platonic notion of reminiscence, 
the seeking after of an immutable world of forms - the archetype of 
transcendence - which Deleuze contrasts with the Bergsonian picture in 
which the past subsists in the present: 'all levels and degrees coexist and 
present themselves on the basis of a past which was never present' 
(DR 83). 
There is, however, a third synthesis of time, which transforms the first 
two. We have already encountered its illegitimate figure in Kant's notion of 
time as the form of inner sense. It is primarily to this that Deleuze 
contrasts his version of the Eternal Return as the empty form of time, 
drawing largely from Klossowski. 44 This return is precisely not the return 
of the Same, it is characterised variously as the return of the future, a 
belief of or in the future (DR 90) - as well as by the phrases 'to throw 
time out of joint, to make the sun explode, to throw oneself in the volcano, 
to kill God or the father (DR 89). This time the distinction between 
illegitimate and legitimate forms of the synthesis is of a different order, for 
what Deleuze's Nietzsche has discovered in the Eternal Return is the 
lived fact of nothing less than the destruction of self, world and God in 
both their transcendent and transcendental guises, and therefore, of the 
very possibility of representation. 'it eliminates the presuppositions of 
representation, namely the Same and the Similar, the Analogue and the 
Negative. For representation and its presuppositions return, but only 
once; [in contrast to the 'every time' of the return of the return] they return 
no more than one time, once and for all, thereafter eliminated for all times' 
(DR 301). 
44 See Pierre KJossowski Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle, tr. Daniel W. Smith, London: 
Athlone, 1997 
43 
On this view, the eternal return is linked to repetition not of the whole of 
time (return of the same), but to the notion firstly that the repeated is 
always different, and moreover, that therefore the only thing that returns is 
difference. This formulation allows Deleuze to say that eternal return is 
'the same of the different, the one of the multiple, the resemblant of the 
dissimilar' (DR 126) - in a phrase that we will return to in relation to the 
Plane of Consistency, it is that which things with nothing in common, have 
in common. The power of this notion is to fill the place formerly occupied 
with some notion of origin or telos (that would clearly be a prime example 
of transcendence) with an immanent principle of creative difference: 
The eternal return has no other sense but this: the absence of any 
assignable origin - in other words, the assignation of difference as the 
origin, which then relates different to different in order to make it (or them) 
return as such (DR 125). 
1.8 The System of the Transcendental Ideas (Fig. 3, overleaf) 
In the interests of clarifying these notions, it is clearly necessary to go 
round this strange loop again, except differently. This time, Kant will again 
feature prominently - appropriately enough, since each time we come 
across the figure of three syntheses in Deleuze, regardless of whether he 
is dealing with Kant directly, it is no doubt a reference to Kant. 46 We must 
plunge into the first Critique, and for reasons that will be made apparent, 
to the 'First Book of the Transcendental Dialectic, 'The System of the 
Transcendental Ideas' (CPR 322). 
46 most obviously, perhaps, to Kant's Threefold Synthesis of knowledge (apprehension 
in intuition, reproduction in imagination, and recognition in a concept) (CPR 129-138). 1 
argue in this section that a different set of three syntheses which appears later in the 
Ctitique, is more closely connected with the Deleuzian conceptions we will shortly 
examine. 
44 
Fia. 3: Svstem of the Transcendental Ideas (ConceDtS of Pure Reason 
All transcendental ideas can be arranged in three classes: 
the absolute unity of the the absolute unity of the the absolute unity of the 
thinking subject series of conditions of condition of all objects of 
appearance thought in general. 






for which pure reason furnishes the ideas for 
a transcendental doctrine of a transcendental science of a transcendental knowledge 
the soul the world of God 
With Deleuze*, these are superseded by 
a logic of neutral meaning a metaphysics of a thought of the present 
incorporeals infinitive 
*as rendered by Foucault in rrheatricum Philosophicum', Language, Counter-Memory, 
Practice, tr. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon, New York: Cornell University Press, 
1977: 176 
Before we can understand, even something as rudimentary as a 
syllogism, deduces Kant, there must be a concept or concepts embedded 
in reason itself, which make this possible. Since the essence of the 
syllogism is the derivation of a specific conclusion from some kind of 
universal (e. g. 'all men are mortal'), Kant decides that 'the transcendental 
concept of reason [that concept which is necessarily prior to the exercise 
of the understanding] is [ ... ] none other than the totality of the conditions 
for any given conditioned' (CPR 316) - and the totality of conditions is 
itself necessarily the unconditioned. We need to grasp the unconditioned, 
or unconditionally or a pfiod true, to establish the truth of any given 
syllogism. 
45 
The number of pure concepts of reason will be equal to the number of 
kinds of relation which the understanding represents to itself by means of 
the categories. We have therefore to seek for an unconditioned, first, of the 
categorical synthesis in a subject, secondly, of the hypothetical synthesis of 
the members of a series; thirdly, of the disjunctive synthesis of the parts in 
a system. (CPR 316) 
In other words: reason is defined by three Transcendental Ideas which are 
the unconditioned of the three categories of relation (substance, causality, 
community) of the understanding that relate to inner sense (the empty 
form of time). In each case, the unconditioned can be reached by 
travelling backwards up a syllogism - as Kant puts it 'ascending, in the 
series of conditions, to the unconditioned, that is, to principles'(CPR 325) 
- that is, to the Ideas that in each and every case, govern the attribution 
of one of these three categories (see Fig. 3). Pure reason, then, furnishes 
the governing Ideas for three posited transcendental sciences: from the 
categorical synthesis we arrive at the 'thinking subject, ' the 
'transcendental doctrine of the souf and the corresponding discipline of 
psychology; from the hypothetical synthesis we arrive at 'the sum-total of 
all appearances' and the corresponding discipline of cosmology; and from 
the disjunctive synthesis we arrive at the 'thing which contains the highest 
condition of the possibility of all that can be thought (the being of all 
beings)' and the corresponding discipline of theology. Kant goes on to 
state explicitly why the transcendental Ideas must be thus and so: 
... in treating of the transcendental concepts of reason, which, in 
philosophical theory, are commonly confused with others, and not properly 
distinguished even from concepts of the understanding, we have been able 
to rescue them from their ambiguous position, to determine their origin, and 
at the same time, in so doing, to fix their precise number (to which we can 
never add), presenting them in a systematic connection, and so marking 
out and enclosing a special field for pure reason (CPR 326). 
What exactly are the status of these transcendental Ideas? Self, world 
and God have become nothing more than regulative ideals - markers of 
46 
the very limits of knowledge. In carrying out the Critique of Pure Reason, 
Kant has shown once and for all time that these a priori limits are imposed 
on us by the very nature of reason itself. While pure reason cannot give 
more 'substance' (so to speak) to these notions, it nonetheless legislates 
that we must proceed as if there was a unity of the soul, a unity of the 
world and a unity of all that is possible for all time as determined by the 
ultimate unconditioned, the existence of God. Kant writes 
Jhe regulative law of systematic unity prescribes that we should study 
nature as if systematic and purposive unity, combined with the greatest 
possible manifoldness, were everywhere to be met with, in infinitum. For 
although we may succeed in covering but little of this perfection in the 
world, it is nevertheless required by the legislation of our reason that we 
must always search for and surmise it; and it must always be beneficial, 
and can never be harmful, to direct our investigations into nature in 
accordance with this principle. (CPR 568) 
'To anyone who asks: "Do you believe in God? " we should reply in strictly 
Kantian or Schreberian terms: "Of course, but only as the master of the 
disjunctive syllogism ... 
n, 47 Eliding Kant and his schizophrenic compatriot 
Judge Schreber is characteristic of Deleuze-Guattari's happy hostility 
towards Kant. Crucial to this is the attempt not so much to overthrow or 
dismantle his system, but to willingly take it onboard as the account of 
Occidental rationality it claims to be - yet at the same time, opening up 
its underside, bringing to the fore that which it excludes. In a paper 
appended to The Logic of Sense, Deleuze draws again on Klossowski to 
make this explic71t. 48 His refiguration of the 'philosophical Christian God, 
defined as Omnitudo realitatis, 
47 in 
... or as its a priori principle 
(God defined as Omnitudo reafitatis, from which all 
secondary realities are derived by a process of division)" (AO 13). We will deal with this 
strange equation of Kantian and Schreberian terms in the next chapter. 
48 Pierre Klossowski, The Baphomet, Sophie Hawkes and Stephen Sarterelli, New York: 
Eridanos Press, 1988 
47 
has no other sense than that of founding this treatment of the disjunctive 
syllogism, since distributive unity does not allow us to conclude that his 
Idea represents a collective or singular unity of a being in itself which 
would be represented by the Idea. In Kant, therefore, we see that God is 
revealed as the master of the disjunctive syllogism only inasmuch as the 
disjunction is tied to exclusions in the reality which is derived from it, and 
thus to a negative and fimitative use (LS 296). 
Here we return to the third synthesis of time, in its illegitimate (i. e. 
'negative and limitative') use. To this God of exclusions, of the either/or of 
identity, Deleuze-Klossowski oppose the Antichrist of inclusions, of the 
'either ... or ... or... ', where everything (philosopher and pig, criminal and 
saint alike) must pass through every position in the eternal return of 
return. Instead of everything resolving into its right and proper identity, the 
same for all time (thus subjugating difference to the Same), reality 
becomes an ever-open field of problems or problem-fields. The 
disjunctions of the Kantian God have not gone away, but the idea of an 
originary reality has - and the point is, we are well shot of it. Rather than 
being the sludgy, indifferent morass that Kant worried about, the order of 
the Antichrist is infinitely more finely differentiated. 
The disjunction is always a disjunction [but] Rather than signifying that a 
certain number of predicates are excluded from a thing in virtue of the 
identity of the corresponding concept, the disjunction now signifies that 
every thing is opened up to the infinity of predicates through which it 
passes, on the condition that it lose its identity as concept and as self (LS 
296). 
This is Eternal Return as principle of selection; what must be affirmed is 
change, transformation and difference, i. e. all things, everything, 
considered not as a distributive unity but as an infinitely diverse in-finity. 
What is necessarily destroyed in this process are the exclusions and limits 
that belong to representation, of the idea that transcendental of self, world 
and God. 
48 
1.9 Immanence of Criteria 
The debt of Anti0edipus to Kantian critique is huge. As Deleuze-Guaftad 
put it, 
In what he termed the critical revolution, Kant intended to discover criteria 
immanent to understanding so as to distinguish the legitimate and 
illegitimate uses of the syntheses of consciousness. In the name of 
transcendental philosophy (immanence of criteria), he therefore denounced 
the transcendent use of syntheses such as appeared in metaphysics. In 
like fashion, we are compelled to say that psychoanalysis has its 
metaphysics - its name is Oedipus. And that a revolution - this time 
materialist - can proceed only by way of a critique of Oedipus, by 
denouncing the illegitimate use of the syntheses of the unconscious as 
found in Oedipal psychoanalysis, so as to rediscover a transcendental 
unconscious defined by the immanence of its criteria, and a corresponding 
practice that we shall call schizoanalysis (AO 75). 
In this section I will summarise the appearance of the three syntheses in 
Anti0edipus, not so much to focus on what they are ostensibly presented 
in relation to (namely, the tired myths of psychoanalysis), but rather by 
way of explaining why the disjunctive synthesis has been seemingly 
demoted to second place, apparently superseded in importance by the 
conjunctive synthesis. 
The connective synthesis of AntiOedipus takes us to the visceral flows of 
the machinic unconscious, a diabolical world of connections, of flows and 
their interruptions: 'it breathes, it heats, it eats. It shits and fucks' (AO 1); 
the 'larvae and loathsome worms' (AO 9), the 'fields of anuses' and 
barrels of rats, the 'amniotic fluid, spilling out of the sac and kidney 
stones; flowing hair, a flow of spittle, a flow of sperm, shit, or urine' (AO 
70). But under the metaphysics of Oedipus, these impersonal, non- 
specific flows, so-called 'partial objects' that do not lack a wholeness 
(precisely because they are not already whole), are taken as always 
already subject to the triangulation of 'mommy-daddy-me': 'a definable 
and differentiable ego in relation to paternal images serving as co- 
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ordinates (mother, father)' (AO 70). Oedipus, as a regulative ideal, tells us 
what we are not allowed to do (i. e. identify with either parent too much 
and risk killing one and sleeping with the other - or any of the endless 
range of symbolic equivalents of these acts) - and then assumes for all 
time that this is all we wanted to do in the first place. 'In reality, global 
persons - even the very form of persons - do not exist prior to the 
prohibitions that weigh on them and constitute them' (AO 70), write 
Deleuze-Guaftad, giving us some insight into a possible response to the 
Kantian monolith. As with Oedipus, the extent to which we are governed 
by the Kantian model is the extent to which we are constituted by its 
prohibitions. The Deleuze-Guattarian schizo is content to get on with other 
things. Since he does not recognise himself either in Oedipus or in the 
transcendental doctrine of the soul - he would not even recognise 
himself in a bloody mirror - they have no power over him. 
The disjunctive synthesis as figured in its Oedipal use as restrictive or 
exclusive (and in full accord with the Order of God) is the mechanism 
whereby you are determined in terms of successful avoidance of or 
collapse into one of the three 'familial neuroses': 'the phobic person can 
no longer be sure whether he is parent or child; the obsessed person, 
whether he is dead or alive; the hysterical person, whether he is a man or 
a woman' (AID 75). Here is the Oedipal equivalent of the horrors of 
undifferentiation, that await anyone who fails to fall on one side of the 
disjunction or the other - pointing to the bigger and nastier disjunction 
that underlies all the others, the 'either/or OR ELSEI' that keeps us back 
from the brink of supposedly inevitable catatonic, abyssal 
undifferentiation. The Deleuze-Guattarian schizo, in contrast, escapes 
both undifferentiation and exclusive disjunction: 
He does not reduce two contraries to an identity of the same; he affirms 
their distance as that which relates the two as different. He does not 
confine himself inside contradictions; on the contrary, he opens out and, 
like a spore case inflated with spores, releases them as so many 
singularities that he had improperly shut off (AO 77). 
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The conjunctive synthesis is characterised as the consumption of 
intensive quantities (affects), setting the 'I feel' as prior to the 'I see, I 
hear of hallucination and the 'I think' of delirium. (This'l feel' involves not 
the I of the subject, but a fleeting I of presubjective sensibility, the 
encounter that begets thought: 'In effect, the intensive or difference in 
intensity is at once both the object of the encounter and the object to 
which the encounter raises sensibility' (DR 145). ) The conjunctive 
synthesis sees two versions of the realisation, 'So it's me! ' In 
psychoanalysis, this is the recognition of the self in the mythical form of 
Oedipus. Everything - all familial, racial, political conflicts and alliances, 
all the states through which we pass - has supposedly been shown to 
relate to the name of the Father. For the schizo, this is not identification 
once and for all but the investment in a series of masks, of simulacra, 
with no one true identity being formed or revealed, and if it has anything 
to do with the Father it has as much to do with every other relation any of 
us are engaged in: 
... everything commingles in these intense 
becomings, passages and 
migrations - all the drift that ascends and descends the flows of time: 
countries, races, families, parental appellations, divine appellations, 
geographical and historical designations, even miscellaneous news items. (I 
feel thao I am becoming God, I am becoming woman, I was Joan of Arc 
and I am Heliogabalus and the Great Mongol, I am a Chinaman, a redskin, 
a Templar, I was my father and I was my son (AO 84-85). 49 
49 The illegitimate use of the conjunctive synthesis (reactionary unconscious investment), 
from which Oedipus is derived, is characterised as 'I am of the superior race', the 
legitimate use (revolutionary unconscious investment) as 'I am not of your kind, I am the 
outsider and the deterritorialized' (AO 105). 
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1.10 Concluding Remarks: Fourth Person Singular 
The problem that was posed at the end of Section 1.5 was how to relate 
the uses of notions of synthesis found in different moments of 
Deleuze/Deleuze-Guaftad, and my provisional answer is as follows. There 
is no one-to-one correspondence between the three syntheses of time in 
Difference and Repetition and the three syntheses of desiring-production 
in Anti0edipus; instead, tendrils run back and forth between the two 
series in a movement of mutual complication. What is crucial in both 
series is the distinction between the transcendent or 'illegitimate' uses 
(illegitimate from the point of view of the machinic unconscious, and 
unable to withstand the Eternal Return of Return) and their immanent, 
legitimate or schizophrenic uses. The three syntheses of time combine to 
shatter representation; at least on the level of transcendental philosophy 
(thereby challenging certain strains of philosophy of mind, cognitive 
science, psychoanalysis, linguistics and many other disciplines); while the 
three syntheses of desiring-production build on this to initiate a full-blown 
positive pragmatics under the (admittedly problematic) name of 
schizophrenia. However 
It is not a question of opposing to the dogmatic image of thought another 
image borrowed, for example, from schizophrenia, but rather of 
remembering that schizophrenia is not only a human fact but also a 
possibility for thought - one, moreover, which can only be revealed as 
such through the abolition of that image (DR 148). 
We have seen the abolition of that image both through the three 
syntheses of time, and the three syntheses of desiring-production. In A 
Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari reappraise what we have called 
true and false problems (or legitimate and illegitimate syntheses) in terms 
of stratification: the field of the true problem is the Plane of Consistency, 
false problems (representation, recognition) are the illusions of the strata 
(though nonetheless pernicious for being illusory). In the next chapter, 
through an engagement with Judge Schreber, we explore the interplay 
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between the two sides of the strata (content and expression) and 
movements between the strata and the Plane. 
The possibility that has been repeatedly raised in this chapter was that we 
can get by without representation, without identity. These themselves are, 
as I have shown, dependent on the unmediated immanence of the 
contractions of our larval selves, the preindividual singularities, intensive 
quantities, partial objects or desiring-machines that comprise the zone of 
intensity or difference in itself, or the 'fourth person singular' (LS 141). 50 
Fourth person because it is prior even to the They, way before You and 
knows nothing of the I think or I perceive of representation, but only a 
flowing, intensive, presubjective '/ feef - which if we are to go along with 
Deleuze's relentless optimism on this point, can never do anything but 
affirm, to 'sing the glory' not of God, but 'of the heavens, the goddesses 
and gods' (DR 75) which are at once the demons, nerves-rays or breaths- 
spirits of the Order of the Antichrist. 
50 Deleuze is quoting Lawrence Ferlinghetti: 'Uses of Poetry (a poem) and 'Poetry as 
News'(an essay) at http: itwww. envy. nulchrista/uses. htmI and 
hftp: //www. corpse. org/issue_4/critical-urgencies/f`erling. htm respectively. 
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2. Serniotics and Soul Murder 
2.0 Introduction 
Having argued for the foundational importance of difference in itself, 
which we have shown to be synonymous with intensity (Section 1.5), we 
must now try and establish why such a stance puts us in any better 
position to understand the functioning of language. 
In the last chapter, we examined Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattari's accounts of 
the formation of the subject and its faculties in a way which demonstrated 
the derivative nature of good sense and common sense, and of the Same 
and the Similar, and proposed the notion of difference in itself, or 
intensity, as the origin of matter and life -a notion that differs from any 
transcendent origin (such as God), since intensity is immanent to 
mattertlife. On this view, rather than being a radical break in the history of 
the world, the human subject is and remains an offshoot of this 
immanence of difference, and further, that the stories told by religion and 
philosophy of its special place in the universe delimit and restrain the 
modes of engagement open to the human bodymind, as well as harmfully 
overemphasising the dichotomy between it and the rest of Nature. 
In pointing to difference or intensity as the 'common' origin of all matter 
and life, it should be noted that this does not entail any homogenisation: 
rather, it allows for greater differentiation across the board. 51 In 
suggesting as I have just done, that the emergence of the human subject 
of common sense/good sense is not a discernible moment or decisive 
break in history, the point is not to play down or devalue the relative 
achievements of humans in comparison to other configurations of matter. 
The point is that these achievements must be themselves understood as 
configurations of matter, certain aspects of which not only have 
51 in both the sense of the theoretical explanation of the 'really different' and of a better 
theoretical approximation of difference in itself. 
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remarkable and diverse ways of affecting other aspects. The unwieldy 
nature of this mode of description offers the benefits (as well as the 
challenges) of freeing us from thinking in terms of isolated human actors, 
as though these were figures in a primitive animated cartoon, moving 
around against a static backdrop. Instead we wish to lay out the resources 
needed to explore the configurations of matter in our tiny region of the 
Cosmos, on a variety of levels and without eliminatively reducing from one 
to another. 
In this chapter I propose the notion of 'material serniotics', a method 
dedicated to the exploration of signs as components in material systems, 
as opposed to being mysterious entities belonging to some purely 
semantic realm (signifiers or representations). 52 In order for this not to be 
reductionist - for example, by attempting to explain the effects of 
'meaning' in terms of brute physical processes - this method requires the 
resources both of the actuallvirtual opposition (discussed in the previous 
chapter), and that of double articulation (introduced below and spelled out 
in further chapters). These two apparent dualisms are erected on a 
pragmatic basis according to the specificities of particular cases, and do 
not detract from the underlying insistence on the singular immanence of 
difference in itself, being as they are not transcendent realms, but 
inadequately explored aspects or modes of this one. As we will see, 
material semiotics concerns signs as active components functioning in 
three modes: on the level of expression, at the intersection between 
content and expression, and on the Plane of Consistency (the all- 
encompassing level of pure immanence) itself. From the angle of the 
52 The point is that signs are signs only in relation to the assemblage of which they are 
components - nothing is essentially signifying in its own right - but also that the 
assemblage does not constitute a unity, but only relates its components to one another 
through their sheer difference. As we argued in the last chapter, the subsequent 
appearance of 'unities' or 'essences' is an effect of sheer difference. See also Daniel 
W. Smith, 'Introduction: *A Life of Pure Immanence*: Deleuze's OCritique et Clinique" 
Projed, CC: xxii-xxiii. 
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relations between actual and virtual, these active signs concern 
movements both of differentiation and differenciation (respectively, 
movements virtual4virtual and virtual-> actual). 53 
In this section, we pursue the nature of the subject, through the 
remarkable case of Judge Schreber. Our aims in this section are to open 
up other zones of Deleuze-Guattari's apparatus, most importantly the two 
sides of the Assemblage (machinic and collective). Along the way we will 
examine selected contributions from psychology, psychiatry and analytic 
philosophy, in order to present a picture of subjectivation that brings 
together the preindividual singularities, or 'fledgling and larval selves', of 
the previous chapter, with the notions of the order-word and stratification. 
A number of themes will be raised in condensed form, to be unpacked in 
later chapters. Since there is no easy way to present these ideas, I have 
chosen to set in motion at least a fraction of the huge range of elements 
present in Schreber's Memoirs, by way of avoiding a move from simple 
(or simplistic) to complex, and instead moving from an irreducible whole, 
through a process of subdivision (as opposed to reduction), to an 
illumination of some of its constituent processes. That Schreber's story, 
itself a recurrent motif in Anti0edious, is eminently amenable to this 
approach, is what I will show in this chapter. 
Did Deleuze-Guattari actually read the Memoirs of Daniel Paul 
Schreber? -r'4 Samuel M Weber, in his introduction to the Memoirs' 
" This terminology is introduced in DR 207. Differentiation is drawn by Deleuze from 
mathematics, differenciation from biology, and he uses them to refer respectively to the 
determination of the components and relations of the problem field (or'Idea! in the terms 
of Difference and Repetition, 'concept' in those of What is Philosophy? ), and the 
'incarnation' or actualisation of these components and relations. The key to these two 
processes is that neither have anything whatever to do with the negative, with negation 
- this only arises insofar as the actualised relations are cut off from 'the virtuality which 
they actualise' (ibid). 
I Daniel Paul Schreber, Memoirs of My Nervous Illness (hereafter M), tr. Ida MacAlpine 
and Richard Hunter London: Harvard University Press, 1988 
56 
translation, takes Deleuze-Guattari as 'exemplary' among those for whom 
Schreber is but a membee of the 'canon of the often mentioned but never 
read' (M xiii and li, note 16). Yet the Judge plays a crucial role in 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, particularly in Anti0edipus, where he 
seems to stand for all those who have been subject to wilful 
misinterpretation at the hands of psychoanalysis. His pivotal position in 
this respect leads Louis S. Sass to suggest that Deleuze-Guattari (and 
other radical antipsychiatric writers, such as R. D. Laing, Norman 0. 
Brown) uncritically accept the psychoanalytic reading of psychosis as 
something childlike or Dionysian, though they then make the romantic 
move of valorizing rather than pathologizing these supposedly primitive 
. 
55 and uncontrolled conditions Another writer, Cric Santner, takes 
Deleuze-Guattari's Schreber as providing 'a storehouse of protofascist 
fantasies and fantasy structures' making it apparent, as the present 
alternative approach will try to show, that it is Deleuze-Guattad who are 
not being read. 56 
What follows, then, comprises the beginnings of a 'material serniotics' of 
'the Schreber case', where 'case' is seen not as indicating Schreber's 
interior world in isolation. Rather, his name is taken to designate the 
singular nexus of a variety of different assemblages or machines 
discussed below. After a short discussion of Deleuze-Guattari for 
purposes of orientation, I will employ elements from Daniel Dennett's 
demythologisation of mentalist explanations in Consciousness Explained 
55 Louis K Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modem Art, 
Literature and Thought (hereafter MM), London: Harvard University Press, 1994: 11 
56 Eric Santner, My Own Private Germany. Daniel Paul Schreber's Secret History of 
Modemity (hereafter MPG), Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1996: x. 
Santner claims that Deleuze-Guattari ultimately follow Elias Canetti's reading of 
Schreber in this regard (Elias Canetti, Crowds and Power (hereafter CP), tr. Carol 
Stewart, London: Penguin 1984). 1 will examine aspects of Sass and Santner's readings 
of Schreber below. 
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to examine Louis Sass's Schreber. 57 Sections 2.3 and 2.4 will concentrate 
on Eric Santner's superlative reading of Schreber, which I will arrange in 
terms of collective assemblages of enunciation (2.3) and machinic 
assemblages (2.4), attempting to elucidate these terms and their relations 
in the process. The last section will look at Schreber's becoming-woman, 
before finally approaching the issue of Deleuze-Guattari's 'schizophrenia'. 
2.1 Immanence 
If there is one basic move Deleuze-Guattari make, it is the abandonment 
of transcendental stability, that is, the refusal to leave any terms 
uninterrogated. It is on this basis that the nearest Deleuze-Guattari get in 
pointing towards some kind of origin or ground is the notion we 
encountered above of difference in itself At different stages in their work, 
this key idea is presented in slightly different forms, in such guises as 
Body without Organs, Plane of Consistency and Abstract Machine 
each relating to a base-level of materiality, which functions as a degree- 
zero, from which everything emerges as differences in intensity. Whether 
this corresponds to a local Body without Organs (such as that of a 
particular individual or a particular social or biochemical assemblage) or 
the Cosmos as a whole - this question remains open - the point of this 
move is to place a big Zero where other theoretical interventions retain 
some transcendental principle or other (e. g. for Kantians or 
phenomenologists, this is the transcendental subject; for Saussurean 
linguistics and semiology this is the Signifier, for Marx as for Hegel, 
History; for empiricists, this might be the World or its experience through 
sense data; for realists and aýti-realists alike, this is some Real whether 
obtainable or unobtainable, and so on). Deleuze-Guattafi deal n0f "Ath %.., L VVILIS 
words and things, but with the processes of production that facilitate the 
articulable and the visible. While both volumes of Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia present different versions of a kind of Universal History, 
57 Daniel C. Denneff, Consciousness Explained (hereafter CE), London: Penguin, 1993. 
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this is an account of contingency rather than necessity - each are 
nonformal, ideographic accounts of how things happen to be. 58 
Given this approach, theory is never a matter of discovering essences, 
underlying structures or gesturing towards unknowable Ur-realities, but 
always a matter of experimentation. Rather than collapsing into 
postmodern relativism, Deleuze-Guattari do not abandon Reality; rather, 
for them it encompasses both things as they are and how they could be, 
with the manifold potentials of sometime-, seldom- or never-actualised 
relations having real effects as the virtual-but-real. This is a 
thoroughgoing immanence of substance (tagged by the 'magic formula' of 
PLURALISM=MONISM we encountered in the last chapter) which sees 
distinctions between Natural/Artificial, Man/World, Organic/Inorganic not 
as originary but as the products of particular, contingent machineries - 
the Strata - which must be diagrammed or 'reverse-engineered'. The 
term 'reverse engineering' is associated with evolutionary biology, where 
natural selection is presented as an explanation for the emergence of 
particular organs or capacities. The point is not to unveil a secret 
teleology that was driving the process all along, but to show how a 
particular series of contingencies resulted in the capacity (or power) 
concerned became 'locked in' and allowed to propagate. According to 
Dennett, this approach focuses (like Deleuze-Guaftad) on the processes 
of production - what he calls 'abstract architecture' and they call 
'abstract machines' - and the material constraints in play every step of 
the way, rather than producing teleological hypotheses on the basis of the 
characteristics of the eventual artefacts (CE: 212-220). 
Such an endeavour is not any kind of disinterested inquiry in the name of 
Science or Rationality (or their cross-cousins Medicine and Psychiatry), 
since both of these are themselves rooted in (and in some sense, 
constitutive of) the Strata. It is necessarily pragmatic, and (as Deleuze- 
Guattari say of the book) there is no difference between 'what it talks 
58 We return to Universal History in Chapters 5 and 6. 
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about and how it is made' (TP 4) - the diagram is not a representation of 
the processes with which it is concerned, it is an intervention on those 
processes. There is no disinterested vantage point from which to survey 
the Strata: the praxis of schizoanalysis involves both de- and re- 
stratifying tendencies. Material semiotics attends experimentally to this 
distinction both in the strategical ly-delimited zone it is engaged with, and 
in its own functioning - an inclusive disjunction which constitutes its 
pragmatics. What follows is an attempt to distinguish this approach from 
that of other readers of Schreber (to whose work I am nonetheless 
indebted). 
2.2 Understanding the Nerve-Language 
How best to approach Schreber, whose Memoirs are an astounding 
mixture of charnel house meat-dream, Cosmic conspiracy theory and 
grotesque theological horror-comed Y? 59 It might be argued that since 
59 The initial symptoms recorded in his medical records include: increasingly morbid 
hallucinations (from the softening of his brain to his actually being dead and rotting); the 
notion 'his penis [had been] twisted off by a "nerve probe"' (M xxi) and that he was now a 
woman, and that he was under threat of rape; several suicide attempts and repeated 
pleas for cyanide; and states of near catatonia as he became immersed in his delusional 
world - the character of which ranged from fantasies of being tortured to those of a 
more supernatural nature, involving ghosts, demons and gods. In his Memoirs, Schreber 
traces the developments of these fearsome developments, and how they lead him to the 
conclusions he draws about the nature of God, the afterlife and the fracture in the Order 
of the World that centres around him. 
The early and most extreme period of his ordeal, running from March to May 1894, 
Schreber dubs his 'holy time', as it was then that he was in most frequent 'nerve-contact' 
with the rays of God. The paraphysiology Schreber presents as the fruits of his 
investigations is based on the idea, widely accepted at the time, of the inherence of the 
human soul in its body, though Schreber develops this notion into a cosmic architecture 
of nerves 'Not even the soul is purely spiritual, but rests on a material substrate, the 
nerves' (M 244) - meaning that its continued existence after bodily death is predicated 
on the body not being cremated or otherwise destroyed. If, following Schreber's advice, 
you arrange to be buried instead, following your death your nerves will become rays (the 
terms are broadly synonymous in the Memoirs), described as fine threads or filaments, 
that will embark on a process of purgatorial purification, involving the gradual 'forgetting' 
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Schreber was quite clearly barking mad, nothing he says can be relied 
upon, except as evidence of his madness. In any case, for material 
semiotics, the Author (whether sane/reliable or mad/unreliable) cannot be 
serve as explanandum, any more than cosmology can be content with 
God as cause of the universe. 60 The book is not a representation of the 
world or an object in-the-world, but a (literary) machine with a set of 
shifting relations with other machines. For us now, these are most 
obviously psychiatric, juridical and psychoanalytic (taking the form, for 
instance, of the reports by Dr Weber, the court proceedings and 
Schreber's essay in jurisprudence, and the essays by Samuel Weber and 
the translators MacAlpine and Hunter, that came bundled with the 
English edition), but they also include the specific machines of 
stratification in their physical and symbolic aspects by which Schreber 
was processed in his lifetime, as we will examine shortly. 
There are certain parallels with this approach and that of Daniel Dennett. 
Dennett's 'heterophenomenology, 61 accepts the importance of individual 
of your earthly identity, until finally you will be subsumed in the 'forecourts of heaven', 
becoming one with the rays of God himself. This process of purification is not to do with 
punishment, which Schreber deems an earthly concept appropriate to the courts, but 
irrelevant to the realms of God. Hell is merely a fairy story, concocted by humans to 
control other humans. The process may take hundreds of years, and often involves 
migration to distant planets (Cassiopeia, for example, is the home of a group of Students 
Union members, who form the impudent 'so-what-party). Before your nerves are 
subsumed by God, they may converge with those of your compatriots. Schreber lists 
these 'soul-complexes' as including Jehovah-rays, Zoroaster-rays, Thor-rays and Odin- 
rays. As such, all your identity gone, you should finally achieve the State of Blessedness. 
Unfortunately the 'cursed Schreber affair' has meant the suspension of all further 
allocations of Blessedness until further notice. 
60 'A book is neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and very 
different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook this working 
of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. It is to fabricate a God to explain 
geological movements' (TP 3) 
61 This method is presented as a solution to the problem of how to obtain scientifically 
respectable data from people's descriptions of their own experiences, as is required in a 
significant proportion of psychological investigations. The key is the method's neutrality 
61 
testimony, but leaves open the question of a 'Central Meaner, that is, the 
notion that there is something irreducible and mysterious at the heart of 
experience that repels all attempts to understand it in purely scientific 
terms. Dennett's explorations are far from definitive; however, he insists 
that the translation of many 'mentalist' descriptions into physical terms 
need not involve an impoverished reduction. The rich descriptive account 
he is aiming at shuns the tendency to rely on -'black boxes' of both 
traditional psychological explanations of the mind (most famously 
Skinnerian behaviourism with its explanations of behaviour simply as the 
result of whatever conditioning there 'must have been' to have caused it 
- the virtus dormitus explanation 
62) 
, and also those which rely on 
homunculi of one form or another, that is, 'little men' in the brain supposed 
to explain behaviour, while themselves remaining completely mysterious. 
In other words, the project is one of demythologisation. 
in relation to questions of its subjects' consciousness (as opposed to any potential 
interference by mad professors or zombification), and to the objective reality of the 
phenomena they report. Dennett applies his notion of the 'intentional stance', whereby 
experimental subjects' utterances are taken not as random noise, but rather as the 
speech acts of an integrated individual: 'we must treat the noise-emitter as an agent, 
indeed a rational agent, who harbours beliefs and desires and other mental states that 
exhibit intentionality or Oaboutness', and whose actions can be explained (or predicted) 
on the basis of the content of these states' (CE 76). The subject is taken to be 
describing his or her 'heterophenomenoiogical world', and the successful experiment 
will be designed to ensure as little chance of the subject's bothering to lie, or of having 
misunderstood the instructions, as possible. But, while the subjecrs words will be taken 
at face value, that is, they will be interpreted on the basis that they express what the 
subject 'meant to say. Where material semiotics and heterophenomenology diverge is 
on the question of the subject. Where Dennett must assume this subject despite 
bracketing off questions of its ontological status, material semiotics regards Schreber's 
testimony as interesting insofar as it describes the set of external relations that 
constitute the subject rather than originate from it. 
62 'Skinner Skinned' in Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind 
and Psychology, Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1979 
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Perhaps the most suggestive material in the Memoirs for Dennett's 
approach is Schreber's account of the 'nerve-language'. 63 Louis Sass 
makes this the focus of a chapter in his Madness and Modernism in which 
(in a nutshell) he argues for a conception of schizophrenia which doesn't 
involve, as is traditionally assumed, a regression to infantile states, but 
instead is a kind of hypeffationality -a state which finds parallels in 
much 20th Century art, literature and philosophy. In Schreber's case, this 
is manifested in his panoptical state of self-observation. Sass interprets 
the nerve-language as inner speech, an idea for which there is more 
support in the Memoirs than Sass himself alloWS. 64 Schreber makes clear 
that the nerve-language is opposed to the spoken language of humans, 
and is what goes on in sleep. This allows God, who is ignorant of the 
whole realm of humans as social beings, to influence sleepers and those 
in contemplative states - hence the divine inspiration of the poets and 
prophets. Schreber also makes a strong distinction between what he sees 
with his 'bodily eye' and what he 'pictures' with his 'mind's eye' - though 
this last technique has both active and passive forms. The rays, despite 
often being described as 'little men' (such as those who climb up his legs 
and pump his spinal column out of his mouth in clouds of steam (M 137)), 
are for the most part known only by the phrases they utter. 65 
Sass writes, 'According to Vygotsky's classic Thought and Language, the 
structure or skeleton of normal adult thought is largely provided by an 
"inner speech" that initially derives from and mimics overt, vocalised 
63 For Schreber, the 'nerve-language' covers all the 'silent talking' (my phrase, not 
Schreber's) of the rays (their mechanical vibration), and is fundamentally different from 
the spoken language of individual humans. 
64 for example, his description of counting upwards in the nerve-language - 1,2,3, 
4-. '(M 233) makes it sound identical to simply'counting in one's head'. 
65 Again, Schreber makes an active/passive distinction, in this case between the 
phrases learnt by rote, and reeled off automatically in response to certain stimuli (such 
as the We have already got this [written down]' whenever a thought occurs that has 
occured before) and those spoken with genuine feeling. The latter category is reserved 
for certain communications from God himself, particularly the lower God Ariman. 
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speech' (MM 256). 66 Such speech is (for reasons of efficiency) simplified 
and condensed into the most minimal of phrases. This truncation is 
possible because the content of the thought is largely carried by the 
particular context in which the individual having it finds itself. For the most 
part, we are unaware that our thoughts are not spelled out completely and 
exhaustively; indeed even in introspection we may fail to detect these 
half-phrases as objects of our consciousness. This is because, Sass 
maintains, in a certain sense they are our consciousness - it is one and 
the same with this flow of thoughts, observations and decisionS. 67 
Sass sees Schreber as laying bare these mechanisms of thought, and 
draws on Foucault's account of the panopticon in Discipline and Punish to 
describe the hyperreflexive state in which Schreber unwillingly finds 
himself. 68 The panopticon instils the belief that the prisoners are 
constantly visible to an external power thus building a self-monitoring 
faculty into their own awareness (the famous 'cop in the head'). For 
Schreber, this takes the form of God and the rays, challenging his every 
thought, and tormenting him with accusations of impropriety (e. g. 'are you 
not ashamed in front of your wifeT and 'fancy a person who was a 
Senatspr5sident allowing himself to be f .... d' (M 149)). 
Sass, who presents 
Schreber as offering an 'allegory of innemess', concludes: 'The strange 
medium of the nerve-language might perhaps stand as a metaphor for 
66 Lev S. Vygotsky, Thought and Language, tr. E. Hartmann and G. Vakar, Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1962 
67 This account fails to explain certain characteristics of the rays. For Schreber, the rays 
that plague him seem in some way to travel from distant stars by means of speech - in 
later stages, their phrases are elongated in a manner reminiscent of the technique of 
time-stretching found in contemporary dance music. Thus, a phrase like 'Why do you 
not then shiff becomes Ww. w. h. h. h. y. y. y d. d. d. o. o. o ..... etc. 
', lasting 'perhaps thirty to 
sixty seconds' (M 175-6). In later stages, the rays fade to a kind of ambient hissing. If 
they are to be identified with the inner speech of consciousness, from whence come 
these developments? My alternative account is picked up in the next section. 
r'8 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (hereafter DP), tr. Alan 
Sheridan, London: Penguin 1991. 
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modem subjectivity in general. For, though the most intimate and familiar 
part of the self, this ghostly product of self-scrutiny nevertheless exists as 
a quasi-extemal object, an alien, mysterious realm that must constantly be 
examined and decoded by the very being who creates and lives it' (MM 
260). 
Sass's account of Schreber's nightmare of hyperreflexivity is extremely 
convincing, and recalls the remark in Anti0edipus, 'it is not the slumber of 
reason that engenders monsters, but paranoid, insomniac rationality' (AO 
112). However, there are certain problems with Sass's account, one of 
which is his insistence that these processes must be read as metaphor, 
as must Foucault's use of the panopticon itself, as opposed to its 
ostensive reality for both Schreber and the subjects of modernity Sass 
takes the Judge as to some extent representing. Rather than Foucault's 
panopticon being a metaphorical allusion to Bentham's design for a 
prison, it designates an abstract machine of surveillance that is actualised 
in schools, hospitals and prisons alike (DP 195-228). This point need not 
detract too much from the importance of Sass's insight. However, in a 
subsequent study dedicated to Schreber and Wittgenstein, Paradoxes of 
Delusion, Sass makes clear his orientation to Schreber, in contrast to 
most of the other commentators: 
In my view, to grasp the distinctive meaning of sex and power in the 
Schreberian cosmos - and in the worlds of many schizoids and 
schizophrenics - one must understand the dimension that is more 
fundamental for such individuals, that of knowledge. 6 '9 
I contend the implication that Schreber's problems are therefore primarily 
epistemological. Epistemology, in a Deleuze-Guattarian or Foucauldian 
view, is hardly capable of grounding the processes of sexuality or power, 
and is not usefully separated off from them - particularly as regards 
69 Louis S. Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the 
Schizophrenic Mind, London: Cornell University Press, 1994: 119. 
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Schreber. Knowledge is indeed fundamental to Schreber's ordeal, but it 
is knowledge in relation to the plot laid against him, his striving to retain 
control over his person (both from God and his rays, and from the 
psychiatric regimes he endures, and the court that imposes his tutelage), 
and also his strategies in cultivating that which provides some little relief, 
his soul-voluptuousness in becoming-woman. These elements will be 
explored in more detail below. There is, however, another sense still of 
knowledge, that of Deleuze-Foucault, whereby the strata (as visibilities 
and articulabilities) comprise the forms of the knowable - and it is 
indeed this type of knowledge with which Schreber is locked in conflict. 
A further caveat to my support of Sass, is that following the 
heterophenomenological approach, we are not obliged to accept as yet 
the idea that this is all going on in Schrebers head. Returning to Dennett, 
we can sophisticate Sass's account by interrogating the Vygotskian 
notion of inner speech. The debate about whether our thoughts are in 
their own language (often called 'Mentalese') is long and complex. 
Dennett's Consciousness Explained seeks ways round this assumption, 
as part of his programme of breaking down the barriers between scientific 
and common sense understandings of the mind. One of the problems 
with the postulation of Mentalese is it requires more explanation than it 
provides (as a kind of distributed homunculus). When finally called upon 
to give a positive account of consciousness by his sceptical interlocutor 
'Otto', Dennett introduces the notion of presentiments as the stuff from 
which consciousness can be said to emerge. After Dennett has 
presented his explanation of what presentiments are, Otto exclaims, 'So 
presentiments are like speech acts except that there's no Actor and no 
Speech! '(CE 364-365). 
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The idea is that beneath the Vygotskian picture Sass utilises of a stream 
of nerve-language, is a PandemoniUM70 of presentiments, or 'events of 
content-fixation occurring in various places at various times in the brain' 
(CE 365). In a recent essay, Dennett describes this Pandemonium as 
an anarchic, competitive arena in which many different sorts of things 
happen - Grand Central Station, in which groups of visitors speaking 
many tongues try to find like-minded cohorts by calling out to each other, 
sweeping across the floor in growing crowds, waving their hands, pushing 
and shoving and gesturing. 71 
This highly suggestive passage contains several key points. There are 
'many tongues' being spoken, rather than a single Mentalese, or lingua 
franca of thought -a notion that is all too compatible with the reinstating 
of a Central Meaner whose mother tongue it would be. 72 The crowds of 
preindividual impulses, relating to the different options afforded the 
individual by its surroundings, and imposed on it by the syntheses of Habit 
and Memory, compete with one another for control of the body's 
utterances and movements. These singularities have the character of 
speech acts in that they are judgements that are completely context- 
dependent. They do not possess any significatory value; they do not refer 
to or represent anything outside themselves - they are unmediated 
relationships of action and reaction between nervous system and 
environment, brain and its habits, bodymind and its memories. They are 
events of orientation, of ordering, that collectively, situate the body in the 
world: they territotialise it. For these reasons, Dennett's presentiments 
can be usefully elided with Deleuze-Guattari's order-words - i. e. there is 
70 'The pioneer model of this sort of process is Oliver Selfridge's early Pandemonium 
architecture in Artificial Intelligence, in which many "demons' vied in parallel for 
hegemony. '(CE 189) 
71 Daniel Dennett, 'Reflections on Language and Mind', in Peter Carruthers and Jill 
Boucher, Language and Thought. Interdisciplinary Themes (hereafter LT), Cambridge 
University Press, 1998: 285. 
72 We return to this debate in relation to Stephen Pinker in Chapter 7. 
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a strong parallel between the intra-personal events of context-fixation, 
these speechless speech acts that are prior to the actor, and the inter- 
personal level of order-words. It is in this respect that they account for 
Schreber's experience of compulsive thinking. 
These presentiments are precisely what Deleuze talks about as the 
'fledgling and larval selves' we encountered in Section 1.7 above. In his 
contact with the nerve. language, Schreber effects a partial escape from 
the Self into the realm of preindividual singularities - and it could be 
argued that it is through his paranoia that he overcodes these as real 
people or portions of real people, while at the same time never losing the 
sense of himself as an integrated subject to whom this is all happening. 
From a common sense perspective, from which all these 'little men' (e. g. 
M 83), 'fleeting-improvised-men' (e. g. M 43), and nerves-rays in general, 
appear as clearly delusional, Schreber has confused these different parts 
of himself, these different fabulations of his own diseased mind, with 
objectively extant personalities. However, from the present perspective, 
the truth is rather that we are all immersed in this oceanic tumult of proto- 
persons (each of which exists purely in relation to particular roles, 
environments and other proto-persons), adopting now this persona, now 
that, as our'subjecf traverses this interplay of pre-ind ivid ual, sing ularities. 
In other words, the individual is characterised at any given point by the 
dominant pre-individyal tendencies in line with which it acts. As Dennett 
puts it, 
most successful activities depend on enlisting large multi-modal coalitions, 
involving the excitation of several largish areas [of the brain] 
simultaneously, but occasionally swifter, more efficient contacts co- 
ordinate activity with hardly any commotion at all (LT 285). 
These latter, more efficient transitions depend on the role of language in 
thought, which we will discuss in much more detail in later chapters. 
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2.3 Symbolic Investiture and Order-Words 
Eric Santner's My Own Private Germany. Daniel Paul Schreber's Secret 
History of Modernity brings together material from a range of sources on 
Schreber, and teases out a range of fascinating implications in three 
areas. These I will outline and then rearrange according to the priorities of 
a material semiotics. In the first section, Santner examines Freud's 
reading in detail, suggesting that the 'crisis of symbolic investiture' that 
faced Schreber in his new post of SenatsprAsident closely matches 
Freud's own, as he barricades his own brand of psychoanalysis against 
those who would usurp his throne. 73 Secondly, Santner presents an 
account of the 'surplus father' (personified most clearly in the lower god 
Ariman and certain of the Flechsig souls) - which far from being simply 
the return of Schreber's repressed homosexual desire for his father, is the 
concretisation of the insidious, all-pervasive machineries of surveillance 
and control that Schreber suffered both as the child of a sadistic 
pedagogue and as what might now be called 'mental health services 
consumer. The third section attempts to rescue Schreber from Canetti's 
diagnosis of proto-fascism (CP 505-537) by characterising the Memoirs as 
'a forceful intervention in the European debates on the "Jewish Question": 
The claim is that when, at the end of the nineteenth century, a German 
man belonging to an elite (such as the judiciary) comes, for whatever 
reasons, to feel his identification with his status disturbed, he will 
automatically find himself in the symbolic position of the marginal figures of 
that culture - in this instance women and Jews - and begin, 
unconsciously and conflictually, to elaborate the consequences of his new 
set of identifications using whatever images and fantasies are ready to 
hand in the cultural *archive* (MPG 99) 
73 In Freud's case, his anxieties are shown by his claims of originality, distancing his 
own insights from those of his contemporaries, and from anything Schreber himself 
directly (if inadvertently) contributed to his analysis (MPG Chapter 1, 'The Passions of 
Psychoanalysis'). 
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This 'crisis of symbolic investiture' is Schrebers recognition of the 
mechanisms of exclusions and cruelties on which his symbolic roles 
(white German Protestant heterosexual male judge etc. ) are based, and 
his inability to metabolise this situation, except through his becomings- 
woman and -Jew. Santners account of symbolic investiture is based on a 
nuanced account of what Deleuze-Guattari call the order-word. Santner 
opens up the realm of symbolic power, as discussed by Bourdieu, as 
related to the crisis of authority and legitimation that faces any juridical or 
bureaucratic system (including of course the machinery of psychiatry) - 
for example, in the words of the title of Schreber's contribution to the 
debate, 'In what circumstances can a person considered insane be 
detained in an Asylum against his declared will? ' (M 363). 74 
Schreber makes clear that his crisis is intimately connected with the 
legitimacy (or rather, the self-legitimation) of power. Once circumstances 
pertaining to the Order of the World are contravened, it is a free-for-all, 
God is drawn into conflict with himself and power is up for grabs (M 58). 
Symbolic power concerns not the relative strength of individual bodies, 
though it may in a roundabout way depend on the relative strength of 
armies and police forces. It cannot be claimed by an ambitious individual 
on his or her own, it must be vested in particular individuals by the 
structures already in place: it is therefore the property of particular modes 
of social organisation - and subsists beyond the tenure of particular 
administrations. We could perhaps distinguish between such 
administrations and 'Administration as such', that which, for example, in 
Kafka's story 'The Great Wall of China', makes it unimportant which 
particular emperor happens to be in power at any given time. 75 
74 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power, tr. Gino Raymond and Matthew 
Adamson, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. 
75 Franz Kafka, 'rhe Great Wall of China', tr. Willa and Edwin Muir, The Complete Short 
Stories, London: Minerva, 1995: 235-248. 
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There are compelling correspondences between Santner's account of 
symbolic investiture and Deleuze-Guattad's order-word, which, they 
argue, is the 'elementary unit of language' and is a function 'coextensive 
with language' JP 76). Contrary to the assumption that language is a tool 
for the communication of information first and foremost, is the assertion 
that the order-word functions through redundancy: language refers not to 
an extra-linguistic world, but rather back to what has been said before: 
'language does not operate between something seen (or felt) and 
something said, but always goes from saying to saying'. Where for 
deconstruction, the symbolic chain cannot be broken and no access to a 
world beneath can be had, Deleuze-Guattari insist that the connection of 
language to the outside is intrinsic to language: the transmission of an 
order word is always a concrete event, and depends for its effects entirely 
on the specifics of the enunciation in question. As we will see in Chapter 
4, Deleuze-Guattari draw on the speech-act theory of J. L. Austin, and (like 
Bourdieu) free it up from semantics, so the efficacy of a speech act lies 
not in the meanings of words, so much as in the specifics of the 
situation. 76 Speech act theory, then, is not limited to blatant examples 
such as 'I promise that... ', 'I'm warning you, ' etc, nor even to all the 
intricacies of Gricean implicature (such as A getting his audience to 
realise he means the opposite by saying "X is a fine friend" when they are 
well aware that A knows that X has in fact betrayed him ). 77 Rather, it eats 
up all of spoken language use, and by extension all written language, 
since all saying and w6ting (or listening and reading) is doing: each 
utterance transmits a statement - its implicit presupposition, or 'sense'. 
This sense can be stated explicitly, but only while simultaneously 
producing its own implicit presupposition, which must be stated 
separately. In any case, the order word is produced in the site of the 
utterance, and is not a matter of signification or semantics, but of the 
76 J. L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (hereafter Words), Oxford University Press 
1976. 
77 H. P. Grice, 'Logic and Conversation' in Readings in Language and Mind, ed. Heimar 
Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, Oxford: Blackwell, 1996: 129 
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variables of the particular situation, and the way they are affected by the 
utterance; i. e. the incorporeal transfonnations it effects. 
In other words, what Schreber's Memoirs could be said to be 'about', is 
the essential relation between the level of symbolic power, and the level 
of the bodies it serves to order and discipline. For Deleuze-Guattari, these 
levels correspond to the double articulation of the Strata, which they 
designate (following Hjelmslev, as we will see in Chapter 6) respectively: 
expression, the level of collective assemblages of enunciation, and 
content, the level of machinic assemblages. The two aspects are 'really 
distinct' (i. e. dealing with different compositions of matter-energy) but are 
in a relation of reciprocal presupposition. The order-word is a defining 
moment of double articulation; it is a moment of reinforcement, of 
repetition or redundancy production. It finds its distorted reversal in the 
'password', inherent in every order-word as its potentials for breaking 
open new zones of relations, rather than reaffirming (helping to lock in) 
the relations already in place. Santner draws from Judith Butler the 
account of gender-assignment in these terms - 'it's a boy' (in the 
circumstances of the maternity theatre) is an order-word, containing the 
imperative that acceptable gender roles are adhered to, while the very 
failure of the categories boy and girl to encompass the range of actual and 
potential sexualities of which the individual body is capable, opens up 
zones of 'deviance' and experimentation, as well as zones of torture and 
destruction. 78 
n Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: 
Routledge, 1990. In this regard, it should be noted how reductive Freud's assumption of 
Schreberjs homosexuality seems, particularly in light of the range and nature of his 
mysticlerotic experiments in 'soul voluptuousness. ' I will return to sexuality and 
Schreber's becoming-woman in Section 2.5 below. 'Psychoanalytic Notes on an 
Autobiographical account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides) (Schreber)' in 
Sigmund Freud, Case Histories 11, The Pelican Freud Library Volume 9, tr. under the 
general editorship of James Strachey, London: Penguin, 1981 
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As we have seen, Sass connects the repeated phrases of the nerve- 
language vVith the commands issued to the subject first by parental and 
other authorities, and then issued internally from a panoptical superego. 
Deleuze-Guattari's account of the redundancy of the order-word is clearly 
visible in Schreber, where the scoldings, demands and abuse Schreber 
suffers have a cumulative effect through their frequent repetition. 
Schreber even manages to harness this redundancy through adopting the 
repetition process himself. Where at first he is compelled to attend to the 
signiricance of the words each time anew, filling in the missing words to 
show he has recognised the sentiment concerned, he learns to simply 
repeat the words themselves to himself over and over again, evacuating 
them of their symbolic content and facilitating the blessed 'not-thinking-of- 
79 anything-thoughf . While on Sass's account mentioned above the 
commands issued by the rays are already linguistic, I contend that the 
linguistic aspect is secondary to that of the command itself, allowing 
Schreber to use the irrelevance of the actual wordý as a way of escaping 
the force of the command of which they are the effect. 80 The question now 
'19 He develops other strategies that achieve the same effect, such as hammering at the 
piano in a 'disturbing manner, reciting poetry or counting, swearing out loud or simply 
bellowing like a mani= all these facilitate the blessed 'not-thinking-of-anything-thought' 
and grant him (if not those around him) a little respite. What he is combating through all 
these practices is the signifying power of the words, and the demand he interpret, 
understand - despite his awareness of their total redundancy. His strategies all involve 
fleeing signification, whether through the nonsignifying activities of playing the piano or 
counting, to repeating the phrases himself till he is no longer bothered by their 
meanings. 
80 The irrelevance of the words themselves is backed up by three factors: 1. Schreber's 
assertion that the rays - who sometimes appear as talking birds of various sorts - 
have merely learned by rote, and there is no feeling behind their words (i. e. Schreber 
must attend to the effect they are intended to have an him in the broad scheme of things 
- to destroy his reason - rather than what the rays, as speaking subjects, are 
expressing); 2. the fact the phrases are often euphemistic, ironic or otherwise context- 
dependent, again implying that Schreber's foreknowledge of the sentiment rather than 
the words themselves is what is important; 3. the process called the 'writing-down- 
system', which ensures all his thoughts are recorded and endlessly repeated back to 
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is to analyse the machineries which give the order-words their force, that 
are the preconditions of those phrases being attached to those meanings 
in the first place. 
2.4 Schreber's Becoming-Minor 
Santners rich and subtle argument finds for Schreber's diagnosis of 
'something rotten in the state of Denmark (M 164) corroborations in 
Kafka's 'The Metamorphosis', in Weininger's Geschlecht und Charakter 
and Panizza's 'The Operated Jew'. 31 Santner's reading of Kafka has 
Gregor Samsa function as the sacrificial victim in the name of authority, 
both before his transformation, working his guts out despite the fact his 
dad has been keeping secret a strongbox full of cash all along, and after, 
where he becomes the monstrous, perverse wretch that embodies the 
breakdown and impotence of that authority - and must ultimately be 
taken out with the trash, allowing the family to flourish. Weininger, coming 
from the opposite side as it were, presents a neo-Kantian (and in certain 
respects proto-Lacanian) account of autonomy, which he defines as the 
metabolization-without-remainder of the categorical imperative. He takes 
it for granted that the likes of women and Jews, who are without souls, 
can never achieve this internalisation of the moral law, and will forever 
suffer conflicts between their own interests and those of the law. The 
Panizza story is ostensibly a piece of virulent anti-Semitism in which a 
particularly grotesque caricature of Jewishness called Faitel Stern goes 
to bizarre lengths (ultimately surgical) to be transformed into an authentic 
German, only to have his bestial and depraved Jewish frame and 
deportment burst out of its disguise at his wedding banquet. Santner 
suggests that Panizza's purpose is to arouse in his 'Aryan' readership the 
suspicion that they themselves can never quite claim to embody their 
81 Franz Kafka, 'The Metamorphosis', tr. Willa and Edwin Muir, The Complete Short 
Stories, London: Minerva, 1995: 89-139; Otto Weininger, Geschlecht und Charakter 
Eine prinzipielle Untersuchung, Munich: Matthes and Seitz, 1980; Oskar Panizza, The 
Operated Jew. Two Tales of Anti-Sernitism, tr. Jack Zipes, New York: Routledge, 199 1. 
74 
ideal, that all humanity is tainted with the 'lying substance' 
(Ugensubstan4, the slimy taint of dissimulation. 
In all these cases we have an account of the rottenness, Schreber's 
'poison of corpses', the redundancy on which the power of the order-word 
is based. This aspect of Santner's account focuses on the level of 
expression, dealing with the formation and breakdown of the notions of 
the pure German that physically affect Schreber - the conflicts raging 
between the majoritarian Aryan male, whose shaky identity is constituted 
on the basis of the exclusion of the minoritarian non-subjects of Jews, 
82 women and so on. Schreber, as former National Liberal Party 
candidate, and as a judge involved in the wranglings over the formation 
of Germany's Civil Code, suffered in madness a visceral critique of his 
Protestant subjectivity. As mentioned above, it is not a matter of 
'identification' with the repressed Other. If there is a 'return of the 
repressed', it is the very mechanisms of subjectification which Schreber 
encounters. Schreber's BwO is the surface on which these elements are 
arranged and classified, and assigned their identity - Schreber's contact 
with them is not through identification, but through the breakdown of his 
capacity to identify with 'himself' as dictated by categories he was thrust 
towards from birth. 
Santner also provides great insight into the level of content, as the 
controls on the body. Here he builds on the insights of Niederland and 
Schatzman, who point out the many correspondences between 
Schreber's delusions and specific practices of his father, and the 
' At one point, Schreber adjourns to Brazil to build a castle against a syphilitic 'yellow 
flood tide' (M 87). Santner demonstrates how syphilis, and other diseases of the nerves 
(such as increased soul-voluptuousness) would have been linked up with notions of 
Judaism and femininity - both of which are combined in Schreber's rebirth as the 
Eternal Jew, whose role is to have the new race of superhumans spring from his 
miracled-up womb (MPG Chapter 3). 
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corresponding insights of Lothane and Kittler relating instead to the 
practices of Schreber's psychiatrists, Flechsig and Weber. 83 In the former 
case, for example, miracles directed at Schreber's eyes (including one 
point where a Flechsig soul lives for a time as a watery substance on the 
surface of Schreber's eyeballs) are taken to relate to his father's 
insistence that the eyeball itself be sponged clean several times a day 
from shortly after birth; similarly, Schreber's distressing encounters with a 
'head compressing machine' are seen to have begun with Moritz 
Schreber's orthopaedic devices for improving posture. In the latter case, 
Schreber's accusation of 'soul murder' against Flechsig is taken to 
correspond to Flechsig's pioneering forays into eliminative materialism, his 
passion for legitimating psychiatry as a science on the basis of a 'psycho- 
physics' of the brain. 84 This project clearly runs contrary to the Order of 
the World as far as Schreber is concerned, since, through the study of 
dead brains on which it is founded, it literally dissects the human soul. 
83 Niederland, William: The Schreber Case: Psychoanalytic Proffle of a Paranoid 
Personality, Hillsdale, N. J.: Analytic Press, 1984. Morton Schatzman, Soul Murder 
Persecution in the Family, New York. Random House, 1973. Zvi Lothane, In Defense of 
Schreber Soul Murder and Psychiatry, Hillsdale, N. J.: Analytic Press, 1992. Friedrich 
Kittler, Discourse Networks 180011900, tr. Michael Metteer and Chris Cullens, Stanford: 
University of California Press, 1990 
84 Schreber is tormented by a variety of Flechsig nerves (particularly 'upper and 'middle 
Flechsig'), though when it comes to publishing his Memoirs, he takes great pains to 
insist he harbours no grudges against the living Flechsig (though he would be grateful if 
Flechsig could confirm that certain nefarious experiments in nerve contact were carried 
out). Schreber is informed by rays that there has been a war between Flechsigs and 
Schrebers for around three centuries. An ancestor of Flechsig's who was also a 'nerve 
specialist', though who worked in the Church rather than in as-yet non-existent 
psychiatry, was conducting illicit experiments in nerve-control. This 'country clergyman' 
tasted undreamed-of power through his experiments, and sought to 'retain his hold on 
divine rays' that resulted, with little inkling of the consequences. (His achievement was 
great, considering how easy it would be for future 'nerve-specialists', with whole 
asylums to play with. ) 
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The importance of Schreber's father to his delusions is not, then, as the 
original object of Schreber's homosexual desire. Moritz Schreber's 
pedagogical practices are in no uncertain terms the systematic disciplining 
and docilising of the child's body, at the same time as it is trained to 
internalise the fathers authority and good sense. Schreber senior was a 
scholar of the disciplinary techniques necessary for breeding a generation 
85 worthy of their Germanic heritage. As Santner notes, there are 
remarkable parallels between Moritzs techniques and those applied to 
Faitel Stem in Panizza's story. Faitel ultimately has all his bones broken 
and reset in the name of achieving that upright Aryan posture. And in 
Weininger's account of the transition from heteronomy to autonomy, there 
are close links with Moritz's methods for forcibly imposing the categorical 
imperative on the psyche of the child, in such a way as to make it 
incapable of distinguishing its own desires from its Duty. 
85 Among Moritz Schreber's many publications are such titles as Medical Indoor 
Gymnastics, or, A System of Hygienic Exercises for Home Use To Be Practised 
Anywhere without Apparatus or Assistance by Young and Old of Either Sex, for the 
Preservation of Health and General Activity, Anthropos, the Structural Wonder of the 
Human Organism, and The Family Friend as Educator and Conductor to Domestic 
Happiness, to Popular Health and to the Refinement of Man, for the Fathers and 
Mothers of the German People. He achieved fame as pioneer of the young science of 
'remedial gymnastics', and as inventor of the Schrebergarten, a specially designed 
exercise yard for the improvement of the nation's youth. Little is known about Daniel 
Paul's childhood, though it can be presumed that Moritz tested many of his authoritarian 
principles on his children, including the use of specially designed machines for shaping 
and disciplining bodies, for example keeping the back straight and head facing forward 
at table, or preventing any nocturnal indiscretions. The missing third chapter of Daniel 
Paul's Memoirs was specifically about his father and brother (the latter was also in the 
legal profession, but shot himself in 1877 within weeks of being appointed judge), but 
was apparently removed by other surviving Schrebers before publication. Aside from 
this there is no reference to his childhood in the Memoirs, though Moritz Schreber is 
fleetingly mentioned as being among the departed souls with whom Schreber has 
contact. 
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Santner introduces the notion of the 'surplus father' to designate the 
machineries of constant and invasive discipline and surveillance that 
characterise the rays' frequent attacks on Schreber's person, as 
delusional actualisations of the same abstract machines of control acting 
on Schreber in childhood and in hospital. For Santner, Schreber 
diagnoses the advent of Foucault's disciplinary society in these terms: 
that God, in conditions consistent with the Order of the World (the lost 
Golden Age that has been irreparably altered), knows only the departed 
souls who assimilate in him (apart from the occasional contact with 
dreaming poets). Following the catastrophe around which the Memoirs 
centre, God is forced into disastrous proximity with Schreber and his 
ignorance of the needs of the living human result in Schreber's many 
tortures and indignities. 86 The 'surplus father' is this harmful overproximity 
of forces insensitive to the needs of man - and its presence reconfigures 
the relationship between Schreber and the world, making necessary his 
active participation in the processes of unmanning he initially regards with 
horror. 
2.5 Schreber's Becoming-Woman 
We have looked briefly at the machineries of stratification, both on 
physical and symbolic levels, the suggestion being that forces acting on 
Schreber all his life actually reappear in his delusions. Perhaps we can 
transduce in the opposite direction Schreber's strategies of resistance - 
and submission - to these forces. Crucial among these is his cultivation 
(despite immense resistance to the plan to begin with) of soul 
voluptuousness, through a paradigmatic example of what Deleuze- 
Guattari describe as 'becoming-woman. The process Schreber refers to 
86 For example, the 'writing-down-system' and the language of the rays that fail to 
distinguish between a human understanding of the meanings of words, and their 
learning by rote and mechanical repetition (which invariably results in falsification). This 
bears interesting comparison with the distinction between oneself as individual 
consumer under Late Capitalism, and one's representations on any number of 
governmental, judicial and commercial databases across the globe. 
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as 'unmanning' is tied closely to soul murder, though while soul murder is 
more or less straightforwardly the destruction of Schreber's reason, 
unmanning is much more ambiguous, its status depending on whether it is 
occurring in consonance with the Order of the World, i. e. in the 
procreation of a new race in a miraculously fecund Schreber, or in 
opposition to the Order, i. e. as a tool of human origin, used in the plot to 
destroy Schreber's reason (M 72). On the one hand it pertains to 
Schreber's transformation into a woman, that he may be 'forsaken', i. e. 
used as a harlot and left to rot (M 71). However this gradually takes on a 
more positive tone, as he realises it is the best way to preserve his reason 
(and as he says, I would like to meet the man who, faced with the choice 
of either becoming a demented human being in a male habitus or a 
spirited woman, would not prefer the latter' (M 149)). Now that soul- 
contact has been established between Schreber and God, his well-being 
is index-linked to the proximity of God's nerves to his body. Schreber's 
nerves have reached such a pitch of excitation that God (or at least his 
posterior realms) are inexorably drawn into Schreber's body, to perish 
within with plaintive cries for help. 
Schreber discovers the happiest situation for all concerned is if he can 
keep the rays' attention by making himself appealing to them, allowing him 
to avoid either assimilating them or enduring the pain of their withdrawal. 
This he does by occupying his mind with all things feminine, dressing in 
trinkets and bows and posing sweetly before the mirror, and by imagining 
himself as a man and woman making love. There is no simple way in 
which Schreber simply thinks of himself as, for example, a woman trapped 
in a man's body. Rather he has been picked up and thrust onto a 
trajectory of becoming, saturated with feminine nerves, the presence of 
which, he remains certain, would be confirmed by a physical examination 
(M 205-206,295). Schreber's extreme experiences bequeath him a 
certain healthy arrogance that enables him to pursue this course, despite 
its obvious dissonance with everything befitting a man of his position - 
'he who entered into a special relationship to divine rays as I have is to a 
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certain extent entitled to sh.. on all the world' (M 177) - even if he is still 
at great pains to emphasise his divine transformations have 'nothing 
whatever to do with any idea of masturbation or anything like it' (M 208). 
From the above, we can construct a pleasing fairy story (with a moral): 87 
Schreber, as former National Liberal Party activist, was fundamentally 
concerned with the fights of individuals, the juridical safeguarding of their 
freedom (most specifically, against being detained against their will). But 
in his illness, he is confronted with the dark underside of this idealism. He 
confronts the nonmetabolisable outside of the rational (i. e. sane) male 
b grantU Protestant German subject position he formerly took IIWI ed. His 
eventual solution is to explore the restorative potential of abandoning that 
position, having by this stage been through ordeals far more terrifying 
than the disapproval of his peers. And where as judge he would have left 
the distinction between sane and insane to the psychiatrists, when he 
finds himself on the wrong end of such a judgement, he challenges the 
right of the state to keep him locked up - and winS. 
88 (We will paper 
over his relapse and death in hospital, for the purposes of a 'happy 
ending' to this paragraph. ) Such a version of Schreber's importance 
could well arise from the kinds of nonreadings of Deleuze-Guattari 
mentioned in the introduction, where 'schizophrenia' is a lifestyle choice of 
the 'right-on' white-faced man, as is becoming-woman: wacky, naughty 
simulated deviances which our Everyman is already better placed to enjoy 
than either actual mental patients (who have carelessly let themselves be 
institutionalised - they should have preserved that little bit of strata to 
wake up to, should they not! 89) or actual women (who have to bother with 
87 Lest my intentions be unclear, this paragraph parodies alternative readings of 
SchreberlDeleuze-Guaftari. 
88 However, it is pertinent to note his contempt for his fellow patients - as far as we are 
told, all lunatics and rough types of low humour, with whom Schreber regularly got into 
punch-ups. 
89 'You have to keep enough of the organism for it to reform each dawn and you 
have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to respond 
to the dominant reality' (TP 160). Easy for them to say, Schreber might respond. 
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the irksome detail of actually fighting for their rights, taking valuable time 
away from pdvate becomings). 
Material semiotics is not interested in the residual voluntarism which 
drives such readings (be they critical or celebratory). What I have 
attempted to do here is approach Schreber as a complex of both territorial 
machines (the processes of discipline/surveillance and symbolic 
investiture) and deterritorialising vectors (finding new joy through 
becoming-woman, neutralising command by harnessing its redundancy) 
- to arrive at an account of Schreber-as-subject as a shifting point along 
these trajectories. There is no one founding point or principle to be arrived 
at, though the order-word has emerged as the locus of switchings 
between these paths, constitutive of both sub- and inter-personal levels 
- most noticeably in Schreber, where such a distinction between levels 
collapses: it doesn't matter from the command's 'point of view' whether it 
has been actualised in a courtroom or hospital, or in a single individual's 
head. 
In avoiding anything like the moralising, voluntarist position caricatured 
above, it must be stressed that the territorial and deterritorialising 
distinction does not correspond to 'bad' and 'good' - the two are opposite 
sides of the same process, and the issue of whether one is preferable to 
the other cannot be prejudged: 'Good and bad are only the products of an 
active and temporary selection, which must be renewed' (TP 10). Soul 
murder, for example, is for Schreber initially understood as the destruction 
of his reason, and is related by Santner (among other things) to 
Schreber's anxieties about the dehumanising effects of early materialist 
psychiatry (which knows only of corpses). Should we then criticise such 
scientific ventures, because of their indifference to the sensitivities of a 
Schreber? Dennett's Consciousness Explained would have given him 
more nightmares, as no doubt would Capitalism and Schizophrenia. One 
point is that such ventures cannot get off the ground merely through 
human effort, they must be taken up by the appropriate economic, political 
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and libidinal assemblages - if Schreber had not felt the impact of these 
ideas directly on his body as already imbued with symbolic and physical 
power, it is unlikely they would have had such dramatic effects. Schreber 
suffers in his conflict with such assemblages, finding his rights eroded and 
identity-assumptions dismantled or decoded. But as it happens, what 
relief Schreber achieves is through the other side of soul murder, 
unmanning, where the limitations of these processes, their failure to lock 
down all the potentials for experimentation open to Schreber, give rise to 
the heightened intensities of his transformations - but these 
transformations were dependent on soul murder in the first place. 
Deleuze-Guaffad use schizophrenia as the immanent end-point of 
capitalism as a planetary machine, the 'subject of the decoded flows on 
the body without organs' (AO 34). While there is not room to explore this 
properly, this thesis is intended to be consonant with that use, in the 
sense that capitalism's decoding of flows, the dismantling of traditional 
structures, of familial roles and of hierarchical organisations of businesses 
and states alike, and most crucially to drastically changing conceptions of 
the subject, tends towards schizophrenia as 'soul genocide'. Material 
serniotics, which oscillates between the Strata and schizophrenia in the 
aforementioned sense, tracks this (inexorable? ) process, and the new 
instabilities and potentials it generates. 
2.6 Conclusion: Homunculess 
To retrace the somewhat frantic steps of the preceding, I present now 
some words of clarification. I drew on Dennett's notion of 
'heterophenomenology' to allow us to take Schreber at his word. We did 
not attempt to explain away his account, but rather to set it in a relation of 
mutual illumination with the theoretical approaches outlined. This was 
done by shedding the foregone conclusion that Schreber's account must 
be read first and foremost as delusional, but rather that it gives insight not 
only into his own experience but also into ours (however far apart they 
may initially seem). Schreber thus becomes exemplary in his contact with 
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the prepersonal and suprapersonal, rather than being the difficult anomaly 
he would be for most accounts of language and the human. 
What, then, has Schreber illuminated for the project we have been calling 
material serniotics? Firstly, and in continuation of the ideas presented in 
Chapter 1, we presented a 'bottom-up' rather than 'top-down' account of 
thought and consciousness, whereby the human body is immersed in 
crowds of preindividual singularities, which struggle for domination of the 
body and its movements. These 'entities', we proposed, are the manifold 
of connections between body and environment. Rather than a preexistent 
division between subject and objects, we have the continual interplay 
between nervous system and environment impacting on one another in all 
kinds of different ways, the boundary between the two constantly 
contested. There is no Central Meaner that receives and sends out 
information to the world; different parts of the bodymind act on and react 
to the world in different (but more or less consistent) ways. These 
connective syntheses that precede the subject are never neutral, but are 
always already weighted with relative degrees of intensity or desire - 
relative to others on the same level and relative to emergent, global 
syntheses of the kind that could appear as conscious judgements ('bad, 
scared, help! ') or instinctive, spontaneous reactions (such as the complex 
corrective movements people exhibit to avoid falling over, if you give them 
a hefty shove). 
Because these subpersonal syntheses between body and world have 
never been neutral, we avoid the charge that the departure of the 
homunculus or Central Meaner in any way leaves a void that needs filling, 
or that it impoverishes our account of the subject. We see with Schreber 
ways in which this Pandemonium of connections is forcibly integrated into 
a global whole - with varying degrees of success. The question of how to 
compare Schreber's consciousness to that of 'normal' humans is not one I 
feel needs to be tackled in those terms, since I do not wish to emphasise 
the pathological side of his story, but rather those interconnected aspects 
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(subjectification, inner speech, receptivity and resistance to command) 
with which we are all engaged in different ways. Though we now leave 
Schreber, we will proceed to develop these aspects, to show how 
Deleuze-Guattad's account (combined with other influences in future 
chapters) opens up this approach to thought, language and identity. 
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3. Schizoanalytic Investigations: 
Deleuze-Guattari and Wittgenstein 
3.0 Introduction 
My contention at the end of the last chapter was that our examination of 
Schreber had relevance not simply for the Judge himself (nor just for 
sufferers of paranoid schizophrenia), but that it raised questions 
regarding the formation of human subjects in general. In this chapter, I 
will examine this approach more broadly, while at the same time making 
connections between Deleuze-Guattari and a philosopher with whom 
they have seldom been mentioned in the same breath - Ludwig 
Wittgenstein. This will orient our Deleuze-Guattarian project of a 
pragmatics of order-words, as well as setting the stage for later 
discussions of some limited convergences between so-called analytic 
and Continental philosophy. The central point in what follows is the 
'exteriorising' of language carried out in different ways by both 
Wittgenstein and Deleuze-Guattari - their rejection of the possibility of 
considering problems of meaning without also considering specific uses; 
the importance at every step of the level of social practice (the socius in 
AntiOedipusl term). 
At first sight, the project of engineering unnatural congress between 
experimental schizoanalysts and concept-creators Deleuze-Guattari, and 
the scourge of philosophical mystification Wittgenstein, may seem 
misguided. Deleuze says virtually nothing about Wittgenstein himself, but 
he does not mince his words when it comes to Wittgenstein's followers. 
In a 1988 television interview with Claire Parnet, the ABC Primer, he 
describes the school of Wittgensteinians as 'a philosophical catastrophe', 
a 'massive regression' of all philosophy, and in an aside in his Leibniz 
book of the same year, he refers to 'Wittgenstein's disciples spread[ing] 
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their misty confusion, sufficiency and terror. 90 Likewise, there is much in 
Wiftgenstein's painstaking, incremental and notoriously elliptical method 
and his explicit and implied attacks on metaphysics to suggest he would 
have little time for Deleuze-Guattari's deceptively 'fast and loose' 
approach to their vast range of subject matter. Wittgenstein's derision of 
the kinds of 'non-spatial, non-temporal phantasm[s]' (1 108)91 that 
philosophy is inclined to invent, indicate that he would strenuously object 
to such slippery notions as Body-without-Organs, desiring-production and, 
indeed, phantasm, that liberally season Deleuze/Deleuze-Guattad's work. 
My main concern is to illuminate the small but crucial zone where their 
respective approaches overlap - specifically, in relation to the irreducibly 
social nature of language - in the hope of finding a Wittgenstein 
independent of the schools who have taken his name, and a Deleuze- 
Guattari who perhaps are not as anathema to trends within so-called 
analytic philosophy as may first appear. 
3.1 Meaning is Use 
For present purposes, I will concentrate on Wittgenstein in his guise as 
demystifier of philosophical obsessions with mental processes, and with 
language understood on that basis. I propose a reading, which I hope will 
be largely uncontroversial, of the Investigations as dissolving traditional 
philosophical problems into problems of language use, but with the 
proviso that 'language use' is not taken as 'purely' linguistic, but to always 
refer outwards to specific social situations. Wittgenstein regularly mocks 
philosophy's attempts to understand the mechanics of language in 
isolation from social interaction - such as trying to understand naming by 
90 LAb6c6daire de Gilles Deleuze, avec Claire Parnet (Gilles Deleuze's ABC Primer, 
with Claire Parnet), TV series directed by Pierre-Andr6 Boutang, filmed in 1988 and 
broadcast 1994-1995. Quotes from the overview of the series, prepared by Charles J. 
Stivale, 1996: part 3, published on the web at http: /Mww. langlab. wayne. edu/Romance/ 
FreD_G/ABC3. htmi. The Fold. Leibniz and the Baroque, tr. Tom Conley, University of 
Minnesota Press 1993: 76. 
91 References are to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M. 
Anscombe, Blackwell 1998, and are of the form (book, section). 
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repeating a name over and over (138) - as well as the attempt to capture 
the sense of expressions like 'to understand in a flash' by trying to catch 
hold of that intangible feeling by introspection (e. g. 1 131,197). He even 
goes so far as to issue the injunction 'Do not try to analyse your own inner 
experience' (11 xi) - somewhat ironically, given the amount of time he 
appears to spend doing it. His private language argument, and the famous 
discussions of the experience of pain, can be seen as prime mobilisations 
of a technique which can be described as subtracting a dimension, a 
strategy proposed by Deleuze-Guaffad (TIP 21), that is, resisting the 
temptation to posit a supposedly explanatory transcendent notion and 
critiquing such notions where they are bequeathed by common sense. 
For Wittgenstein, this dimension is most often that special, private 
something (such as whatever it is that might actually be in each of our 
beetle-boxes (1 293)) which is appealed to by way of explaining how 
language works. Such appeals to the first person perspective, on the 
archaic, Cartesian assumption of its privileged access to reality, are 
shown to be appeals to 'a wheel that can be turned but nothing else 
moves with it, [which hence] is not part of the mechanism' (1271). 
A central proposal that follows from this rejection of mentalist accounts of 
language and thought as adequate justifications, is that the meanings of 
words cannot be separated from their use, a move Deleuze endorses in 
The Logic of Sense (146). 92 The idea that there is something that is the 
92 This endorsement is not without anti-representational qualification: '[S]uch use is not 
defined through a function of representation in relation to the represented, nor even 
through representativeness as the form of possibility. Here, as elsewhere, the functional 
is transcendental in the direction of a topology, and use is in the relation between 
representation and something extra-representative, a non-represented and merely 
expressed entity. Representation envelops the event in another nature, it envelops it at 
its borders, it stretches until this point, and it brings about this lining or hem. This is the 
operation that defines the living usage, to the extent that representation, when it does 
not reach this point, remains only a dead letter confronting that which it represents, and 
stupid in its representatiyeness' (ibid. ) This seems to connect with Wittgenstein's 
notion that to mean is'to go up to', 'to aim at', which in his later work replace notions of 
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meaning of a particular word, that can be accessed in isolation from any 
particular use in a particular context, is thoroughly dismantled in the 
Investigations: 'only someone who already knows how to do something 
with it', writes Wittgenstein, 'can significantly ask a name' (1 31), and 
later, 'When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that 
a great deal of stage setting in the language is presupposed if the mere 
act of naming is to make sense' (1257). 
Wittgenstein can repeatedly be seen to emphasise the remarkable range 
of uses and applications of language, with a view to hacking any story - 
such as that of naming (as we have seen), or that of communication (to 
which we will return) - which might claim to capture what is essential 
about language. Indeed (in 192), he criticises the notion that there is an 
essence to language that lies below the surface, arguing instead for what 
is 'already lies open to view and that becomes surveyable by a 
rearrangement. ' One of his methods is to take a particular word, such as 
the verbs'to believe' (e. g. 1587), 'to obey' (e. g. 1206,219), or'to be' (e. g. 
1 558), and by means of hypothetical examples and extreme cases, he 
shows that whenever it seems we have a grasp on their supposed 
essence, it evaporates into thin air, and all we are left with is the varieties 
of usage and the corresponding varieties of contexts or language-games 
in which they occur. An example whose significance will become clear in 
what follows, is that of the statement 
"My broom is in the corner, " - is this really a statement about the 
broomstick and the brush? [ ... ] Suppose that, instead of saying "Bring me 
the broom", you said "Bring me the broomstick and the brush which is fitted 
onto it"I Isn't the answer "Do you want the broom? Why do you put it so 
oddly? " ] This sentence, one might say, achieves the same as the 
ordinary one, but in a more roundabout way (160). 
stupid in its representativeness' (ibid. ) This seems to connect with Wittgenstein's notion 
that to mean is 'to go up to', 'to aim af, which in his later work replace notions of 
representation, as though the latter required the specification of this movement, if it were 
not simply to be static and dead. 
88 
In other words, what appears to be a case of analysing a statement into 
its logical components, or basic constituents, turns out to take us further 
away from rather than closer to understanding. To better understand 
statements and commands concerning brooms, we need not dig around 
for the essence of broomness, but instead are referred upwards and 
outwards, firstly to situations where brooms come in handy (as wholes 
rather than connected bits) and more broadly to the sphere of social 
interactions in which remarks and commands in general can be 
understood to function. We can clumsily refer to this direction of analysis 
as'reducing upwards, and we will discover more of its importance in what 
follows. 
3.2 Language Games 
Wittgenstein's famous notion of the 'language-game' has been 
instrumental in his frequent alignment with relativist linguists such as 
Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf, and the associated suggestion that 
different cultures can have no hope of understanding each other - the 
idea that language and thought are intertwined to the extent that speakers 
of different languages live in incommensurable realities, between which 
only vague, approximate and ultimately futile bridges of translation can be 
built. Since on this view there is a one-way determination from language 
to thought, the 'facts of the matter' are said to be accessible only to fully- 
fledged players of a particular language-game, and one language-game 
changes in nature when subsumed or assimilated by another. I propose to 
leave this position of linguistic determinism and translative nihilism 
hanging in the air for the moment, and approach the question of the 
nature of language from a slightly different angle, that of the command 
and the rule, the analyses of which take up a large proportion of one the 
key texts for present purposes, Wittgenstein's Philosophical 
Investigations. 
To examine one of Wittgenstein's suggestions, most relevant to Deleuze- 
Guattari's account, could a language eAst which consists entirely of 
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commands? Right at the start of the Investigations Wittgenstein 
proposes a language shared by builder A and his assistant, B, consisting 
only of four words, "block", "pillar", "slab" and "beam". A calls one out, and 
B fetches the appropriate item - 'Conceive this as a complete primitive 
language. ' (12) That this thought experiment is at all plausible has been 
questioned by a number of commentators: surely the builders need to 
have more means of communication open to them than these four 
wordS? 93 However, it is here that we have a striking connection with 
Deleuze-Guattari, who in A Thousand Plateaus propose that the 'basic 
determination' of language is the command, or order-word. Raimond 
Gaita phrases what seems to be the insight, 
something which is like what the builders do must have been the origins of 
all natural languages - that in their beginnings, natural languages must 
have consisted of a few names which were devised and used to further a 
common enterprise, and that the features of natural languages which are 
essentially connected with peoples, their histories and cultures, are 
sophisticated developments from such primitive languages. Therefore (the 
thought continues) whatever qualitative discontinuities there may be 
between language as we have it and what the builders do, they are not of a 
kind which mark the difference between language and a mere semblance of 
it (WCE 102). 94 
Gaita goes on to argue that this view, if it can indeed be taken as what 
Wittgenstein is proposing in these passages, marks a moment of 
divergence from the main thrust of the rest of the Investigations, and 
93 Such commentators include: Newton Garver, This Complicated Form of Life: Essays 
on Wittgenstein Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court 1994; Raymond Gaita, 
'Language and Conversation: Wittgenstein's Builders', in A. Phillips Griffiths, ed.: 
Wittgenstein Centenary Essays, Cambridge University Press, 1991; R. Rhees, 
Discussions of Wittgenstein, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970 
94 Wittgenstein tackles the apparent incompleteness of this language of orders in 1.18, 
drawing the analogy between our language and an ancient city with streets, squares and 
suburbs added through the ages. Prior to which addition was it not yet a town, not yet a 
city? 
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hence for Gaita, an unrepresentative approach not crucial to the work as 
a whole. The problem is that the builders appear to lack what is central to 
natural (as opposed to purely artificial or functional) languages, namely 
the capacity to distinguish between sense and nonsense, which, he 
insists, depends on the capacity for conversation. Though a situation 
(proposed by Norman Malcolm) can be imagined in which A utters 
something resembling nonsense - such as 'Slabl' in a situation where, 
clearly, only beams will do, causing B to fall about laughing, and A to slap 
his forehead and chuckle when he realises his mistake - this is not 
convincing for Gaita, because he assumes that they would only find it 
funny if they had experience of other situations of nonsensical uses of 
words, i. e. in a conversational setting. 95 Gaita believes this to be a 
Wittgensteinian insight into the difference between natural, public 
languages which are intertwined with the human beings that are capable 
of conversing in them, and the mere semblances of language we might 
find amongst robots, say, or amongst a tribe of Wittgensteinian builders. 
Natural language is for Gaita characterised by the very necessity that 
mote than simply commanding can happen in it. 
3.3 The Abominable Faculty 
In contrast to Gaita's emphasis on conversation, I hope to show that a 
more sophisticated and all-encompassing notion of the command, namely 
Deleuze-Guattari's order-word, can indeed be taken as language's 
delementary unif (TP 76) - more fundamental, even, than subjects or 
signs, information or communication - and that this approach to 
language coheres with much in Wittgenstein's Investigations. 
As with his other peculiar and occasionally disturbing examples of inability 
to recognise, to understand, to follow rules, Wittgenstein shows that given 
the u nderdetermi nation of rules themselves, and the fact that when you 
95 Norman Malcolm, 'Language Game (2)', in Wittgenstein., Attention to Particulars, 
Essays in Honour of Rush Rhees, ed. Phillips, D. and Winch, P, London: Macmillan, 
1989. 
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start looking for the rules for how to correctly obey rules, you end up in an 
infinite regress, that the understanding of rule-following has to stop 
somewhere. He writes 
'How am I able to follow a rule? " - if this is not a question about causes, 
then it is about the justification for my following the rule in the way I do. 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrocK and my 
spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: 'This is simply what I do, (I 
217). 
Need we be satisfied with this apparent dead end? 
Rather than pursue the intra-linguistic line towards the infinite regress of 
rule-upon-rule, Wiftgenstein, on a number of occasions, appeals to 
training ['Abrichtung'] as the basis for language functioning the way it does 
- the teaching of language is not explanation (1 5), nor can it simply be 
ostensive definition (1 6), 'but only [these] together with a particular 
training' (ibid. ). Later, he writes 'Following a rule is analogous to obeying 
an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way' 
(1206). This is why it is nonsense to assume that conscious operations of 
interpretation or understanding are necessary components of the order. 
When I obey a rule, I do not choose. 
I obey the rule blindly (1219). 
As Gordon Bearn writes, this is 'Training in the sense that we train 
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animals to do tricks, or the sense in which we break a horse'. It could be 
otherwise, but it is not, and we are unable to fully accept as plausible, 
people who are in other respects normal (i. e. not completely insane), who 
nonetheless think it intuitively likely, for example, that the instruction 
'continue the series n+2' means one thing up to 1000 - 2,4,6, etc - 
and another - 1004,1008, etc - thereafter (1 185). This is because, as 
9'0 Gordon C. F. Beam, 'Derrida Dry: Iterating Iterability Analytically', Diactifics, 25.3: 3- 
25, Fall 1995: 21 
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Deleuze-Guattad say, the whole process of induction into language is one 
of learning to obey commands, to accept as given the 'semiotization' of 
reality on the basis of the social practices in which we must participate. 
When the schoolmistress instructs her students on a rule of grammar or 
arithmetic, she is not informing them, any more than she is informing 
herself when she questions a student [ ... ] The compulsory education 
machine does not communicate education; it imposes upon the child 
semiotic coordinates possessing all of the dual foundations of grammar 
(masculine-feminine, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of the statement- 
subject of enunciation, etc. ) (TIP 75-76). 97 
We are trained, disciplined and docilised, to the point that we tend not to 
be particularly aware of the 'abominable faculty' that has been instilled in 
us, 'consisting in emitting, receiving and transmitting order-words' (TP 76). 
This serniotization occurs through the interlocking of the rules of linguistic 
and paralinguistic expression on the one hand, which have as much to do 
with gesture, facial expression and posture as to do with word order, 
matching tenses and the like, and on the other hand, the networks of 
social practices (such as the way the day is divided up into work time and 
free time, or the differing etiquette of communication with peers, elders 
and juniors) segmentalised with appropriate behaviours for each 
situation. 98 They call these two sides of the social machine the machinic 
97 Of course, that there is a 'child' upon which these semiotic coordinates are imposed 
is in a certain sense only true after their imposition, since the opposition 'child-adult' is 
as weighted with social-grammatical significance as the other oppositions mentioned. 
As with sexual difference, age difference involves an admixture of biological and 
cultural factors that use the former to justify and naturalise the latter. 'Not only are 
prisoners treated like children, but children treated like prisoners. Children are 
subjected to an infantilization which is alien to them. ' Deleuze in conversation with 
Foucault, 'Intellectuals and Power', tr. Donald Bouchard and Sherry Simon, in Michel 
Foucault, Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984, ed. Sylv6re Lotringer, New 
York: Semiotext(e), 1996 
98 Wittgenstein gives weight to this picture in several ways, e. g. 1. his many examples of 
misuses of language or rules of maths which are inescapably odd and uncanny, 
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assemblage of bodies (training, discipline) and the collective assemblage 
of enunciation (the statements or order-words in circulation at a given 
point). The difficulty of fully distinguishing these levels mirrors the difficulty 
in Wittgenstein of distinguishing the corresponding terms, form of life, and 
language-game. 99 I propose reading the two sides as mutually, holistically 
interdependent, yet without referring to or representing one another, a 
relationship Deleuze-Guaftad describe as reciprocal presupposition: 
neither side can be adequately understood except in relation to the other, 
neither is primary or foundational, they both appear at once (in the double 
articulation of the strata). Our language-games do not represent our form 
of life - philosophy cannot create some special language that gets more 
deeply into the heart of things, nor can it use 'some sort of preparatory, 
provisional one [ ... it can only] use language full-blown [... ] this by itself 
shews that I can adduce only exterior facts about language' (1 120). 100 
Why so? Because language has no interior. As Deleuze-Guaftari put it, 'If 
language always seems to presuppose itself, if we cannot assign it a 
nonlinguistic point of departure, it is because language does not operate 
between something seen (or felt) and something said, but always goes 
from saying to saying' (TP 76). 
showing us that disagreements of grammar don't concern merely the intellect or 
aesthetic sensibility but run all the way to our sense of what it is to be 'normal', safe, 
acceptable. 2. his linking of such familiar and fundamental notions as truth and pain 
with training - arguing that neither notion and its associated behaviours comes to us 
over and above our training as social animals (truth: 1.136-137; pain, e. g.: 1.257,11. xii). 
99 Wittgenstein is not entirely helpful when he says'to imagine a language is to imagine 
a form of life' (119), and 'the term glanguage-game* is meant to bring into prominence 
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life' (123). 
100 In the first of these notions, what is being rejected is the possibility of a 'perfect 
language' which is absolutely flush with the Real, mapping it point for point not the 
notion that linguistic invention (combined, necessarily, with the practice of a people) has 
the potential to transform their relation with the world, such as by increasing their affects 
and powers. I take it that the lafter notion is central to the philosophy of Deleuze- 
Guattari, if not Wittgenstein. The difference between the two possibilities is that the 
former is predicated on an entirely representational notion of language, the latter on the 
exteribrised notion of language I present here. 
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The necessary exteriority of language (Wittgenstein's idea that everything 
is already on the surface), and the all-encompassing nature of the order- 
word, are made clearer in the following passage from A Thousand 
Plateaus (with an explanatory sentence from me inserted in the middle): 
'Order-words do not concern commands only, but every act that is linked 
to statements by a Osocial obligation", Every statement displays this link, 
directly or indirectly' - because every statement commits us to other 
statements through the rules of grammar, and ultimately to acts, which we 
are forced to carry out if we are not to be shown to be mad, or lying, or 
stupid, or otherwise unable to function socially. 'The only possible 
definition of language is the set of all order-words, implicit 
presuppositions, or speech acts current in a given language at a given 
moment' (TP 79). Wittgenstein is close to this, when he muses 'The civil 
status of contradiction, or its status in civil life: there is the philosophical 
problem' (1 125, my emphasis). How would we react to people who 
constantly contradict themselves in their words and actions? How willing 
would you be to spend an entire weekend, as an experiment, deliberately 
contradicting yourself? This would seem to suggest, that no matter how 
willingly and deliberately we aspire to consistency, correctness and 
consideration for others in thought and deed, we arefrom time to time 
reminded what awaits us when we mess up. Is this sheer coincidence, or 
can we discern a pattern here? The point is that as long as we behave in 
accordance with the grammar of behaviour, conforming to others' 
expectations, we are allowed to get on and mind our own business, but 
when we break the rules, or apply them in peculiar new ways, we might 
either be praised for creating something new, or else we risk 
admonishment, censure, ostracism, imprisonment or a damn good hiding. 
(Clearly these controls do not govern each of us in the same way - they 
vary dramatically in their effects across bodies, genders, situations, and 
we are affected by and respond to them in vastly different ways. It is in 
this continuous interaction that we 'become who we are'. ) 
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It could be argued that to focus in this way on this allegedly intrinsic 
nonnativity of linguistic interaction is paranoid, sensationalist and possibly 
destructive. Surely we should attend to the content of what people say 
rather than this dark level on which we are supposedly preoccupied with 
emitting and receiving commands all the time? Unfortunately such a 
nalive view fails to get to grips with how the system keeps itself stable, 
mistaking the level of information and communication for the bottom line, 
the zone of most importance. It fails to see that the ostensive content of 
conversations and other linguistic interactions (newspaper articles, 
colloquia, sessions in parliament or court, bureaucracy, etc) is entirely 
dependent on the normative, behavioural level, and that the content itself 
is often entirely redundant - 'the redundancy of the order-word is [ ... ] 
primary and [ ... ] information 
is only the minimal condition for the 
transmission of order-words' JP 79). We will return to the centrality of 
redundancy shortly - but here it will suffice to say that for a pragmatics of 
the order-word, what is said is subordinate in importance to, and entirely 
dependent on, what is being done in saying it. 
To rehearse the objection again via a return to Gaita's argument against a 
language consisting solely of commands, surely for all the implicit and 
explicit commanding that goes on, there is a lot more to our linguistic 
behaviour, most of which seems to be unrelated to commands? What is 
wrong with Gaita's notion that it is conversation rather than commanding 
or ordering that characterises natural language? It should help to 
emphasise two basic notions that Deleuze-Guaftari share with 
Wittgenstein. Firstly, we again have the idea that to speak is to do 
something (which may succeed or fail), something necessarily public 
(even if one is alone). 101 This speech-action depends on the backdrop of 
shared social practices (which are divisible - though not absolutely or 
101 1 allude here once again to Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument as evidence 
that language is necessarily public and social; I am not suggesting that private 
utterances are not possible, but rather that insofar as they are linguistic, they are 
dependent on (if not entirely governed by) social machinery. 
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straightforwardly - into ling uisticlsym bol ic and nonlinguistic regularities 
(and irregularities)). Secondly, Deleuze-Guattari argue that the most basic 
properties of utterances are the ways in which they conform to, or break 
away from, these regularities - moves characterised respectively as 
order-word and password - corresponding to the extent to which 
utterances are, in Wittgenstein's broad sense, grammatical, by which I 
take to mean not just rules of sentence formation, but the rules of 
applications of different terms in different situations, as well as their links 
with non-linguistic behaviour (facial expression, intonation, gesture and so 
on). What Deleuze-Guaftari call the password, then, corresponds (in the 
first instance) to deviant, inventive, experimental uses of language. 102 
This can be from such a case as Wittgenstein urging us to change our 
associations from one set of pictures to another (e. g. 1 115), or when he 
suggests that conceptual moves in philosophy (such as the proposal that 
'sense-data are the material of which the universe is made) are less 
'grammatical movements', or moves within an already-established 
language-game, as 'a new way of looking at things [... like] a new way of 
painting; or again, a new metre, or a new kind of song. -' (1401). 
What exactly am I proposing here? There are two aspects which we now 
examine in greater detail - the notion of reciprocal presupposition, and 
how it differs from relations of representation or signification, and the 
notion of the nonnativity of the order-word, its status as mechanism of 
normalisation. 
Reciprocal presupposition is the codependence of the two levels we have 
been discussing - that of language-game, or collective assemblage of 
enunciation, and that of form of life, or machinic assemblage. The former 
consists in events, the latter in bodies, their actions and passions. 
Paradoxically, they differ in nature but are both equally material - the 
102 'In the first instance' because later in A Thousand Plateaus, the password, or 
component of passage, is given a much wider role in nonlinguistic circumstances, 
especially in 'Of the Refrain' (TP 310-350). 
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level of events inserts itself into the flows of bodies, as incorporeal 
transforynations effected by speech-acts or other emissions of order- 
words (gestures, memos, publications, legislations, etc). The 
'instantaneousness' of the incorporeal transformation is not to be taken in 
terms of clock-time, since its effects on the level of bodies may be 
staggered (for example, the discovery of an historical document that 
resonates in the present, connecting up moment of emission and moment 
of reception across history; or a 'no spitting' poster in a department store, 
imposing a transformation on each customer into potential spitter and/or 
spat-on). 103 
For the purposes of this section, the point is to introduce reciprocal 
presupposition as an initial assumption from which the investigation 
proceeds: rather than separating language from the rest of behaviour, we 
separate the level of event (or expression) from the level of bodies (the 
corresponding content). As far as this goes here, the point is that the two 
must be examined in tandem, neither is primary or foundational. 
3.4 Relativism and Mentalese 
It is time to return to the question of linguistic or cultural relativism, which I 
take to be the thesis (often known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis) that 
1. 'the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions 
which has to be organised by our minds, 
103 '... the most obscure, seemingly trivial part of the whole puzzle appeared in a 
department store in Houston. It was a sign that said: 'NO SMOKING. NO SPITTING. 
THE MGT. ' This replaced an earlier sign that had hung on the main showroom wall for 
many years, saying only ONO SMOKING. THE MGT. O The change, although small, had 
subtle repercussions. The store catered only to the very wealthy, and this clientele did 
not object to being told that they could not smoke. The fire hazard, after all, was 
obvious. On the other hand, that bit about spitting was somehow a touch offensive [ ... ] 
Resentment festered. Sales fell off. And membership in the Houston branch of God's 
Lightning increased [ ... ] (The odd thing was that the Management had nothing at all to 
do with the sign. )' Robert Shea and Robert Anton Wilson, The Illuminatus Thlogy, New 
York: Dell, 1975 71-72 
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2. 'this means largely by the linguistic system in our minds', 
3. that there is 'an agreement [to organise and classify in this way] 
that holds throughout our speech community', and 
4. that Ve cannot talk at all except by subscribing to the 
organisation and classification of data which the agreement 
decrees"04. 
This position leads one to severe pessimism when it comes to the 
possibility of ever understanding or communicating with speakers of other 
languages, and makes the task of learning another language seem nigh- 
on impossible, since it would involve displacing the terms of one's own 
speech community, which Whorf sees as 'absolutely obligatory' But 
moreover, it reffies language to the godlike position of providing the very 
structure of our experience, indeed of being the very condition of 
possibility of conscious thought. 
In this extreme form, the thesis is relatively easy to dismiss. Steven Pinker 
does a good job of dismantling the usual arguments in its favour, which 
tend to rely on extremely dodgy anthropological evidence (mystificatory 
accounts of Apache grammar, the Hopi conception of time or the 
astounding range of Eskimo words for snow (almost as many as can be 
found among professional skiers! ); physiologically ignorant accounts of 
different languages' supposedly bizarre colour spectrums, and so on). 
However, he goes on to stretch our credulity a little when, in the interests 
of demonstrating how thought is entirely possible without any form of 
language, he cites the example of Ildefonso, hero of Susan Schaller's A 
Man Without Words. 105 I quote Pinker's gloss and italicise the more 
blatant contradictions. Ildefonso, a deaf adult who allegedly lacked 'any 
form of language whatsoever - no sign language, no writing, no lip 
reading, no speech', was 
104 Quotes from J. B. Carroll, ed., Language, Thought and Reality. Selected Writings of 
Benjamin Lee Whorf, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press 1956, cited by Steven Pinker, The 
Language Instinct (hereafter LI), London: Penguin, 1994. 
105 Susan Schaller, A Man Without Words, New York: Summit Books, 1991 
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a twenty-seven-year-old immigrant from a small Mexican village whom she 
met while working as a sign language interpreter in Los Angeles. 
Ildefonso's animated eyes conveyed an unmistakable intelligence and 
curiosity, and Schaller became his volunteer teacher and companion. He 
soon showed her that he had a full grasp of number he learned to do 
addition on paper in three minutes and had little trouble understanding the 
base-ten logic behind two-digit numbers. In an epiphany reminiscent of the 
story of Helen Keller, Ildeforiso [as opposed to "the nameless one"] 
grasped the principle of naming when Schaller tried to teach him the sign 
for 'caV. A dam burst, and he demanded to be shown the signs for al I the 
objects he was familiar with. Soon he was able to convey to Schaller parts 
of his life story: how as a child he had begged his desperately poor 
parents to send him to school, the kinds of crops he had picked in different 
states, his evasions of immigration authorities. He led Schaller to other 
languageless adults in forgotten comers of society. Despite their isolation 
from the verbal world, they displayed many abstract forms of thinking, like 
rebuilding broken locks, handling money, playing card games, and 
entertaining each other with long pantomimed narTatives (LI 67-68). 
Was Ildefonso really completely isolated from our 'verbal' form of life? 
Pinker needs him to be because he is trying to show the presence of 
'Mentalese', the universal language of thought, which we each translate 
into our particular languageldialect/ideolect - or in the case of Ildefonso, 
leave untranslated. Pinker enlists Alan Turing as an ally, using his notion 
of the Turing Machine to show that reasoning is independent of language, 
and contends that 
Knowing a language, then, is knowing how to translate mentalese into 
strings of words and vice versa. People without a language would still have 
mentalese, and babies and many nonhuman animals presumably have 
simpler dialects. Indeed, if babies did not have a mentalese to translate to 
and from English, it is not clear how learning English could take place, or 
even what learning English would mean (LI 85). 
In place of this notion of mentalese, I wish to point to the zone of fledgling 
and larval selves discussed in the last two chapters - the continual 
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pandemonium of context-fixated 'judgements' that orient the organism in 
its world: indeed they precede the organism as integrated whole: it is not 
at all clear that non-linguistic creatures have any need of an overarching 
concept of self-identity, over and above the consistency of their 
perceptions and impulses. However, to posit an innate mental language 
common to all one's subselves is firstly to export an already constituted 
conception of language back to the origins of the subject, as if that could 
then serve as an explanation of language or thought. It is also to risk 
taking thought as representational, before the notion of representation can 
have taken root in the neonate's bodymind: the idea of mentalese, 
conceived as strings of mental tokens for things in the outside world, 
places the child at one remove from the world, rather than being always 
already immersed in it. There is undoubtedly mediation between self and 
world, but it need not be conceived of as necessarily representational. 
Rather, it is mediated through its multiplicity: the idea of a single 
integrated self surveying the world, and perhaps internally narrating its 
survey in vividly descriptive prose, is a resuft of, rather than any kind of 
explanation for, the many connections between organism and world, 
categorisable (at least after the emergence of the organism as a 
supplementary dimension) as impulses from within and impingements 
from without. 
It is not necessary to appeal to mentalese in order to dispute linguistic 
relativism, nor is it necessary to propose linguistic relativism to dismiss 
the notion of mentalese. Mentalese is tantamount to the suggestion that 
fundamentally, all humans at least think in the same language, even if 
they often have trouble listening to one another. My proposal would be 
that even speakers of what is ostensibly the same language are as likely 
to misunderstand one another as those of different languages: in both 
cases, what matters as much as-the tongue spoken, are questions of 
shared or conflicting aims and the balance of power between the 
speakers - their respective capacities to coerce or willingness to 
cooperate. This is not to do with their having equivalent capacities to 
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represent in their heads what is occurring, since on the level of the order- 
word, 'understanding' is irrelevant anyway, if it means anything over and 
above being able to reproduce the appropriate behaviours. As 
Wittgenstein takes pains to show, this kind of explanation is irrelevant in 
comparison to descriptions of what people actually do. The point is that 
there is much more at play in any interaction than simply the words that 
are spoken and the 'thinks' that are 'thunk. ' 
As regards Ildefonso, he as much as anyone else had been coercively 
initiated into the social whirl, and even if he did not have conventional 
language, he clearly had developed, of necessity no doubt, ways of 
surviving in amongst particular groups. The common factor between him 
and, say Steven Pinker, and the explanation for the empathy the latter 
feels for him, is due not to a common mental language representing the 
world identically in either head, but rather the shared social world, the 
world where one is shaped through a mixture varying degrees of coercion 
and encouragement - training - to the extent that one can achieve a 
degree of independence. Despite the huge differences between the 
situations in which Pinker and Ildefonso grew up, and despite the fact 
that Pinker could hear and speak, they both had to spend much of their 
time interacting with other people without getting beaten or killed, and 
neither of them needed an innate representational language to learn this 
fact. In any case, over and above this basic level of 'common humanity', 
the differences between Ildefonso and Pinker need to be emphasised - 
indeed, it is the vast difference between their respective economic 
situations that makes it extremely hard to draw anything conclusive from 
such a comparison! 
3.5 Relativism Revisited 
At the start of section 3.2,1 alluded to the problem of linguistic relativism, 
the notion that the differences between languages and the cultures they 
characterise are insurmountable. I would like to propose that the present 
picture gets over this difficulty by giving an account of the functioning of 
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language which shows the impossibility of separating it from the 
functioning of a culture as a whole, and hence aspires to an objectivity 
that is not founded in 'universals of communication. ' Communication is 
not the be-all and end-all of language, because communication is 
impossible without a common foryn of life - that is, a common training, 
resulting in compatible notions of rules and how to follow them, and the 
constant background threat of what might happen if you don't. The 
corresponding point is that language is not the be-all and end-all of 
culture, and hence that there are approaches open to us which, while 
necessarily expressed through language, point far beyond it, and indeed 
collapse the supposed boundary between linguistic and non-linguistic 
phenomena. In Wittgensteinian terms, the idea that "Language (or 
thought) is something unique' [ ... I proves to be a superstition [ ... ] itself 
produced by grammatical illusions' (1 110). In Deleuze-Guattarian terms, 
to reify language or thought and appeal to them for answers about the 
nature of things, is to make them transcendent, to see them as in some 
way standing outside the complex interactions of machines of all kinds 
social, technological, biological, physical and so on. 
We can happily, therefore, reject the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis of the futility 
of translation, arguing that a thorough enough description of linguistic and 
social practices of different cultures give as much (or as little) hope of 
understanding as do similar descriptions of our own. To reject this 
possibility would be to reify language, ascribing to it powers way beyond 
its actual capabilities. Nor would accepting this stance entail an appeal to 
a universal human nature or any other homogenising notion - instead, 
schizoanalysis sets about differentiating the different machines at work, 
looking for the ways they vary independently yet mutually presuppose one 
another, without ever coming to rest on a single founding principle (such 
as Language, Being, Man, Spirit or God). 
In place of such a foundation is an armoury of material relations, an open- 
ended series of concepts which can be applied or ignored as the 
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investigation dictates. The key notion in what we have been talking about 
is double atticulation, the separation of material flows (of bodies, events, 
signs) into two reciprocally-presupposing levels. I have suggested that 
Wiftgenstein's terms 'language-game' and 'form of life' designate the 
double articulations of the social machine, which Deleuze-Guattari call 
respectively the collective and machinic assemblages. On either side, two 
opposing tendencies can be observed, that towards stability and 
regularity, and that towards creation and change. In Wittgensteinian 
terms, the former would be speech-actions in accordance with Grammar 
- unproblematic and smooth social functioning - while the latter is seen 
in his many examples of failure to apply rules correctly, of attempts to 
misuse language (such as attempting to mean 'The weather will change' 
by saying 'a bc d'). He often seems to be presenting these possibilities 
(or impossibilities) as disturbing, strange, uncannily counterintuitive 
notions, yet by emphasising their ever-present possibility he once again 
shifts our focus away from isolated intra-linguistic problems to the 
complex and inseparable threads of language, thought and social 
behaviour - which are themselves inseparable from our nature as 
disciplined, docilised subjects of control. Perhaps this is the common state 
of humanity, as Wittgenstein suggests, when he writes 
Suppose you came as an explorer into an unknown country with a 
language quite strange to you. In what circumstances would you say that 
the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled 
against them and so on? The common behaviour of mankind is the system 
of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown language (1,206). 
3.6 Conclusion: Creativity and a People 
In conclusion, while the differences in their respective views of the role of 
philosophy must remain insurmountable, we can nonetheless see in both 
Wittgenstein and Deleuze-Guattad the insistence on tackling in a non- 
reductive fashion the whole field of social practice, the changing field of 
discipline and training that produces and sustains it, and the possibilities 
for creation, disruption and anomaly it produces in spite of itself. If we 
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have shown that this approach gets out of linguistic relativism, does it 
have anything to say about non-humans? is it limited in scope to human 
language-users, allowing a pfiori rejections, like Gaita's, of, for example, 
the possibility of thinking, conversing robots? I would argue no, since to 
be a language-user, to be a human, already presupposes the social 
machinery we have been discussing. If you are a participating member in 
a group of humans, if you have learned strategies enough to avoid getting 
beaten or killed, you are to all intents and purposes human. If, however, 
you somehow manage to change this social machinery, or discover 
completely new forms, you are no longer concerned with the human as we 
know it - but you are still 'schizoanalysing': investigating the nature, 
formation and functioning of all the different machines and their dual 
tendencies - restrictive, habitual, stabilising, and disruptive, explosive, 
revolutionary - yet without raising any one above the rest as first cause 
or prime mover. The aim is that of demonstrating the possibilities for 
invention and intervention that accompany the recognition that there is 
nothing standing apart from the contingencies of our social practices and 
the-resulting understanding of ourselves they produce, that grounds them 
as eternal or immutable. If we change our practices we change ourselves, 
and change what it is to be human. 
What we most lack is a belief in the world, we've quite lost the world, it's 
been taken from us. If you believe in the world, you precipitate events, 
however inconspicuous, that elude control, you engender new space- 
times, however small in their surface and volume [ ... ] Our ability to resist 
control, or our submission to it, has to be assessed at the level of our every 
move. We need both creativity and a people. 106 
Our discussion has led us back to the notion with which we began 
(Section 1.1) - the existence of two tendencies, that of stability, regularity 
and control, and that of creation, change and disruption. What is the 
status of these tendencies, and can they be shown to be fundamental? 
106 Deleuze, in conversation with Toni Negri, N 176 
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This raises the question of Deleuze-Guaftad's method of stratoanalysis, 
the point of which is to examine the contingencies of matter and life, on 
the basis of a complex materialism which refuses an a priori distinction 
between the behaviour of humans, that of animals, and that of organic 
and inorganic processes. This is not to propose a universal homogeneity 
of the interactions of material processes - some ludicrously simplistic 
cosmic reductionism - but instead to recast our investigation of language 
in terms of layer after layer of immense complexity where the primary 
terms are no longer human subjects and their conscious needs and 
desires. 
As we have seen, the purpose of the analysis is to strip out 
transcendencies, terms such as 'human' and 'language' which remain 
unchallenged or uncritiqued throughout the investigation. Instead, we are 
reaching for a 'boftom-up' approach which tries to keep in view both the 
pandemonium of low-level interactions and the' emergent, high-level 
controls and regularities that are exhibited by the most complex systems. 
Such an analysis cannot proceed without its interests being declared from 
the outset; it is a philosophical or ethical enterprise and not a scientific 
one; its targets are dictated not by the determinacy of some sort of 
scientific objectivity but by an interest in transforming our notions of 
language and the human, of opening up the paths closed off by traditional 
approaches, of increasing our powers and potentials, the possibilities of 
creation, of a people. 
This last term is to be emphasised on the basis of the social conception of 
language elucidated above. The weight of our common sense 
assumptions about subjects and their signs can be dissolved by due 
attention to collectivities, both extant and potential, possible and 
impossible. Language, we have argued, is always already public and 
social; each enunciation is the product of a collectivity, and only 
secondarily is it attributable to a single individual. While on one level it 
could be seen as nothing more than a distinction in points of view - 
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whether collective or individual is seen as primary, or whether the 
collective is universal or relative, global or local - it should become 
apparent that if the account is successful it will show the standpoint of the 
individual to be a small subset of the interactions of collectivities, and that 
the shifting constellations of these collectivities produce an unlimited 
range of possible individuations. 
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4. Deconstruction and 
Schizopragmatics' 07 
4.0 Introduction 
Having in the last chapter illustrated some connections between Deleuze- 
Guattad and Wittgenstein, and in the process filling out our pragmatic 
approach to language, I now continue this process by contriving a 
confrontation of sorts between Deleuze-Guattari and Derrida. I will begin 
with a sketch comparing the respective approaches of Derrida and 
Deleuze-Guaffad, to make at least some of my prejudices and 
preconceptions apparent at the outset, before attempting an analysis of 
the role of Austin's speech acts in either corpus. The main focus of this 
analysis will be to show how Deleuze-Guattad escape the deconstructive 
deadlock and attempt to do something. 103 In so doing, the analysis will 
argue that Derrida's approach - for example, how he might respond to 
the previous sentence (grist enough for one or two small volumes there, 
surely) - could be said to be a 'restricted economy', in comparison to the 
more 'general economy' proposed by Deleuze-Guattari. 109 A second aim 
107 By 'schizopragmatics' I coin a term to designate Deleuze-Guattarian practice. 
Rhizomatics, stratoanalysis, schizoanalysis, material semiotics, pragmatics would also 
have done. 
108 The deadlock which, for example, if 'allowed to' infect one's writing organs, prevents 
the completion of any sentence without the insertion of multiple qualifying parentheses, 
scare quotes and footnotes -a fine but infuriating testimony to Derrida's uncanny, 
mortal rigour. 
log I refer here to Derrida's essay'From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism 
Without Reserve' in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass, London: Routledge, 1993, in 
which Derrida examines the problem of escaping Hegel's Aufhebung, the move by 
which any contrary philosophical move is reincorporated into the progressive movement 
of the dialectic. An adequate discussion of the foregoing suggestion, i. e. that Derrida 
himself remains within a kind of restricted economy, will only be carried out elliptically in 
the present essay, the explicit examination in economical terms being postponed for the 
time being. See, for some remarks on Derrida's relation to Hegel, fnl 13 below. 
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will be to show how, nonetheless, many of Derrida's conceptual 
innovations are consistent in certain ways with those of Deleuze-Guattari, 
and how an account of such connections is useful for our broader 
discussion of Deleuze-Guattari. I do not disagree with the arguments 
Derrida presents, but my position is that he does not go nearly far 
enough. 
4.1 Differences in Method 
The 'general strateg. V of deconstruction, writes Derrida, is 'to avoid both 
simply neutralizing the binary oppositions within metaphysics and simply 
residing within the closed field of these oppositions, thereby confirming 
it'. 110 It is thus a 'double science', consisting in the critical project of 
goverturning' metaphysics' binaries, and the positive project of enacting a 
'double [or multiple] writing'. Derrida's cautionary tone as regards the 
critical move is reminiscent of Deleuze-Guattari's circumspection in A 
Thousand Plateaus. "' To deconstruct is to 
overturn the hierarchy at a given moment. To overlook this phase of 
overturning is to forget the conflictual and subordinating structure of 
opposition. Therefore, one might proceed too quickly to a neutralization that 
in practice would leave the previous field untouched, leaving one no hold on 
the previous opposition, thereby preventing any means of intervening in the 
field effectively (P 41). 
The positive move involves the emergence of a new "concept" (or "word", 
where the meanings of 'concept' and 'word' have subtly changed) -a 
"concept" that cannot be assimilated by the old regime. For example, 
"0 Jacques Derrida, Positions (hereafter P), tr. Alan Bass, London: Athlone, 1981: 41. 
111 Examples of Deleuze-Guattari's circumspection are the dire warnings about 'the line 
of flight crossing the wall, getting out of the black holes, but instead of connecting with 
other lines and each time augmenting its valence, turning to destruction, abolition pure 
and simple, the passion of abolition' (TP 229). Despite similarity of sentiment, the 
difference in style/content of the analysis is staggering - clearly there is more at stake 
here than the danger of languishing within metaphysics. 
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Derrida's expanded and transformed "concept" of 'writing' (to which we 
will return), which 
simultaneously provokes the overturning of the hierarchy speechtwriting, 
and the entire system attached to it, and releases the dissonance of writing 
within speech, thereby disorganising the entire inherited order and 
invading the entire field (P 42). 
This is, for the most part, a completely different philosophical approach 
from that of Deleuze-Guaftari's schizoanalysis, as evinced by the contrast 
between their respective styles and subject matter. In practice, this means 
that while Derrida will focus on a small set of specific texts in each work, 
often only one at a time, and from these draw sweeping but inconclusive 
conclusions about the whole Western metaphysical tradition (which for 
him is intrinsically linked to problems in 'everyday language" 12) , Deleuze- 
Guaftad will cover a massive range of cross-d iscipli nary sources and draw 
sweeping but ambivalent conclusions about the Cosmos itself (see 
'Concrete Rules and Abstract Machines', the conclusion to A Thousand 
Plateaus). Both are doing something new with (and to) philosophy. 
Derrida is its self-styled outside, enacting the "confrontation" (that may 
never actually happen) 'between the tradition and its other, an other that 
is not even "its" other any longer'. 1 13 His approach is often joyful and light 
112 'Now, Oeveryday language* is not innocent or neutral. It is the language of Western 
metaphysics, and it carries with it not only a considerable number of presuppositions of 
all types, but also presuppositions inseparable from metaphysics, which, although little 
attended to, are knotted into a system' (P 19). This use of 'presuppositions' by Derrida 
corresponds to Deleuze-Guattari's use of 'order-word'. 
113 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1993 
(hereafter Ltd): 71 - this quotation refers specifically to the relation between 
deconstruction as practised by Derrida himself and the speech act theory of Austin and 
Searle, but can be broadened out following Derrida's remark that Austin and Searle 
proceed in the same way as'[a]ll metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, Descartes to 
Husserl' (Ud 93). The common structure to the thought of each of the above - simply, 
the derivation of deprivileged terms from their prioritised, idealised opposites (impure 
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(brimming with puns and irony) but is nevertheless permeated with the 
painstaking gravity of its relation - as the Auffiebung that is not an 
Authebung' 14 - to Western Philosophy. 
115 The interminability of the 
deconstructive process (at least from the point of view, perhaps 
astoundingly nalive, from which other paths are possible) seems to lock its 
progenitor (and much of the disparate 'school' he has engendered) into a 
certain neutered agnosticism. 
Deleuze-Guaffad, on the other hand, are 'pop analysts' (TP 24), explicitly 
concerned with writing for the short- as opposed to long-term memory (TP 
15-16). In 'The Geology of Morals', they adopt as spokesman Professor 
Challenger, readily graspable as a caricature of "themself" - not only is 
his relation to any particular extant discipline decidedly shady ('the 
professor was not a geologist or a biologist, he was not even a linguist, 
ethnologist or psychoanalyst; what his speciality had been was long since 
forgotten' (TP 42-43)) and effectively bicephalous (he Vas double, 
articulated twice [... ] people never knew which of him was present' (TP 
43)), he also shared Deleuze's predilection (N 6) for an intimate but 
unorthodox relation to the 'authorities he appealed to: 'The professor 
cynically congratulated himself on taking his pleasure from behind, but the 
offspring always turned out to be runts and wens, bits 
-and 
pieces, if not 
from pure, evil from good and so on) - is described by Derrida as 'the metaphysical 
exigency' (Ltd 93). 
114 Hegel's Aufhebung, the move by which everything is profitable for the speculative 
economy of the dialectic, endowed with meaning through a simultaneous 
negation/raising up (Aufhebung). Derrida translates this as la reldve, from the verb 
relever, meaning both 'lift up' but also relieve, relay - thereby injecting a splash of 
diftrance to transform the concept. We will return to this move below. 
115 the inseparability of these two aspects of Derrida's strategy serves itself to 
deconstruct the distinction between 'play' and 'rigour' - or 'serious' and 'nonserious', 
about which more below - preferring to ask of his critics, 'On what basis is such a 
distinction being made? ' Christopher Johnson, Matrix and Line: System and Writing in 
the Philosophy of Jacques Derrida, Cambridge University Press 1993: 203) 
Ill 
stupid vulgarisations' (TP 42)1 16 . 
There is more to this than jokey self- 
deprecation. In laying things out thus, Deleuze-Guattari make a 'virtue' of 
everything that differentiates their projects from the logocentric, onto- 
theological approach with which Derrida remains locked in conflict - and 
thus, arguably, achieve a more positive movement than Derrida's 
resolutely critical endeavours. 'Even in the realm of theory, especially in 
the realm of theory, any precarious and pragmatic framework is better 
than tracing concepts, with their breaks and progress changing nothing' 
(TP 24). By way of contrast, consider Derrida's self-restricting 
announcement that 'we are not concerned with comparing the content of 
doctrines, the wealth of positive knowledge; we are concemed, rather, 
with discerning the repetition or permanence at a profound level of 
discourse, of certain fundamental schemes and of certain directive 
concepts'. ' 17 
To pre-empt the fuller discussion that must follow (but only in part in the 
present thesis) about the relation between deconstruction and 
schizopragmatics, one which tentatively awaits the long-rumoured book 
on Deleuze by DerTida, let me suggest a simplistic version of that relation. 
Derrida limits himself to talking about what in Deleuze-Guaftari's terms is 
the level of expression, and never reaches its necessary interrelation 
(double articulation) with the level of content. In their account of the Strata 
(TP 39-74), Deleuze-Guaffari show the futility of analysing one without the 
other, of succumbing to the illusion that everything is in some sense 
linguistic (and for this we could read 'writing' in Derrida's sense' 18) is 'the 
illusion that one can grasp and shuffle all the strata between one's 
pincers' (TP 65) - which misses the real, categorical differences, both 
among the systems of signs belonging to different strata, and between the 
116 We will examine the content of Professor Challenger's lecture in Section 5.3 below. 
117 Jacques Derrida, Margins of Philosophy (hereafter MP), tr. Alan Bass, Brighton: 
Harvester Press 1982: 153, my emphasis. 
Ila though of course Derrida's sense of writing is, as I will show, non- or super-linguistic 
- rendering this formulation highly provisional. 
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two levels of each stratum (content and expression - which, as we will 
show in Chapter 6, are not to be confused mfith signifierlsignified! ). 
4.2 'Writing' and 'Indirect Discourse' 
Before launching into the illocutionary, I will examine Derrida's "concepr 
of 'writing', in order to point to certain correspondences between it and the 
primacy of the notion of 'indirect discourse' in Deleuze-Guattari's account 
of language, en route touching on the problematic role of the sign in either 
approach. 
In 'Signature Event ContexV (Sec) 119 Derrida begins by restoring the 
polyseMiC120 value of the word 'communication', arguing that to assume it 
can be ascribed a 'proper or primitive' meaning - whether this is a 
semantically or serniotically orientated definition, e. g. 'the vehicle, 
transport or site of passage of a meaning, and of a meaning that is one', 
or alternatively a nonsemiotic definition, e. g. 'the transmission of a shock, 
tremor or force' - is inadmissible. This is because, given that we are 
already dealing with the communication of notions of communication, and 
the meaning of notions of meaning, there is no foundation on which we 
can complacently rest our analysis - the very concepts we are appealing 
to in using language, in writing, at all, are undergoing transformation. For 
example, to suggest that either of the above definitions of 'communication' 
119 Published both in MP and Ltd 
120 Part of the aim of Sec is to distinguish between polysemia (the irreducible multitude 
of meanings of any given word) and dissemination (which is also the concept of writing' 
(MP 316) which Derrida is presenting in Sec - see below), undermining the common 
criticism of Derrida that he simply ends up with an unhelpful notion of 'the free play of 
signification', where 'anything goes', any word can mean anything. Strangely, however, 
Derrida almost (barring scare quotes) seems later to re-equate the two, when he says of 
Austin's account of context that 'No remainder ['escapes the present totalization'], 
whether in the definition of the requisite conventions, or the internal and linguistic 
content, or the grammatical form or semantic determination of the words used; no 
irreducible polysemia, that is no Odissemination' escaping the horizon of the unity of 
meaning'(MP 322). 
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is primary and that the other stems from its metaphorical application 
elsewhere, presupposes some notion or other of transport or transmission 
as that which is 'constitutive of the very concept of metaphor' (MP 309- 
31 o). 121 
With this in mind, Derrida tries to get at that which is constitutive of 
writing, namely iterability, or the inherent - possibility of repetition- 
transformation, that belongs to every system of marks or 'graphemes'. 
Writing is classically defined as that which inscribes a mark or series of 
marks, each of which is 'not exhausted in the present of its inscription, 
and which can give rise to an iteration both in the absence of and beyond 
the presence of the empirically determined subject who, in a given 
context, has emitted or produced it' (MP 317). It is part of 'the very 
structure of the written' that 'a written sign carries with it a force of 
breaking with its context' - that is, the written sign, or the mark in 
general, has an inherent legibility, 'by virtue of its essential iterability, 
which is in no way tied to its 'original' meaning, the writer's intention, or 
indeed anything that belongs purely to the context of the inscription (ibid). 
Derrida thus distinguishes this context-independent functionality of the 
sign, the possibility that it can always be grafted into other chains of signs, 
from its (now severely circumscribed) capacity for communication. 
This structural possibility of being severed from its referent or signified 
(and therefore from communication and its context) seems to me to make 
of every mark, even if oral, a grapheme in general, that is, as we have 
seen, the nonpresent remaining of a differential mark cut off from its 
alleged Oproduction" or origin. And I will extend this law even to all 
121 Derrida similarly problematises the three notions of the title ('Signature Event 
Contexf) and is bemused when Searle, in his response to that essay entitled 
'Reiterating the Differences', fails to broach the subject of a single one of them, and 
proceeds to rely (in his discussion of speech acts and where Derrida misinterpreted 
Austin) on such concepts as they were before Derrida got his hands on them (Ud 46). 
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Nexperience' in general, if it is granted that there is no experience of pure 
presence, but only chains of differential marks' (MP 318). 122 
The 'sign' for Derrida is no longer composed of a relation of signifier and 
any kind of determined signified. He takes Saussure's injunction that the 
sign is determined by its difference from all other signs to its extreme - 
inserting difference (or rather diff6rance, whose crucial aspect here is that 
it is not to be conceived negatively, but rather positively or productively) 
into the structure of the sign itself, the possibility of repetition-difference or 
iterability that belongs to the sign qua sign. This is to say, having 
abandoned any ideal notion of 'pure presence', the sign is a sign because 
of this capacity to be differentiated from itself through repetition. Thus 
whether or not it remains tied to a particular signified, or tied to any 
signified at all, is undecidable in advance. Having transformed the notion 
of the sign in this way, Derrida finds its application is unlimited: the thing 
itself is a sign. 
Henry Staten in his fascinating study Wittgenstein and Derfida 123 argues 
that this move, contrary to the accounts of many of Derrida's critics (and 
followers), does not amount to saying that 
"there isn't really any 'thing in itself"; nor does it mean 'the thing is really 
all in your mind% nor "there are really only words -we can't get outside of 
words! Instead, 'it means approximately this: 'Let us consider the 
experience of what we call 'things themselves' as structured more like the 
presence of signs than like the experience of an idealized 'full presence'" 
(VVD 58). 
Earlier in his argument, Staten states that 'The cleconstructive critique of 
language could even be phrased as a denial that there is language' - or 
122 It is Wthin' such a 'concept" of writing that Derrida introduces his far-reaching but 
'discreet graphic intervention' (MP 9), that which is neither word nor concept, diff6rance 
- for which any pithy gloss would be merely facetious. 
123 Henry Staten, Wittgenstein and Derfida (hereafter WD), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1985 
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rather, 'a denial that there is any boundary of essence between what we 
call language and what we think of as nonlanguage' (WD 20-21). But in 
broadening writing and the sign in this way, and correspondingly 
deprivileging language (as understood by linguistics for example), can it 
seriously be claimed that Derrida leaves us with anything other than a 
linguistic metaphor that encompasses everything, with nothing but 
severely underdetermined signifiers circulating around from chain to 
chain? Staten's formulation above suggests this metaphoricity, as well as 
a (perhaps irreducible) phenomenological orientation: 
'Let us consider the experience of what we call 'things themselves' as 
structured more like the presence of signs than like the experience of an 
idealized'full presence- (WD 58, my emphasis). 
There are two responses I wish to present to this reading - intra- and 
extra-Derridean respectively. Derrida's aforementioned gesture towards 
the problem of metaphor in Sec could be developed as either a defence or 
a critique of Staten's formulation, both making the same point: to complain 
about metaphoricity as a literary or stylistic technique as opposed to a 
suitably philosophical one is to rely on uninterrogated oppositions such as 
literal/metaphorical or philosophical/literary that Derrida would not 
countenance. Thus in defence of Staten, we could say that the power of 
the 'like' in his formulation is as good a way as any to approach the 
account being presented, it is simply more explicit about the non-literal, 
impure, underdetermined relation to its object that must belong to it as 
writing. Alternatively, and to Staten's cost, we could complain that he is 
inaccurately - or let us say, unhelpfully - reinserting Derrida's thesis 
into the economy of 'mere' metaphor with which Derrida has already had 
done. 124 
124 1 am more convinced by the first option - though either would seem to make the 
point at hand. 
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A second response, and one more central, if not to this chapter then to 
the thesis of which it forms part, is the possibility of a connection with 
Deleuze-Guattari. I have proposed that there are important convergences; 
this is in spite of the many passages in the work of the latter that are 
directed against any linguisticisation or serniologisation of reality that are 
symptomatic of many Derridean approaches: for example, in 'The 
Geology of Morals' where they talk of the twin dangers of 'the imperialism 
of language affecting all of the strata', and 'the imperialism of the signifier 
affecting language itself, affecting all regimes of signs, and the entire 
expanse of the strata on which they are located' (TP 65). The question of 
the sign, and the ways in which Deleuze-Guaftari wish to retain but 
circumscribe its usage (limiting it to 'signs of deterritorialization and 
reterritorialization', and thus applicable to asignifying instances as well as 
signifying ones (TP 67-68)) will be raised in Chapter 5. The current 
proposal is that Derrida's account can be read as compatible with that of 
Deleuze-Guattari (in that it releases the sign from signification), and the 
extent to which it describes signification is the extent to which it is also 
critical of it. 
What if we were to assume that, by 'writing', Derrida had in mind the 
same notion that Deleuze-Guattari designate by 'indirect discourse'? 125 
125 The key quotations in this respect are: 'the 1rsr language, or rather, the first 
determination of language, is [ ... ] indirect discourse' (TP 
76-77). 'If language seems to 
presuppose itself, if we cannot assign it a prelinguistic point of departure, it is because 
language does not operate between something seen (or felt) and something said, but 
always goes from saying to saying. We believe that narrative consists not in 
communicating what one has seen but in transmitting what one has heard, what 
someone else said to you. Hearsay. ' (TP 76) 'Indirect discourse is the presence of a 
reported statement within the reporting statement, the presence of an order-word within 
the word. Language in its entirety is indirect discourse. Indirect discourse in no way 
supposes direct discourse; rather, the latter is extracted from the former, to the extent 
that the operations of signifiance and proceedings of subjectification in an assemblage 
are distributed, attributed and assigned, or that the variables of the assemblage enter 
into constant relations, however temporarily... ' (TP 84) 
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There are two directions to which such a move lends itself, either towards 
Derrida (thus making Deleuze-Guattari's account of language, of order- 
words, stretch out across all the strata in some way, relating every sign, 
signifying or not, to the 'implicit presupposition' of the order-word: such a 
move could be made to insert Deleuze's The Logic of Sense (in which 
'sense' is presented as just this implicit presupposition that constitutes 
particular signs and subjects) into the Cosmic materialism of A Thousand 
Plateaus) or else towards Deleuze-Guattari (where Derrida's 'writing' is 
instead taken to relate only to the level of expression on the alloplastic or 
cultural stratum). This choice depends on one's interests, and there are 
strong arguments for moving in either direction. The former movement 
returns us to the idea (introduced in Section 1.2) of matter itself 'stating' 
and solving problems, with human writing as a subset of this all- 
encompassing view. The latter move has the advantage of focusing the 
discussion on the tangible level of the human. However, let us leave aside 
this discussion and return to the more concrete and less fantastically 
speculative notion of the speech act. 
4.3 Austin and the Illocutionary 
In this section and the next, I will draw some connections and divergences 
between Deleuze-Guattari and Derrida, showing the extent to which either 
account connects with and surpasses the speech act theory of JL Austin. 
As far as Deleuze-Guattari are concerned, Austin is a valuable stepping 
stone in their critique of the 'Postulates of Linguistics' (TP 75-110), and 
the setting up of their pragmatics. By opening up the zone of the 
illocutionary, Austin has tied language to action: words are primarily 
something one does things with - and communication of information is 
but a tiny subset of all the things one can do. 126 However for Deleuze- 
126 The performance of an illocutionary act is, writes Austin, 'performance of an act in 
saying something as opposed to performance of an act of saying something' (Words 99- 
100), though all explicit locutionary acts (acts of saying something: asking a question, 
giving a warning, pronouncing sentence, etc) also fall into this broader category of the 
illocutionary (Words 98). 
118 
Guattari (and in a less extensive way for Derrida) the status of the 'one' 
(or'many') doing things with words changes radically. Language can only 
be defined as 'the set of all order-words, implicit presuppositions, or 
speech acts current in a language at a given moment' (TP 79). The move 
cannot be from identity (of speakers and intentions, of signifiers and 
signifieds, of words and things), to speech acts (the successful utilisation 
of these relations in order to inform, communicate or otherwise act). For 
Deleuze-Guaftad, the signification required by information-transmission 
and the subjects in communication both presuppose or 'depend on the 
nature and transmission of order-words in a given social field' (ibid). 
What, then, becomes of speech acts as we knew them? We must 
backtrack and examine the Derridean route. 
Austin's How to Do Things with Words, for Derrida, marks a Nietzschean 
moment in English philosophy: 
Austin had to free the analysis of the performative from the authority of the 
value of truth, from the opposition true/false, at least in its classical form, 
occasionally substituting for it the value of force, of difference of force 
(illocutionary or perldcutionary force) (M P 322). 
As Derrida shows (both in Sec and at considerably greater length in 
Limited Inc), however, Austin reintroduces precisely this distinction in his 
initial move of bracketing off all 'unhappy' or 'infelicitous' speech acts as 
being 'parasitic' on the paradigmatic cases of those which are deemed 
happy or felicitous. To qualify for the [after honour, you must first be in no 
doubt as to your own intentions in performing the act; you must succeed 
fully and totally in the articulation of these intentions; said articulation must 
therefore be the pure coincidence of you-the-speakers words and 
intentions (there must be no element of 'merely acting' - i. e. citing the 
words without really meaning them, all the way down - or any other kind 
of deviation from good sense and gravity); those to whom they are 
directed must share your language and conventions of behaviour, they 
must hear your enunciation clearly and with no margin for 
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misunderstanding or confusion; they must then act precisely according to 
what is appropriate and do so because of your enunciation and not for any 
other reason... (these criteria must proliferate until all possible errors or 
impediments to the success of the act are removed). Austin admits that 
such a pure instance of a speech act may never actually exist, but 
nevertheless takes this idealised case as the model from which all our 
everyday, messy and otherwise unhappy speech acts are derived. 
John Searle, in his Reply to Derfida (itself quoted in total by Derrida in his 
response, 'Limited Inc abc... ' (Ltd)) insists that this is a straightforward 
strategic move on Austin's part which does not involve any kind of 
evaluation of the differing degrees of felicitousness in speech acts, nor 
any kind of ontological prioritising of the model over its copies - but as 
Derrida convincingly shows, this defence is untenable. Austin and Searle 
both require this idealisation of speech acts for their analyses to get off 
the ground in the first place, since neither wants to accept or even 
consider Derrida's moves as will shortly be described, since they would 
seem to preclude any possibility of a science, philosophy or pragmatics of 
speech acts as Austin and Searle have formulated them. 
For Derrida, Austin's illegitimate move, his lapse back into ontotheological 
metaphysics, is the move of setting the ideal instance up as that against 
which all imperfect instances are measured. Derrida employs his 
characteristic technique of turning the authors words against himself - in 
this case, Austin's allowance that error or infelicity, while incidental to the 
ideal model, is nonetheless a latent possibility within any performative (MP 
323, Words 18-19). 
Derrida deconstructs the notion that statements proceed or function 
through identity (whether identity of words and intention, or of words and 
things). Rather, he argues, this posited, ideal identity is permeated by the 
essential, immanent possibility of error, abuse or 'infelicity'. Therefore, if 
there can be a theory of speech acts at all, it cannot proceed on the basis 
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of such an unattainable ideal, without a) presupposing a fundamentally 
inaccurate model of how language works (where the ideal has to be the 
rule rather than the impossible exception); b) having to admit its 
interminability - in Ltd, Derrida argues that the 'set' of papers which 
constitute this "particular debate" necessarily remains open, as each new 
instalment will itself be subject to the application and re-application of all 
the questions and categories accredited by the theory of speech acts, 
whether or not they are performatives, in what measure and aspect they 
depend upon the per- or illocutionary, whether they are serious or not, 
normal or not, void or not, parasitic or not, fictional or not, citational or not, 
literary, philosophical, theatrical, oratorical, prophetical or not, etc. (Ltd 39); 
and therefore c) remaining subject to speech act theory's 'fundamentally 
moralistic' presuppositions (ibid. ). 
This last point Derrida applies to Foucault's archaeology (in 'To Have the 
Ear of Philosophy', a conversation with Lucette Finas, cited in Ltd 108, 
note 1), and given the ties between Foucault's archaeology (specifically, 
his account of the 'statement') and Deleuze-Guaftad's appropriation of 
Austin, the same issue can be raised in relation to A Thousand 
Plateaus. 127 To what extent is the notion of the order-word, as 
illocutionary act, infected with Austin's moralism? 1-0 a pragmatics of the 
order-word inevitably moralistic? Or, do Deleuze-Guattari depend on 
aspects of speech act theory that Derrida has blown out of the water? 
4.4 The Order-Word 
What exactly is the order-word? We need to tease apart the various 
elements of Deleuze-Guattari's analysis - simultaneously flagging the 
correspondences with deconstruction. The order-word emerges in their 
attack on the presuppositions of linguistics (their headings to the four 
127 Derrida, Jacques: 'Avoir l'oreille de la philosophie', a conversation with Lucefte Finas 
Ecarts, Quatre essaisd propos de Jacques Derrida, Paris, 1973 
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sections of the chapter 'Postulates of Linguistics' in A Thousand 
Plateaus), i. e.: 
1.81-anguage is Informational and Communicational" (TP 75) 
11. OThere Is an Abstract Machine of Language That Does Not Appeal to 
Any'Extrinsic! Factor' (TP 85) 
Ill. wThere Are Constants or Universals of Language That Enable Us to 
Define It as a Homogeneous System* (TIP 93) 
N. *Language Can Be Scientifically Studied Only under the Conditions of a 
Standard or Major Language' (TP 101) 
'Postulates of Linguistics' is a circle, its four sections (corresponding to 
the four postulates above) tracing a path through the following stages: 1. 
the introduction of key concepts (order-word, indirect discourse, 
incorporeal transformation and collective assemblage of enunciation, 
which presents the pragmatics of the order-word (as an aspect of 
language's intrinsic continuous variation/relation to the outside) as prior to 
syntax and semantics, and as prior to any reified notions of information or 
communication); 11. the situating of the collective assemblage of 
enunciation as always tied to a particular machinic assemblage of bodies, 
where the latter (as bodies, their actions and passions) are distinguished 
from the former (incorporeal transformations, redundant complexes of 
statement and act that are attributed to or inserted instantaneously into 
the realm of bodies) - they thus enact the critique of linguistics insofar as 
it ignores this necessary interweaving of language and life; Ill. the 
presentation of language as in continuous variation, and amongst whose 
variables are to be found nonlinguistic as well as linguistic factors - thus, 
language as a set of constants is replaced by the Abstract Machine as the 
set of lines of variation which are effectuated in particular Concrete 
Assemblages (with both machinic and collective aspects, both of which 
are more or less relatively deterrit0rialised at any given point); and finally 
IV. the introduction of the distinction between Major and Minor languages, 
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which does not distinguish between types or categories of language, but 
between ways of approaching the same language - i. e. from the quasi- 
scientific standpoint of linguistics, with its insistence on grammaticality, on 
syntactic and phonetic constants and so on, and the concomitant political 
project of legislative standard isation, or from the standpoint of indirect 
discourse itself, where language's intrinsic variation is encouraged, 
exacerbated ('making language starnmer' (TP 104), becoming a foreigner 
in one's own tongue), everything is set in motion, and the capacity of 
order-words to become components of passage (passwords) is utilised. In 
what follows, I will trace a path through this argument that will make things 
more clear. 
The order-word is presented as command/judgement/death sentence (TIP 
76) - an initial definition which shores up the key aspects of the order- 
word seen more generally (as the 'elementary unit of language' (TP 76)). 
These intertwined aspects can be summarised as follows: a) that it is the 
implicit, nondiscursive presupposition of a statement (TP 77 and 524n9), it 
is the illocutionary act that is in a relationship of redundancy with the 
statement; b) that the order-word is the effectuation (through this 
redundancy of statement and act) of an instantaneous, incorporeal 
transformation that is attributed to bodies; and c) that since this 
statement-act can only occur in certain circumstances, the order-word is 
noted as 'precisely that variable that makes a word an enunciation' (TIP 
82). 
Deleuze-Guattari are rejecting the picture of words and things, signifiers 
and signifieds. Instead, words, even statements, are things or bodies 
alongside other things or bodies. What constitutes the 'superlinearity of 
expression', 
128 however, what distinguishes the cultural or alloplastic 
128 This phrase relates to the new form of expression that emerges on the cultural 
stratum, its temporal linearity (as opposed to the spatial linearity of, for example, the 
genetic code (TP 62)). The most important feature of this temporal linearity is its 
facilitation of general translatability, not simply from language to language, but also in 
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stratum from the physical and biological strata, is the variability intrinsic to 
language that allows it (if the circumstances are right) to effect 
incorporeal transformations of bodies - instantaneous, immediate 
changes that are distinct from the incremental modifications of bodies 
and their actions and passions. 129 Deleuze-Guattari's examples of 
incorporeal transformations range from the familiar courtroom scene in 
which the accused becomes the convict through the judge's performative, 
to the 'mass-media act"30 whereby the passengers of a hijacked plane 
are turned into hostages, not by the gestures of the Uzi-wielding terrorist 
but by the international news bulletins. The illocutionary is defined as the 
set (or continuum) of (possible, or rather, 'virtual-real' (TP 100)) order- 
words in a given society. 
Do Deleuze-Guattari therefore face the problem raised by Derrida, of the 
felicity of speech acts? Are they dependent on a model whereby 
everything works out and everyone concerned is acting in good faith, in 
spite of the numerous cases in which, for example, hoodlums laugh in the 
faces of policemen, pupils intimidate teachers and politicians' insistence 
on 'family values' are often roundly derided by the general populace? 
Deleuze-Guattari raise the problem of the circumstances of the order- 
word in order to show that the order-word can be equated with the 
variation within language that makes incorporeal transformations possible 
- the obvious example being the distinction between any old fool 
shouting 'I declare a general mobilization' and the situation in which that 
old fool happens to have the authority to do so (TIP 82). In the latter case, 
the emergence of the capacity of language to overcode the other strata. Temporal 
linearity facilitates formalisation, the freeing of form from substance, allowing 'the same 
form to pass from one substance to another' (ibid), for instance, from chemical reactions 
in a lab to their reproduction in a system of signs. I will examine the issue of the formal 
more thoroughly in Chapters 5 and 6. 
129 In line with the previous footnote, we can consider such incorporeal transformations 
as a species of translation, particularly since 'all human movements, even the most 
violent, imply translations' (TP 63). 
130, 
... in the sense in which the English speak of "speech actsm (TP 81). 
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the appropriate variable has been effectuated, constituting the necessary 
redundancy between statement and the act in which it simultaneously 
consists. But what is at stake here is not a 'context' external to language. 
Still less is it the intentions or good faith of an individual actor. Rather, the 
effectuation (or not) of the appropriate variable is a function of the 
collective assemblage of enunciation, which we have encountered 
already as the illocutionary realm of a particular society at a given 
moment, the set of order-words appropriate to it, or (in a formulation that 
will become crucial) the particular mixtures of regimes of signs that are 
dominant. 
So, rather than begin from the point of speech act theory as conceived of 
by Austin and Searle, where it is regarded as an innovation to consider 
those instances where things are being done with words, as opposed to 
their merely being deployed to inform or communicate, and where the 
general set-up of a society of free individuals whose normal mode is to 
act honestly and rationally towards one another, Deleuze-Guattari, like 
Derrida, start from another position entirely. For Derrida, as we have 
seen, what must precede any setting up of speech act theory is the whole 
system of writing, the notion of the sign as intrinsically iterable, and the 
necessary flaw or fissure this inserts into any notion of full presence - 
the sign as something which by its very nature is differentiated from itself 
is necessary before any confused individuals can set about trying to insist 
otherwise. For Deleuze-Guaftari, instead of 'writing' we have 'indirect 
discourse' (see fn125 above), the movement from saying to saying of 
language, the many voices within a single voice, the presence in any one 
enunciation of all others of the same 'family' (the set of all I do's, of all 
'Did you spill my pint? 's, of all 'This is not Philosophyl's). On this basis, 
such phenomena as 'intuition', glossolalia and seances can be 
understood in terms of special attention to, or celebration or exploitation 
of this aspect of language. Every enunciation is in this way already 
collective, whether the population in question is that of subpersonal 
singularities, ('larval and fledgling selves') or of a particular minority, or 
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other particular spatio-temporal cross-section of the socius. Direct 
discourse is an extraction from this 'anonymous murmur (F 18), it can 
only be reached via a 'dismemberment of the collective assemblage; but 
the collective assemblage is always like the murmur from which I take my 
proper name, the constellation of voices, concordant or not, from which I 
draw my voice' (TP 84). 
This extraction of direct discourse from indirect discourse, and its 
establishment in a position of supposedly self-evident primacy, is one 
aspect of stratification, which proceeds through the ossification of 
continuous variation, of the intensive micro-variations of matters- 
functions on the Plane of Consistency. Deleuze-Guattari's list of 
linguistics' postulates above defines the assumptions of Major language, 
language considered in terms of an underlying syntactic or phonetic 
structure (often assumed to be a structure or capacity hard-wired in the 
human brain), a homogeneous system with listable constants or 
universals, from which the everyday deviances of speech are the 
exception and precisely not the rule. To assume language 'really is' like 
this, underneath all the colloquialisms, dialects, patois and so on, as well 
as all the variations, inflections and idiosyncrasies in an individual's 
speech depending on who she is talking to and where she is, is not 
simply to adopt the disinterested position of the scientist, it is to adopt a 
State-centred politics that must deprivilege the inherent variations in 
language and label them incompetent or ungrammatical: 
Linguistics can claim all it wants to be nothing but a pure science - it 
wouldn't be the first time that the order of pure science was used to secure 
the requirements of another order (TP 101). 131 
131 In Chapter 7, we will examine challenges to this View, as we explore issues of 
grammaticality, linguistic deficiency and 'verbal hygiene' (and also the issue of the 
gender of the third person pronoun). 
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4.5 Conclusion: Resplendent in Divergence 
So far, then, we can see at least two correspondences between Derrida 
and Deleuze-Guattari: 1. In either case, the basic linguistic element (the 
sign for Derrida, the order-word for Deleuze-Guattari) has the 
characteristic of iterability or difference-from-itself. 2. Just as Derrida 
notes Austin's complicity with metaphysics in his extraction of self- 
present, self-identical constants (in his idealisation of actor, context and 
the capacity to exhaustively describe them both), Deleuze-Guattari note a 
corresponding complicity between linguistics' attempts to regulate and 
standardise language, and the State's stratic procedures for disciplining 
and regulating bodies. The correspondence between these otherwise very 
different moves can be surnmarised in the suggestion that Derrida's 
deconstruction of phallogocentrism, of onto-theological metaphysics (and 
of the "everyday language" that presupposes it) is (in its critical aspect) 
entirelly con or - -446 El y i1sW1,014k V Lit LO-elleuze-Guaftaris ac..... unt of the Strata. Both 
wish to have done with identitarian accounts of language, whether based 
on unproblematised notions of signification, of notions of timeless 
structure, or on a sense-giving transcendental subject. For both parties, 
thICS-1, the theorisation of 'speech acts' on the basis of such constants will 
only ever be a strategic, pragmatic project, and not one that can claim 
exhaustive scientificity, or any other form of 'the last word'. 
However, while Derrida titillates himself with page after page of the ritual 
h- -; hurniliation of John Searle (at least in Ltd), Deleuze-Guattari present an 
account of language which, arguably, is more practical than that of 
Derrida in a number of ways. 
In ways we will explore more thoroughly in the remainder of the thesis, 
Deleuze-Guaftari's account presents ways of understanding the 
relations between words and things, or rather 
bodies on which they intervene, leaving signifier and signified behind, 
while Derrida just keeps agonising over the irreducible psychologism of 
Saussure (P 23). 
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This theorisation in terms of bodies and events is certainly no less 
pragmatic and flexible than Dernda's; indeed his suggestion that 'the 
thing is itself a sign' makes some kind of sense, since gestures, 
expressions and so on are obviously as efficacious as transmitting 
certain order-words as statements are, in the appropriate 
circumstances. Yet these circumstances are dependent on the 
collective assemblage of enunciation, itself in reciprocal presupposition 
with the machinic assemblage - and both assemblages being 
Concrete instantiations of a singular Abstract Machine. All this takes us 
a long way from the individual thing which may or may not be a sign, 
and demands a diagrammatics of the Concrete Assemblage (in terms 
of the arrangements of bodies on the one hand and the mixtures of 
regimes of signs on the other) before we can talk about individual 
signs: not a particularly straightforward way to proceed, but 
nonetheless a practical one. 
Their account of Minor Language (and the related discussions of Minor 
Literature 132) provides tentative suggestions for effectuating this 
setting-in-variation of language, this becoming-minoritarian: subtract 
the 'supplementary dimensions' of the superimposed constants of 
grammaticality, and saturate all the intrinsic variation - make language 
stutter. 133 
As for the queries with which we ended section 4.3: do Deleuze-Guaftad 
rely on a moralistically normative account of speech acts? This point is 
interesting for a number of reasons. Firstly, for Austin and Searle the ideal 
situation is primary, but for Deleuze-Guaftari, indirect discourse is primary, 
132 most notably, in Gilles Deleuze and F61ix Guattari, Kafka: Towards a Minor Literature 
(hereafter K), tr. Dana Polan, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986, a book 
which prefigures much of the apparatus of A Thousand Plateaus. 
133 See also 'He Stuttered' (CC 107-114), where Deleuze specifies that this 'making 
language as such stutter is the creation of 'an affective and intensive language', where 
'the stuttering no longer affects preexisting words, but itself introduces the words it 
affects; these words no longer exist independently of the stutter, which selects and links 
them together through itself (CC 107). 
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the continua of all a society's order-words at a given point, including all 
their ecstatic, cheerful, indifferent, gloomy, and despairing instances, and 
all are virtually present in each. Deleuze-Guattari are happy for Derrida to 
pop up and insist that the possibility of 'infelicity' is always present 
whether you like it or not, since for them, this is what is great about the 
order-word, its redeeming feature - acting not as 'little death sentence' 
but as password. This capacity (the priority of indirect discourse) is what 
can set it in motion and give it the virtual-real capacity to rearrange things 
in creative new ways, through an inclusive disjunction of contrary 
instances and impulses. On this level at least, Derrida's account of the 
productivity of diff6rance seems to obtain. 
Secondly, Deleuze-Guattari undoubtedly have a normative slant to their 
account of language, consisting as it is in an attack on the 'molar' 
presuppositions of linguistics, as opposed to the 'molecular linguistics of 
variation and transformation they propose. Yet thisis strictly speaking an 
ethical rather than a moralising approach, as, I would argue, was that of 
Foucault (against whom Derrida initially made the claim), i. e. it concerns 
an immanent pragmatics in which the rules are subject to transformation 
with every move - there is no categorical imperative, or indeed any 
Universal laws, nor even any implicit, normative assumption of 'good' or 
ecommon sense', or of a Normality that should be striven for. 
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5. Corpo-real-ising Judgement 
5.0 Introduction 
In this chapter we will trace two different approaches to language and 
judgement, the pragmatics or schizoanalysis (schizopragmatics for short) 
of Deleuze-Guaftafi, and the realist textualism of Horst Ruthrof. 13' Both 
approaches have many differences with traditional philosophical and 
linguistic approaches to language. Both seek to reintroduce bodies as 
fundamental components of any understanding of language - semantics, 
unless it is dealing with purely formal languages, is nothing without 
pragmatics. For an adequate understanding of how meanings are 
produced, its irreducible connection to the social, corporeal or material 
must be articulated, particularly if one's interests are political. While 
Deleuze-Guattari are more explicitly concerned with the political aspects 
of language, Ruthrof, in an article in the South Ati6ntid Quarterty, argues 
that due to lingering formalist tendencies in Deleuze-Guaftad, they fail to 
articulate an account of language that gives an adequate role to the body, 
hence crippling their political project and undermining their philosophical 
credibility. 135 1 will attempt to answer this charge, in the process, 
articulating again the key components of Deleuze-Guattari's approach to 
language, which as we will see, hinges on their ambivalence towards the 
order-word. 
After introducing Ruthrofs project as presented in his Semantics and the 
Body, I will examine his application of this approach to Deleuze-Guattari, 
taking the opportunity to work through their account, with particular 
reference to the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia. From this I 
134 Horst Ruthrof, Semantics and the Body. - Meaning from Frege to the Postmodem 
(hereafter SB), Melbourne University Press 1997 
135 Horst Ruthrof, 'Deleuze and the Body: Eluding Kafka's "Little Death Sentence"' 
(hereafter DB), South Atlantic Quarterfy 96: 3, Summer 1997,563-578 
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will draw some problems both with Ruthrof s reading of Deleuze-Guaftari 
and with his project as a whole. 
5.1 The Non-Semiotic Noumenon 
At the heart of Ruthrof s problematic is the relationship between language, 
meanings and the world. Linguistics, linguistic philosophy and the 
philosophy of language have all neglected the non-verbal, the non- 
linguistic, the corporeal - namely 'sign systems (visual, tactile, olfactory, 
proximic, haptic, gustatory, auditory ... etc)' (SB 35). His central thesis, as 
expressed in the last lines of Semantics and the Body, is that 'For 
meaning to occur the non-verbal must inhabit the linguistic schema. In 
itself language is no more than a symbolic grid which does not mean at all' 
(S13 261). Earlier in the book he writes 
both [empiricism and phenomenology] duck the question of how a 
significatory system such as language can be linked with something non- 
significatory. Perception, experience and world need to be translated into 
signs before the link can be made. Paradoxically, two philosophical 
traditions - one following Frege, the other Husserl - by committing 
themselves to opposite positions commit similar errors: the assumption of 
ideality in natural language meanings and of the possibility of non- 
significatory phenomena (SB 169). 
It is particularly the second point ('the possibility of non-significatory 
phenomena') that relates to Ruthrofs reading of Deleuze-Guaffad, in 
whom he finds traces of a Husserlian eideticism. I will focus on two of his 
claims. First, the inconceivability of asignifying signs, and second, ' the 
impossibility or at least irrelevance of formalist approaches to a 'corporeal 
semantics'. As regards the first, I will argue that Deleuze-Guaftad succeed 
both in relativising the sphere of signification to a small subset of actual 
acts of meaning-creation, namely those associated with judgement or 
serniotic subjection, but a disproportionately huge part of the theorising 
that has accompanied, and attempted to describe, meaningful activity in 
general. The second point causes more problems for Deleuze-Guaftad, 
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which we will tackle in reference to their use of the linguist Louis 
Hjelmslev in the next chapter. 
I would like to argue that non-significatory phenomena are not impossible, 
nor can they only be postulated as 'a kind of non-semiotic noumenon', as 
Ruthrof decrees (SB 33). In fact, in arguing that appealing to non-signs is 
implausible or a challenge to our 'intuitive grasp of what typically goes on 
when meanings are being produced' (SB 33), Ruthrof shores up the 
underlying basis of his approach in thoroughgoing Kantian defence of 
common sense. Meaning, as Ruthrof argues, does not reside either in the 
dictionary or in language considered as a whole; it is a property of the 
much wider sphere of social doings. 'Let us say that social doing of any 
kind is regarded as either meaningful or meaningless by a community, ' 
where the community could be 'a tiny group or the population of the 
planet. ' This community 'knows' its world by imposing its 'significatory 
matfix' on it. The community can never escape this matrix of its own 
devising, since the very notion of an outside - an outside to the matrix of 
socially recognisable meaning - is indescribable. Understandably, 
Ruthrof writes, 
for the purpose of describing meaning [ ... ] this [non-semiotic noumenon] is 
of no further interest, since everything we can see, touch and talk about is 
available to us only in the form of signs: more or less meaningful and very 
rarely meaningless (SB 33). 
Reference for Ruthrof is redefined in terms of intersemiotic corroboration 
- the coherence of different serniotics, governed on the one hand by our 
cultural form of life and on the other by physical laws. A kind of natural 
selection of cultures has ruled out all those where the accepted beliefs 
about the world are significantly divergent from how the world actually is, 
so that there are no forms of life in which drinking mercury or leaping off 
high buildings are seen as compatible with the preservation of life. The 
limits of our world are also those of our significatory matrix, writes Ruthrof, 
and despite his stated aims of bringing the Body back to semantics, he is 
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happy to restate this as the 'semiotic extension' of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus: 1 36 'The limits of our 'world' are not constituted solely by our 
language but by our sign systems in toto. The limits of our signs are the 
limits of our 'world" (SB 34). 1 would argue that this constitutes a semiotic 
idealism which is little improvement on the linguistic idealism that Ruthrof 
attacks - and what is more, it prevents him accessing bodies, their 
actions and passions, altogether. 
5.2 Having Done with Judgement 
Ruthrof, in 'Deleuze and the Body', writes 'We are dealing here with a 
machinic pragmatics that has political effects. So we need to ask how 
Deleuze's semantic politics can operate as a pragmatics in a significatory 
frame, a semiotics' (DB 566, my emphasis). Perhaps the reason this 
question (to quote Ruthrof again) 'does not seem to have been asked in 
the relevant literature' (DB 566) is that for Deleuze-Guattari, pragmatics is 
prior to semiotics, to significatory frames, so in their terms at least, the 
question does not make sense. Clearly there are fundamental differences 
in Ruthrofs and Deleuze-Guattari's initial orientations: Ruthrof is 
concerned with semantics, with the sphere of human communication, 
whereas Deleuze-Guattari's pragmatics, in principle, is unlimited in scope, 
and has applications, or rather is its applications, everywhere or nowhere. 
Yet this would not seem to explain Ruthrof's criticisms. 
The Deleuze-Guattarian critique of signification functions on (at least) two 
levels - firstly signification as a process or event, which they show to be 
exclusive to specific periods in human history, to be more about 
subjugation than communication or representation, and to function on the 
basis of transcendental illusions (though nonetheless real for all that - 
transcendental illusions are real processes that affect behaviour as well 
as belief, the two are not helpfully separated); secondly signification as a 
theory, whereby the signifier is shown to fail to explain anything, and is 
136 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logicoý-Phildspphicus, tr. D. F. Pears and B. F. 
McGuinness, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974 
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itself in need of explanation. In short Deleuze-Guattari show that there is 
much more to be explored, there is much more to life as we are 
experiencing it now, than signs and their vicissitudes, and there is much 
more to signs than relations of signifier/signified. Just because Ruthrof 
prefaces his remark with the words 'Strictly speaking, it doesn't make it 
any more true that 'the only asignifying signs we have are formal signs in 
homosemiotic systems'(DB 567). 
In Anti-Oedipus Deleuze-Guaftari's target is not simply psychoanalysis, 
but also the fundamental notions about man as being separate from 
nature, and constituted necessarily as a free, responsible individual, in a 
certain overdetermined set of relationships with his parents, siblings, 
spouse and offspring. Oedipus is figured in a variety of ways in the book, 
as a myth perpetuated by psychoanalysis (in its attempts, for instance, to 
'discover Oedipus amongst the savages) but also as a very real structure 
of - subjectification (the processes by which subject-positions are 
assigned), at once transcendental illusion and material process with very 
real effects. Indeed it is in their account of the emergence of Oedipus, 
which they demonstrate to be closely associated first with 'primitive', then 
despotic, and finally capitalist society, they present the origins of writing 
and speech, and the way signification has eaten t, he Cosmos. This 
account, 'Savages, Barbarians and Civilised Men', (Anti-Oedipus chapter 
3) is the tale of how Man came to see himself as an isolated unit whose 
prime characteristics were defined by his limited freedoms, his weighty 
responsibilities and his wishes, beliefs and needs. Their dense account 
has many levels, regarding their relationship with Marxism, 
psychoanalysis and ethnography, but for us the key stages are: the 
separation of the personal from the social, the changing relationship 
between the written and spoken word, and the bases for a schizoanalytic 
approach to language. 
As proposed at the end of Chapter 2, for our purposes here, 
schizophrenisation is equivalent to capitalism's process of decoding, 
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where old customs, authorities, institutions and so on are privatised, to 
become yet more business opportunities and industries, whose 
significance is to be discerned purely in their success in the stock market. 
This decoding is always accompanied by a corresponding overcoding in 
terms of revived archaisms, whereby their old functions in the interests of 
the State are resuscitated in the interests of homeostasis; kept alive as 
mechanisms of control and stability, despite their anachronism. This is 
true even of language. 'Writing has never been capitalism's thing' write 
Deleuze-Guattad, 
Capitalism is profoundly illiterate. The death of writing is like the death of 
God or the death of the father: the thing was settled a long time ago, 
although the news of the event is slow to reach us, and there survives in us 
the memory of extinct signs with which we still write (AO 240). 
This astonishing claim, drawing as it does on Nietzsche, stakes out the 
problematic in Deleuze-Guattari's assault on everyday language as a 
battlefield of social repression-psychic repression. 137 Grammar, in this 
sense, as an organising principle in language, emerged with the original 
coupling of speech and writing, at stage two of Defeuze-Guaftad's 
universal history - the era of the despotic, Imperial State. They present 
an ironic, critical 'universal history', tracing the development from the 
'savages' of the primitive territorial machine, to the 'barbarians' of the 
despotic State machine, to the 'civilised men' of capitalism. This account 
is ironic, because, as a history of sheer contingency, it nonetheless 
results in capitalism as a universal standpoint (yet at the same Aime 
entirely singular) from which alone it becomes possible to trace a 
universal history. 138 
137 '1 fear we are not getting rid of God because we still believe in grammar, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols and The Anti-Christ (hereafter TI), tr. R. J. Hollingdale, 
London: Penguin, 1990: 48 
138 Deleuze-Guattari quote Maurice Godelier - rThe Wests line of development far 
from being universal because it will recur everywhere, appears universal because it 
recurs nowhere else [ ... ] It is typical therefore because, in its singular progress, it has 
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For each of the three stages, Deleuze-Guattari delimit a 'body without 
organs' (BwO) on which the appropriate regime of representation is 
played oUt. 139 The BwO is a polyvalent concept for Deleuze-Guattari with 
a variety of applications, but in each case, the BwO is what stands in the 
place of a notion of origin or telos, and instead, while serving as surface of 
the whole, is figured as one machine-part alongside the rest in a shifting 
constellation -a proviso which prevents interpreting the BwO as a 
totality or unity. The general characteristics of the BwO are that it is pure 
immanence, pure desire, the zero intensity upon which worlds are played 
out - yet one could equally say that it is produced in and by those worlds, 
as their limit and end. In A Thousand Plateaus, they ask 'How Do You 
Make Yourself a Body without Organs? ' a process that is equivalent, as 
we will see shortly, to having done with the judgement of God TIP 150- 
151.140 
The three bodies without organs that correspond to the three stages of 
obtained a universal result. It has furnished a practical base (industrial economy) and a 
theoretical conception (socialism) that permit it to leave behind, and to cause all other 
societies to leave behind, the most ancient and the most recent forms of exploitation of 
man by man [ ... ] The authentic universality of the Wests line of 
development lies 
therefore in its singularity, in its difference, not in its resemblance to the other lines of 
evolution' (AO 140, citing Maurice Godelier, Sur le mode de production asiatique, Paris: 
Editions Sociales, 1969). Universal history, then, retrospectively traces the 
contingencies that have allowed this universal viewpoint on the global decoding that 
industrial capitalism has performed. 
139 We have already noted the close proximity of the concept BwO to the Deleuze- 
Guaftarian terms Abstract Machine and Plane of Consistency (see Section 2.1). 
140 Antonin Artaud, To Have Done with the Judgement of God, a radio play, in Se/ected 
Wiffings, ed. Susan Sontag, tr. Helen Weaver, Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1976 
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universal history are the full body of the earth in territorial representation, 
the body of the despot in imperial representation, and finally the body of 
capital itself. In territorial representation, it is the full body of the earth 
itself that is the repressed represented of all representation - repressed 
because it is through the coding of all relations in terms of the socius that 
conceals the body of the earth and instantiates the territorial regime of the 
primitive socius: the earth becomes the territory. On this surface are 
played out diverse relationships of direct connotation - rituals in which 
bodies are marked, segments of power are maintained, social roles are 
reinforced - yet crucially, voice and graphism remain independent. The 
territorial machine does not lack writing. Such cultures are deemed oral 
because voice and graphism are not yet coupled, isomorphically locked in 
a single 'language' - instead, their graphic system 'marks signs on the 
body that respond to the voice, react to the voice, but that are 
autonomous and do not align themselves on it' (AO 202). The governing 
principle is that of use and function: the two levels* of mark and word are 
connected by the eye that 'evaluates the suffering caused by the 
graphism' (AO 204). In what Deleuze-Guaftari call the 'magic triangle' of 
'voice-audition, graphism-body [and] eye-pain, ' we find a 'system of 
cruelty where the word itself has an essentially designating function, but 
where the graphism itself constitutes a sign in conjunction with the thing 
designated, and where the eye goes from one to the other, extracting and 
measuring the visibility of the one against the pain of the other' (AO 204). 
From the point of view of this universal history, there is one key break in 
history, that diagnosed by Nietzsche in On the Genealogy of Morality, the 
arrival all-at-once of the State, bringing with it the beginnings of the 
modern-day subject of bad conscience and cynicism . 
141 Nietzsche writes 
of 'a leap, a compulsion, a fate which nothing could ward off, the 
emergence of the 'oldest state' 'as a terrible tyranny, as a repressive and 
ruthless machinery', which 'continued working until the raw material of 
people and semi-animals had been finally not just kneaded and made 
141 Friedrich Nietzsche, On The Genealogy of Morality (hereafter GM), tr. Carol Diethe, 
Cambridge University Press, 1994 
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compliant, but shaped' (GM 62-63). It is with the arrival of the despot, the 
conquering and enslaving of the primitive socius by the 'blond beast' (GM 
25,63), that the magic triangle is crushed: 'the voice no longer sings but 
dictates, decrees; the graphy no longer dances, it ceases to animate 
bodies, but is set into writing on tablets, stones and books-, the eye sets 
itself to reading. ' (AO 205) The key transition has been from a socius in 
which all the radiating networks of 'words, bodies, sufferings [ ... ] formulas, 
things, affects [ ... ] voices, graphic traces and eyes' (AO 204) are linked in 
relations of use and function, to a socius in which meaning reigns: 
everything must now be traced back to the despot himself. 'The triangle 
has become the base for a pyramid, all of whose sides cause the vocal, 
the graphic and the visual to converge toward the eminent unity of the 
despot. ' (AO 205). In Nietzsche's words, within this 'structure of 
domination that lives [ ... ] there is absolutely no room for anything which 
does not first acquire 'meaning' with regard to the whole' (GM 63). 
In what sense does the arrival of the despot constitute 'meaning'? As I 
understand this transition, it is one from a situation where the chieftain of 
the primitive socius occupies a temporary, contingent hold on power, 
where the territory itself holds sway, to one where such notions as the 
divine right of kings or pharaohs, the instantiation of a line of rulers, 
whose authority is absolute - the move, say, from Earth Mother to Holy 
Father, the emergence of monotheism (which is not to rule out the 
possibility that there can be monotheistic, despotic conceptions of the 
Earth Mother). The network of 'polyvocal graphisms flush with the real' 
(AO 206) is replaced the emergence of transcendence as such. The plane 
of connotation, evaluation in terms of function, is superseded by the plane 
of subordination: instead of networks of detachable segments, a single 
term is detached and reified, causing a finearisation of the chains: this is 
the emergence of writing, a deterritorialised flow of graphisms that are 
infused with the 'silent voice' of the despot: 
The mouth no longer speaks, it drinks the letter. The eye no longer sees, it 
reads. The body no longer allows itself to be engraved like the earth, but 
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prostrates itself before the engravings of the despot, the region beyond the 
earth, the new full body (AO 206). 
It is necessary to be more specific about the distinction between signs in 
general and signifiers in Deleuze-Guattari's sense. They write: 'The 
signifier is the sign that has become a sign of the sign, having crossed the 
threshold of deterritorialisation; the signifier is merely the deterritorialised 
sign itself (AO 206). This particular deterritorialisation, or detachment 
from the territory, is the constitution of transcendence: the detached 
object or supplementary dimension on which the whole chain depends. At 
this point language - not signs in general, but the specific complex of 
voice and graphism, a writing which presupposes the voice of the despot 
- is born: and this is the meaning (for Deleuze-Guattari at least) of 
Nietzsche's 'deification' of grammar. Language, considered in terms of 
signification, and hence everything else that is considered in terms of 
signification, consists in the biunivocal relationship between a linear chain 
of signifiers (each signifying other signifiers) and the transcendent object 
(whether God, Pharaoh, Pope, phallus, Being - or even Being, absence, 
nothingness). 'Despotism', writes Nietzsche, 'with its subjugation of the 
independent nobility, always prepares the way for some sort of 
monotheism' (GM 66). In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze-Guattari call this 
the regime of signification, and of it, write: 
The signifier is the sign in redundancy with the sign. All signs are signs of 
signs. The question is not yet what a given sign signifies but to which other 
signs it refers, or which signs add themselves to it to form a network 
without beginning or end that projects its shadow onto an atmospheric 
continuum (TP 112). 
That this is a 'funereal world of terror (TP 113) is because everything has 
been subordinated to signification, everything, or content dissolves in the 
infinite network of signifiers: there is nothing but the infinite gravity of a 
recursive 'What does it mean? ' 
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5.3 The Death Sentence 
Guattari, speaking at Columbia University in 1975, describes the change 
of focus that he and Deleuze undertook between the two volumes of 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, away from a focus on psychoanalysis: 
We thought the most formidable enemy was psychoanalysis because it 
reduced all forms of desire to a particular formation, the family. But there is 
another danger, of which psychoanalysis is but one point of application: it 
is the reduction of all modes of serniotization. What I call semiotization is 
what happens with perception, with movement in space, with singing, 
dancing, mimicry, caressing, contact, everything that concerns the body. 
All these modes of semiotization are being reduced to the dominant 
language, the language of power which coordinates its syntactic regulation 
with speech production in its totality. What one learns in school or in the 
university is not essentially a content or data, but a behavioural model 
adapted to certain social castes. 142 
The story of the rise to ascendancy of 'language' (conceived of in its 
significatory aspect) - the semidtization of the world under the great 
redundant signifier - is presented in A Thousand Plateaus as part of a 
universal 'geology' to correspond to the universal history of Anti-Oedipus. 
Moving even further from a personalist account, the 'geology of morals' 
presents (through a bizarre lecture by the bicephalous conceptual 
persona of Professor Challenger) the global process of stratification. 
Stratoanalysis, the mapping of the transition from intensity to the 
extensive world, utilises stratificatory processes itself - axioms, formulae, 
abstract relations - to diagram these processes from the molecular to the 
cultural. That there is this ambiguity, in Deleuze-Guattari's (and our) 
complicity, or at least immersion, in the strata, is reflected by the way 
Professor Challenger, as he mutates and deterritorialises, gradually 
develops pincers, stigmata of the holy lobster. 
142 F61ix Guaftari, Soft Subversions (hereafter SS), ed. Sylvbre Lotringer, New York: 
Semiotext(e), 1996: 11 
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The key to stratification are the 'double pincers' of content and 
expression: the terms are arbitrary but the distinction is always real - yet 
it does not pre-exist the double articulation of the strata. You either have 
both content and expression, or you have neither. Deleuze-Guattari write 
'we must combine all the resources of real distinction, reciprocal 
presupposition, and general relativism' (TP 45). What constitutes a 
content in relation to one plane of expression could also constitute the 
expression of a different content. Each plane may itself be subdivided into 
content and expression. Despite this relativity, the distinction is 
nonetheless real, in that although they can be isomorphic to one another 
(TP 108), the two planes must be capable of some degree of independent 
variance: if not, it makes no sense to distinguish two separate planes, and 
we have reached instead the level of form and substance of content, and 
form and substance of expression. In both cases, the substance (from a 
paradigmatic point of view) is an amorphous continuum (for example, the 
colour spectrum, which is chopped up differently in different languages), 
or (from a syntagmatic point of view) a purport - to take a linguistic 
example, substance of content as a particular thought, such as 'I need to 
go to the bathroom', and substance of expression as the words 'I need to 
go to the bathroom'. In both cases, the forrn that articulates these 
unformed purports into substances are dictated by the particular language 
in question: the form of content being 'I need to go to the bathroom' rather 
than 'Ich m6chte zurn Badezimmer gehen', and the form of expression 
being 'I need to go to the bathroom' rather than 'Far aboot's yer shunky? ' 
Deleuze-Guattari draw this terminology from 'the Danish Spinozist 
geologist' Louis Hjelmslev, who, they write, 'was able to weave a net out 
of the notions of matter, content and expression, form and substance. 
These were the strata, said Hjelmslev' (TIP 43, referring to PTL). For 
Hjelmslev himself, engaged in the program of inventing Linguistic Theory 
as the source of metaserniotic and metasemiological analyses unlimited in 
scope, this net, which casts its shadow onto the amorphous continuum, is 
the ordering of nature according to the vast ranges of linguistic and 
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semiotic systems of humanity, for Deleuze-Guattari the net is neither 
'linguistic in its scope or origin' (TP 43), and the matter onto which it casts 
its shadow is far from inert or amorphous. It is the Body without Organs: 
the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or destratified body and all its 
flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, pure intensities, prevital and 
prephysical free singularities (TP 43). 
Here the BwO, the full body of the earth, is the Plane of Consistency - 
on whose surface the strata of Hjelmslev's net congeal, fold upon one 
another and ossify. 
Deleuze-Guaffad's use Hjelmslev's formal resources in ways which, as we 
will explore in the next chapter, elude Ruthrofs criticisms. Forrn is to be 
understood in terms of Deleuze-Guaffari's notion of abstraction. Forms of 
content and expression are statistical regularities with only relative 
stability and porous boundaries. They are completely dependent on the 
pop ulations, packs, multiplicities, who are the 'subjects' of particular strata 
(TP 54). Whether we are talking geologically, biologically or socially, it is 
never a case of autonomous forms being imposed on inert matter. 
Intensive immanence is not homogeneous sludge, it is already fully 
differentiated. As we saw in Chapter 1, intensity is difference, it does not 
change in degree without also changing in kind. The appearance of 
formed substances in the strata is a result of their foldings, their selection 
of the more homeostatic organisations, so that regularities and 
correspondences are amplified through the machinery, generating 
localised areas of stability, and giving the illusion of a pre-existing natural 
order. 
Formal transformation is possible in the material world, if we conceive of 
form in this way, as an aspect of virtual - incorporeal, yet fully material - 
processes, acting on and through stratified assemblages. What 
constitutes 'incorporeal transformation' can be conceived both as the 
instantaneous crossing of a threshold (resulting, for example, in the 
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switching in a chemical clock) or as change imposed on a multiplicity from 
outside, from an exterior milieu. Deleuze-Guattari's view of language, of 
which for them the basic determination is the order-word, is in terms 
primarily of such switching. The two aspects of stratified social 
assemblages, corresponding to content and expression, are the machinic 
assemblages of bodies, and the collective assemblages of enunciation. 
The emission of order-words by collective assemblages can be speech 
acts, but equally be mere gestures, the issuing of memos, the 
presentation of university degrees, passing of sentence, even (in certain 
circumstances) tacitly assenting in conversation - in each case a 
judgement has been performed, an instantaneous insertion into the flows 
of bodies (content) has been made from the deterritorialised flows of 
social signs (expression), causing a sudden shift in the relative relations 
of forces that may be anything from barely perceptible to catastrophic. 
That language is not primarily about information or communication for 
Deleuze-Guattari is clear - rather, what we saw earlier in terms of the 
redundancy of signification also applies to the order-word: commands are 
not interested in conveying an understanding; they are miniature death 
sentences, little 'stings' to use Elias Canetti's term (CP 351), which lodge 
in us until we can pass them on to someone else. 
, 
And we all have 
massive investments in these controls, for if you play by their rules, 
accept willingly the stings from those higher up the structure and happily 
pass them on to those below, you will go far, my son. To summon up 
Nietzsche once again: in Human, all too Human, he writes, 
In social dialogue, three-quarters of all questions and answers are framed 
in order to hurt the participants a little bit; this is why many men thirst after 
society so much: it gives them a feeling of their strength. 143 
143 Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, all too Human (hereafter HH), tr. Marion Faber and 
Stephen Lehmann, London: Penguin, 1994: 50 
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However the order-word carries the ever-present possibility of a 
transformation of a different kind. It can also be a password, a component 
of passage, a switching point a new arrangement of forces, with greater 
rather than fewer available directions. While it is seldom as simple as this, 
the two extremes of the order-word continuum are death, as we have 
seen; the full force of social repression-psychic repression in the name of 
normalisation - how ever relative those norms may be to particular social 
milieus - and at the other end, creation, the 'liberation of desire', escape 
from bad conscience, blame, responsibility - away from the 
intemalisation and reproduction of social norms, towards a transformed 
relationship of forces. Nietzsche at one point uses the concept of justice in 
reference to this bright new day - unshackling justice from judgement 
No one is responsible for his deeds, no one for his nature; to judge is to be 
unjust. This is also true when the individual judges himself. The tenet is as 
bright as sunlight, and yet everyone prefers to walk back into the shadow 
and untruth - for fear of the consequences (HH 44). 
'44 
5.4 On the Formal 
In what might be either irony or a typo, Ruthrof himself goes on to 
describe his single conceivable variety of asignifying signs as signifiers, 
albeit 'signifiers that act as nothing more than placeholders for whatever 
variables we wish to substitute' (DB 567). Several remarks: First, if 
Ruthrof finds 'asignifying signs' oxymoronic, what about 'asignifying 
signifiers? ' Second, what is the force of 'nothing more than 
placeholders? ' Is it that the signs in question are arbitrary, that they are 
not determined by the 'variables we wish to substitute'? The insight that 
linguistic signs are arbitrary, the disputes over rigid designators, natural 
kinds and so on (about which the jury are still very much out), would at the 
144 Deleuze makes an analogous move in rTo Have Done With Judgemenr (CC 126- 
135) where he writes 'Herein, perhaps, lies the secret: to bring into existence and not to 
judge. If it is so disgusting to judge, it is not because everything is of equal value, but on 
the contrary because what has value can be made or distinguished only by defying 
judgemenf (CC 135). 
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very least suggest that this arbitrariness is not a property of formal 
languages that sets them apart from natural languages. Third, is the point 
that in formal languages particular individual logicians, say, decide what 
the signs stand for, where as in natural languages everything is 
determined on the level of our intersubjective Vorstellungen? The 
remarkable immunity to social constraints and influences that Ruthrof 
grants logicians, these Obennenschen who alone can meddle in the 
formal realm, would suggest a reification of formal languages on his part 
- they arrive like thunder, immune to social representations, and capable 
of transformations belonging to an order distinct from everything else that 
happens. I would counsel that logicians and their adventures are as much 
permeated by social constraints and political/libidinal investments as the 
rest of us. 
If Ruthrof does not regard logicians in this way, it certainly seems to be 
the case that he allows for a dualism between the corporeal and the 
formal - for example, in his discussion of Deleuze's The Logic of Sense, 
he asks 'Is sense [placed by Ruthrof s Deleuze in the 'no-man's-land 
between world and full formalisation] quasi-propositional or quasi- 
corporeal or both? ' (DB 570) (Might it not rather be neither? ) This 
strange isolation of the formal from the corporeal - if by corporeal 
Ruthrof means 'standard social conceptuality' - makes the formal an 
incorporeal netherworld, even if Ruthrof conceives of it only as a 
misguided technique or resource of logic-influenced philosophy. Is he 
denying that the formal is a part of the real world? If it is not, how come it 
seems to have so many applications (consider the chastening success of 
the 'hard' sciences, mathematics, and the design and functioning of 
computers as three interrelated examples)? If he is not denying that 
formal languages are as much active components of our world, as much 
as economies, exchange rates, particle accelerators and so on, might it 
not after all be the case that some 'formalisation' of natural languages 
could be possible? In any case, I contest Ruthrof s claim that 
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the description of language, especially from the perspective of a politically 
engaged pragmatics, gains nothing from the stipulation of empty 
signification, such as asignifying signs (DB 567). 
On the contrary, if the choice is between a pragmatics that entertains the 
possibility of 'empty signification', and one which a-prioristically refuses 
to, it is the latter that would seem in danger of being politically limiting. 
What Deleuze-Guattari show is that it is far more dangerous dogmatically 
to insist that everything necessarily signifies, than to insist that it does 
not. The former makes 'signification' empty and redundant (even if a 
zone of supposedly non-signifying algebraic placeholders is staked out). 
I would argue that Ruthrof is misguided in noticing an 'impression of 
formalism' (i. e. an antipathy towards a properly 'corporeal' semantics) 
lurking, as is the support he finds for it in Brian Massumi's remark, 'x =x 
= not y (I =I= not you) [is replaced in Deleuze-Guattari's work] with an 
open equation: .. .+y+z+a. .. 
(. 
.. + arm + 
brick + window +. . . 
). 9145 it 
is true that Massumi's formulation does not capture 'what actually occurs 
in natural language and in standard social conceptuality' as Ruthrof sees 
them. This is because Deleuze-Guattari are critiquing natural language 
and understandings thereof in terms of 'standard social conceptuality' - 
a critique which (as usual with Deleuze-Guattari) applies both on the level 
of 'standard social conceptuality' as such and on the level of theoretical 
approaches which extract a notion of 'standard social conceptuality' from 
the polyvocality and continuous variation of actual language use, and 
attempt to use this standard in a legislative, limiting way whilst claiming 
(as Ruthrof would seem to be) to be purely descriptive. How else are we 
to take his appeal to such a standard, as though it were not his own 
abstraction but were in fact the way things have to be, the way things 
must be described by any theoretical approach to be taken seriously. 
The problem with Ruthrof's injunction against formalism is that it 
constitutes an a prioristic prohibition on philosophy: formal languages, all 
145 'Translators Forward' (TIP xiii) 
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the resources of logic and syntax, are strictly limited to those particular 
spheres, and cannot be applied to any corporeal phenomena without 
resulting distortion - and by the same token, how are we ever to 
understand where formalism came from, its achievements as well as its 
black holes, if we cannot talk about the relations it describes? Deleuze- 
Guattari draw on formalist techniques as they draw on everything else: 
pra- # , -,, maucally, knowingly - so that each ransacked discipline 
is 
contextualised within the machinery of the strata. They do indeed talk of 
forms, of formal distinctions - such as form and substance of content 
and form and substance of expression - but these relationships are 
of machines and are always relative to particular concerns, 
particular perspectives. 146 Their discussions of immanence, of incorporeal 
transformations, if at all productive, have the potential to explain formal 
relations as Ruthrof understands them. It is a function of the 
(super) linearity of natural language that allows the inscription and function 
of formal languages. The sa, me of 1,3nguage that facilitate its 
universal takeover, its imperialism, are those that allow the quasi-linguistic 
apparatus of logic to appear with such force and efficacy. 
5.5 Conclusion: The Ruin of Representation'47 
Representational thought is analogical; its concern is to establish a 
correspondence between these symmetrically structured domains ['the 
subject, its concepts and also the objects in the world to which its concepts 
are applied'] . The faculty of judgement is the policeman of analogy, 
assuring that each of the three terms is honestly itself, and that the proper 
correspondences obtain. In thought its end is truth, in action justice. The 
146 To quote once again, 'We must combine the resources of real distinction, reciprocal 
presupposition, and general relativism' (TP 45). 
147 Dorothea Olkowski, in her Gilles Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation, London: 
University of California Press, 1999, proposes a reading of Deleuze/Deleuze-Guaftari 
that is entirely compatible with the present one, except with the advantage of a strong 
engagement with Freud and Lacan, and some excellent material on Deleuze-Guaffari 
and feminism. 
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weapons it wields in their pursuit are limitative distribution (the 
determination of the exclusive set of properties possessed by each term in 
contradistinction to the others: logos, law) and hierarchical ranking (the 
measurement of the degree of perfection, of a term's self-resemblance in 
relation to a supreme standard, man, god or gold: value, morality). The 
modus operandi is negation: x=x= not y. Identity, resemblance, truth, 
justice, and negation. The rational foundation for order. 148 
Ruthrof s analysis of language need not be dismissed but rather refigured 
as descriptions of the proper functioning of language. Another author I 
would cite in this respect is Ruth Millikan. 149 1 see such authors as 
exemplary theorists of the level of order-words. Their aporia is to miss the 
underside to language's regular, proper functioning, its social 
determinations and standardised representations, and examine the 
deviant, the transitional, the unprecedented, that cannot be accounted for 
in terms Of pn--pner functi-on --r 'standard socialconceptuality' at all. 
By setting up culturally sanctified, intersubjective intersemiotic 
corroboration as the ground of all possible meaning, Ruthrof installs his 
own despot above the world, its si! --. r,. t voic-Ich fhn-merv CA ry o. i gi g %. ,-h ve ringin .ýW%, 
meaningful act. This despot is the Community, and it reduces all 
possibility of meaning to interserniotic redundancies, the translations 
between different semiotic. chains on the model of Just ass we 
saw in Nietzsche's account of the first state machine, 'there is absolutely 
no room for anything which does not first acquire 'meaning' with regard to 
the whole' (GM 63). Thus Ruthrofs signification is not merely leAcally 
similar to the regime of signification described by Deleuze-Guattari. He 
may -have introduced aspects of meaninta, g-e-nerallby ne-1--t-A I-, Ii guistic 
accounts, but because he conceived of them in terms of signifiers, whose 
importance is to be judged in terms of corroboration, his 'metasemiotics' 
retains language as text as its central model. His notion of corroboration, 
'48 Bnan Massumi, 'Translator's Foreword', TP xi-xii. 
149 Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and other Biological Categories, London: 
MIT Press, 1984 
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an interchangeability between verbal, haptic, olfactory, tactile and all other 
types of signs would itself indicate a rather formal, empty notion of sign - 
not to mention a complete absence of anything distinctly corporeal or non- 
linguistic. More importantly, corroboration, coherence, analogy, 
redundancy between signs as necessary for any kind of meaning, is an 
abstract principle of community-sanctioned order, correctness. It is not 
that this is inaccurate, that meanings are not created and fixed in this 
ation manner. It is that in an age where capitalist represent., -Z are a! '1- 
pervasive, a critical standpoint on community-sanctioned meaning, or 
better still, an investigation of those experimental zones where such 
meaning itself is of no interest, where the outcome is not determined in 
advance, is surely where philosophy comes into its own. 
In the next chapter, we examine in more detail the relationship between 
Deleuze-Guattari and Hjelmslev, from whom they have drawn their crucial 
+ r1_% notion -of stratificati-on. Olf ceent. -1 i. m., portance will be the apparent paradox 
that they should draw from a linguist (indeed, one with far from modest 
notions about the role of language in life - see Section 6.5) a theory 
which aims to transform our understanding of language, which (as we saw 
in Section 4.4) is antagonistic to the central tenets of linguistics, and 
which seemingly aims to describe the whole of matt. er in ostensibly 
linguistic terms, while at the same time denying language any foundational 
role! Meanwhile, in parodic deference to the faculty of judgement, I will 
end this chapter with a slogan, hopefully more password than order-word, 
for a truly corporeal account of meaning: not 'body as text', but text as 
body, text as machine. 
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6. FORMALHI N CORPOREAL 
6.0 Introduction 
In Anti0edipus, Louis Hjelmslev is introduced as the originator of 'the only 
modern - and not archaic - theory of language' (AO 243), a 'purely 
immanent theory [ ... ] that shatters the 
double game of the voice-graphism 
domination' (AO 242). In the Kafka book, though they do not mention him, 
Deleuze-Guattari present a Hjelmslevian account of content and 
expression as an antidote to readings of Kafka based on the Signifier (K 
3-8). However, it is not until A Thousand Plateaus that Hjelms1ev is made 
central to their work. The bulk of this chapter concerns the Prolegomena 
to a Theory of Language by Louis Hjelmslev and its use by Deleuze- 
Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus. I'll examine the tensions in their 
utilisation of his theory, particularly the role of language in it, and hope to 
show why his Danish posterior was so inviting to Deleuze-Guattari's alter- 
ego Professor Challenger, the mouthpiece for their'Geology of Morals'. 150 
What does this have to do with the terms 'formal' and 'incorporeal'? I will 
show that the extent to which Deleuze-Guattari utilise formal resources is 
more or less the extent to which they take up Hjelmslev's approach, and 
that the incorporeal, far from being a merely formal category, is the key to 
their transformation and radicalisation of Hjelmsiev's embryonic 
transcendental empiricism. 
In the last chapter I examined Horst Ruthrof s 'realist textualism', an 
attempt to put the body back into discussions of language. Ruthrof s 
attempt, as I think I showed, fails on almost every level. Not only does he 
have a completely linguicised notion of the body, he also has a very 
bizarre notion of formal relations. I argued instead that Deleuze-Guattari, 
with their much wider ranging Spinozist conception of bodies, and their 
notion of incorporeal transformation, show the way towards a material as 
opposed to Ruthrof s corporeotextual approach to language - and much 
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else besides. They show firstly that an analysis of language cannot be 
separated from an analysis of the bodies involved, their relations and 
intermixtures, and secondly that the whole approach cannot get off the 
ground while a reified notion of the Signifier or of Meaning is allowed to 
govern the relations between bodies. Instead, meaning and signification 
are seen to be but a small subset of the functioning of language and the 
movements of signs, and a new vocabulary of incorporeal relations is 
required in order to get at the various abstract machines involved in 
assemblages with linguistic or semiotic components. The resulting 
methodology, then, what Deleuze-Guaffad at one point call a 'linguistics of 
flows' (AO 241), is no more confined to language than a Nietzschean or 
Foucauldian genealogy is confined to family trees. 
The problems I seek to address in this chapter are: the mechanics of this 
analytic approach, the empirical and ontological claims it makes, and the 
status of the corporeal and incorporeal relations involved. I will 
demonstrate how Ruthrof's charge of formalism, levelled at Deleuze- 
Guattari, conflates formal relations in Ruthrof s own impoverished sense, 
with the sphere of the incorporeal in Deleuze-Guattari, a resource which is 
essential to an analysis which must take pains to avoid erecting any 
supplementary dimensions to simply take the place of Meaning, 
Representation or Signification. The result will necessarily be an approach 
which is ultimately aformal, anexact - it will not be reducible to an 
algebra of formal relations between predefined and delimited terms - but 
the method will be rigorous, drawing (as Deleuze-Guaftad do, but in 
different ways) on the Linguistic Theory of Louis Hjelmslev, on Deleuze's 
Bergsonian empiricism, and on Deleuze-Guaffari's Geology or 
stratoanalysis. 
The aim will be to set out the primary concerns of a pragmatics of the 
order-word, principal among which will be that the apparatus itself is seen 
as nothing more than provisional, the terms arbitrary, and the approach as 
150 We encountered Professor Challenger earlier, in Sections 4.1 and 5.3. 
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open to transformation as the phenomena to which it can be applied. I see 
the applications of this apparatus as something that will inevitably be put 
to the service of philosophical prejudices and preoccupations - how 
could it not be? - which therefore (like the work of Deleuze-Guattari 
itself) contain enough safeguards against reification as possible. In the 
effort not to confuse the map with the territory, while at the same time 
keeping open the possibility of destabilising the boundary between the two 
(in the move towards the couple diagram and phylum, where this 
separation is lost), the method constantly teeters on the edge of self- 
destruction, or of lapsing into futility and impotence. This machine can 
only function by breaking down, by devouring its own components, since 
only in this way can it produce something new. 
6.1 Ruthrof Reprise 
Central to this approach is the notion of the incorporeal transformation, 
which I will concentrate on in the final section. Ruthrof can only get his 
head round this in terms of what goes on in logic or algebra, where from 
one step of (for example) a syllogism to the next, something pertaining to 
a realm other than that of marks on a blackboard or the fidngs of 
neurones has taken place. Hence Ruthrof accuses Deleuze-Guattari of 
joining the ranks of philosophers and linguists who in one way or another 
have evacuated the body - considered by Ruthrof in terms of fields of 
resonances between the different senses - from an understanding of 
'natural language. ' 
In this narrow conception of the formal, Ruthrof leaves himself with two 
grim options. Either he must commit himself to this oddly Platonic realm of 
formal relations, which is separate from everyday uses of language (which 
for him must be understood in terms of a socially created, intersubjective 
serniotic matrix) - giving himself the unenviable task of trying to explain 
where this timeless realm emerged from and how on earth it connects up 
152 
with everything else. 151 Alternatively, his formal realm could be seen as 
the creation of particularly imaginative logicians, who have somehow 
escaped the corporeal imperative he has imposed on all other 
manipulators of symbols - the imperative that all symbolic 
transformations (all possible meaning) involves traces of the body, 
'synaesthetic' resonances between different corporeal sign systems. 
Ruthrof's overarching problems, which prevent him getting to grips with 
bodies at all, are due to his commitment to semantics, meaning, above all 
else. It seems clear that in raising the notions of meaning (and hence 
communication, information and understanding) above all the other 
aspects of linguistic and semiotic functioning - at the expense of such 
non-significatory behaviours as ordering, seducing, humiliating, 
supplicating, consenting, attacking, ingratiating and so on - Ruthrof 
erects a normalising view of the uses of language and signs whose 
governing principle is recognition. The lives of bodies, their attempts to 
find their own ways, maintain and increase themselves and their powers, 
is ignored or at least subordinated to the life of disembodied rational 
reflection. Disembodied, because despite the fact that Ruthrof brings in 
coll-faction, touch, taste and so on, he treats them not as unstable zones of 
real difference, of intensive engagement (as in, for example, Deleuze's 
account of the faculties in Difference and Repetition that we saw in 
151 A companson could be noted between Ruthrofs timeless formal and Deleuze- 
r-i taff, %rVe r%r zone of the incorporeal - surely the latter is 1- - --to- - 
as much a Platonic and inexplicable formulation as the former? Two points can be 
made in response. Firstly, the incorporeal is precisely not to be considered as a 
supplementary dimension, a wellspring from which everything else occurs, but instead 
is but a component of an 'exhaustive' and fully material analysis; it cannot be 
considered as apart or separate from the intermixtures of bodies, but instead as either a 
'surface' or 'plane' on which bodies interact, or else a 'gas' orvapour produced by their 
interactions. Secondly, Ruthrof s formal realm is distinguished by its complete banality: 
t all it ref-rs; to arl! % the steps in formal. agjumend, the predetermined relations between 
predefined terms. It explains nothing and creates nothing, and is itself in need of 
explanation. 
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Section 1.5) but simply as different tickertape printouts for the rational 
homunculus to compare and contrast. 
Underlying this, as Ruthrof freely admits, is a notion of the intersubjective 
Community which establishes and governs all meaning. It somehow 
precedes the flows of signs; all meaning refers back to it. The Community 
is God, the Despot, the supplementary dimension that stands outside 
Ruthrof's significatory schema and imposes order on it, yet countenances 
no explanation or understanding of itself. 
Do Deleuze-Guattari do any better at providing the basis for an approach 
to language which is fully materialist? The rest of this chapter zigzags 
between an overview of Hjelmslev's Theory of Language and discussion 
of how Deleuze-Guattari take it up. Since I am primarily interested in the 
former in terms of the latter, a comprehensive overview of HjelmsIev has 
been forfeited in order to deal more carefully with the aspects of his 
approach that resonate with Deleuze-Guattari. 
6.2 Deductive Empiricism 
H ch -'s --=, ý- cm 1J46, -11 1 Is"'Q VI C411 CS 6W u, 1; PJ-;; PtL1N_11 , of relations consisting of about 108 
technical terms meticulously and incrementally defined (and then 
summarised, PTL 131-138), has the immense virtue of showing how the 
analysis of language and serniotics is absolutely inseparable from an 
analysis of the relations of bodies. It is not that language is some kind of 
preexistent apparatus which chops up undifferentiated reality into usable 
blocks, nor is it a system of ad-hoc labels we have invented to tag 
preexistent objects. It is precisely that the relations between what we 
often simplistically refer to as 'words and things' are in reciprocal 
presupposition, and in any given investigation, the entire comP. 1, aX of 
assemblage and abstract machine must be exhaustively analysed, both 
sides at once and with equal attention. This proviso serves to ward off the 
risk of using one side to 'explain' the other and thus lose sight of or lose 
the site of the consistency of the 'whole'. Hjelmslev could be described as 
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a 'deductive empiricist, and it is the sense of deduction that he employs 
that will show us one aspect of how Ruthrof s notion of the formal 
completely misses what Hjelmslev and Deleuze-Guaftari are up to. 
Hjelmslev writes: 
A theory will attain its simplest form by building on no other premises than 
those required by its object. Moreover, in order to conform to its purpose, a 
theory must be capable of yielding, in all its applications, results which 
agree with so-called (actual or presumed) empirical data (PTL 10-11). 
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This could be taken as an indication that Hjelmslev himself is engaged in 
a programme of proving what we already know; of ensuring any possible 
results conform to an already 'given' empirical, a common-sense 
understanding of the world. But this would be to assume a predetermined 
and unproblematic empirical, which Hjelmslev, working at the coalface of 
material linguistics, clearly does not. Instead, his 'so-called' empiricism (as 
he puts it) can be seen as the attempt to construct Planes of Consistency. 
He presents the empirical principle, the basis of his entire approach: 
The description shall be free of contradiction (self-consistent), exhaustive, 
and as simple as possible. The requirement of freedom from contradiction 
takes precedence over the requirement of exhaustive description. The 
requirement of exhaustive description takes precedence over the 
requirement of simplicity (PTL 11). 152 
152 The adoption of this principle is not without its dubious perks for the unscrupulous 
linguist, as Dwight Bolinger points out: 'The first of the two hedges - the precedence of 
freedom from contradiction over exhaustiveness - gives the linguist a license to shut 
out inconvenient data. The second hedge allows the description to be somewhat 
cumbersome in order to include all the non-contradictory data. ' Dwight Bolinger, 
Aspects of Language (hereafter AL), New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975. 
Though Hjelmslev himself was after a total theory, and hence no doubt had to make the 
inevitable sacrifices in accommodating all data that this principle authonses, I will argue 
that Deleuze-Guattari's use of his theory is pragmatic rather than dogmatic. In what 
follows, I nevertheless defend Hjelmslev's approach, on the basis that his theory is not 
formalism for its own sake, as Bolinger seems to suggest. See also Section 7.1. 
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The prioritising over the requirements simplicity and exhaustiveness of 
that of self-consistency is intrinsic to Hjelmslev's deductive rather than 
inductive method. Induction, the movement from individual instances to 
the categories they supposedly exemplify, has according to Hjelmslev 
been the misguided approach of his linguistic forebears. Induction 
'inevitably leads to the abstraction of concepts which are then 
hypostatized as real' (PTL 12). This movement from particular to universal 
I would characterise as 'bad abstraction', as opposed to the 'good 
abstraction' of the bidirectional relation between abstract materiality and 
the articulations of the strata. Induction as characterised by Hjelmslev is 
the age-old error of 'discovering' or rather positing universals derived from 
particulars, of reifying the transcendental as a field of immutable forms, 
from which particulars are then supposed to have somehow descended. 
It is apparent that no such procedure can beget anything that can function 
as an 'explanation'; the result of this sort of induction is often merely a 
wholesale justification of the status quo. Perhaps more insidious is the 
selective derivation of the ideal, which is then applied to messy reality by 
way of so-called 'critique: step one, focus on the apparent rules or 
regularities you are particularly keen on; step two, derive supposed 
universals from these; step three, attempt to downgrade or eliminate all 
those phenomena which fail to conform to your universals. 
Instead of this move from particular to universal, Hjelmslev proposes a 
move from the initial 'totality' of the object of analysis (the text) to a 
description which homes in on its specificities, its singularities, moving 
from the net of relative, arbitrarily-delimited classes and categories to the 
real differences they designate, and ending with the most exhaustive and 
simple description which manages to retain the initial totality or 
consistency. 
This procedure may therefore be defined briefly as a progression from 
class to component, not from component to class, as an analytic and 
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specifying, not a synthetic and generalizing, movement, as the opposite of 
induction in the sense established by linguistics (PTL 13). 
Relating this notion of a preexistent totality of the text to the use made by 
Deleuze-Guaftari may appear awkward, but it is simply the case that 
Deleuze-Guaffari are more pragmatic in their delimiting of the 'unities' in 
question. Rather than Hjelmslev's notion of the totality of the text in its 
self-consistency, which precedes and survives the analysis, we should 
think instead of the move from particular problematics, or problem fields, to 
a description of the assemblages and abstract machines involved. As we 
saw in Chapter 1, Deleuze's Bergsonism presents his First Rule of 
intuition as method, as: 
Apply the test of true and false to problems themselves. Condemn false 
problems and reconcile truth and creation at the level of problems (B 15). 
The initial step, then, is to delimit a 'self-consistent' problem field, a true 
problem, as object of analysis. To run the risk of confusing terminology 
which we will later return to tease out in more detail, we can for the 
moment equate Hjelmslev's 'totality of the text', Deleuze-Bergson's 
'problem field', and Deleuze-Guaftari's 'Abstract Machine' or 'Plane of 
Consistency'. Guattari writes' 53 
Abstract machines can always be complicated but they can never be 
broken down without losing their mutational specificity. So one must take 
them in their entirety. It is impossible to reach them piece by piece, through 
learning or conditioning (GR 142). 
In other words, the move is from an unanalysed 'whole', to an analysed 
'whole'- yet in both cases, the apparent totality is nothing other than the 
plane of consistency itself. Not an essence or form in any sense, it is 
153 Pierre-F61ix Guaffan, The Guattaii Reader (hereafter GR), ed. Gary Genosko, 
Oxford: Blackwell 1996 
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rather a machine part that functions as surface, or else that inserts itself in 
the assemblages in question. Guattari continues 
[Abstract machines] cling to each other, every part of them becoming a 
process. They assimilate themselves into an assemblage and change its 
'destiny'. Or they silence themselves and return to a plane of pure 
machinic virtuality (GR 142). 
6.3 The Hjelmslev Manoeuvre 
How does Hjelmslev envisage his theory as proceeding? This issue of 
the relationship between the structure of language as revealed by the 
theory, and the structure of reality itself, is the problem of the map and the 
tenItory alluded to above. 
To formulate the problem in a simplified, tendentious, and deliberately 
naive form - does the object determine and affect the theory, or does the 
theory determine and affect its object? (PTL 13) 
To flesh out this problem, Hjelmslev moves from the notion of a theory as 
a 'system of hypotheses' (PTL 13) to that of theory considered in terms of 
arbitrariness and appropriateness (PTL 14). The former factor is a move 
that differentiates Hjelmslev's approach from that of a na7fve empiricism, 
giving him the freedom to build a system independent of any experience. 
This is an important sense in which the Hjelmslevian net (to which we'll 
shortly return in greater detail) is formal. it is a 
purely deductive system, in that it may be used alone to compute the 
possibilities that follow from its premises (PTL 14). 
This can be seen as a move from na7fve to transcendental empiricism, 
where what is being sought, as we have seen, is the immanent structure 
(in this case of language), but the method refuses to abstract this 
structure from the given, for such a move would be to model the 
transcendental on the empirical. 
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It is the second factor, that of appropriateness, that makes or breaks the 
theory, by introducing premises 
which the theoretician knows from preceding experience that they fulfil the 
conditions for appfication to certain empirical data. These premisses are of 
the greatest possible generality and may therefore be able to satisfy the 
conditions for application to a large number of empirical data (PTL 14). 
So, does the theory determine the object or vice versa? Hjelmslev's 
answer is a resounding "both ... and": he writes 
by virtue of its arbitrary nature the theory is arealistic, by virtue of its 
appropriateness, it is rearisfic (FrTL 15) 
and then, 
By virtue of its appropriateness the linguistic theory is empirical, and by 
virtue of its arbitrariness it is calculative (PTL 17). 
Here Hjelmslev presents the two sides of his approach as 
appr-opriatelempiricallrealistic and arbitrarylcalculativelarealistic. He writes 
Linguistic theory cannot be verified (confirmed or invalidated) by reference 
to [ ... I existing texts and languages. It can be judged only with reference to 
the self-consistency of its calculus (PTL 18). 
While Deleuze-Guattari transform this ultraformalist notion of calculative 
consistency into a nofion of real or material consistency, there is already 
in Hjeimslev reason to see something more than a fantastic algebra of 
linguistic components: he argues elsewhere against a purely logical notion 
of this consistency, meaning that his own use of formalism exceeds the 
logic of identity and contradiction, and instead works in terms of 
'participation'. 
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Hjelmslev remarked that a language necessarily includes unexploited 
possibilities or potentialities and that the abstract machine must include 
these possibilities or potentialities (TP 99). 
The Prolegomena is concerned primarily with applicability - fixing by 
definition the properties common to all "'natural" languages', as defined in 
the process as those semiotics into which all other semiotics can be 
translated (PTL 19). For the purposes of the Prolegomena, Hjelmslev 
performs a kind of transcendental deduction: to focus initially on "natural" 
languages, and then move outwards after the principles have been 
established, to the entirety of semiotic phenomena (sign systems that 
necessitate biplanar analysis). This focus, based on the empirical 
principle, safeguards the theory's claim to immanence (PTL 19-20,108). 
Another aspect of the significance of Hjelmslev's formal approach is that 
the system of for7nal as opposed to real definitions is 
not a question of trying to exhaust the intensional nature of the objects or 
even of delimiting them extensionally on all sides, but only of anchoring 
them relatively in respect to other objects, similarly defined or premised as 
basic (PTL 21). 
There is also the option of including operative (temporary) definitions, to 
be superseded at a later stage, part of Hjelmslev's attempt to be as 
'unmetaphysical as possible' (PTL 20): 
A purposeful attempt to eliminate implicit premisses leads to replacing 
postulates partly by definitions and partly by conditional propositions, so 
that the postulates as such are removed from the apparatus. Thus it seems 
possible in most instances to replace pure eAstence postulates by 
theorems in the form of conditions (PTL 21). 
In addition to the elimination of all implicit premisses, Hjelmslev's 
conception of the objects of the analysis is contextual and relational rather 
than in any respect essentialist. 
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The important thing is not the division of an object into parts, but the 
conduct of the analysis so that it conforms to the mutual dependences 
between these parts, and permits us to give an adequate account of them 
[ ... ] Both the object and its parts have existence only by virtue of these 
dependences [ ... ] After we have recognized this, the Nobjecte of nalve 
realism are, from our point of view, nothing but intersections of bundles of 
such dependences. The dependences [ ... ] become from this point of view 
primary, presupposed by their intersections [ ... ]A totality does not 
consist of things but of relationships (PTL 22-23). 
Hjelmslev's 'wholes', then, are merely that to which all 'parts' have a 
uniform relation, an account which coheres with the body without organs 
being a machine part alongside the all the others, distinguished only by 
the fact that it has the same relationship to all the other components. 
Hjelmslev distinguishes functions and functives, on the basis that 
functions are dependences, and functives are -entities that contract 
functions. A function is composed of functives, which themselves may be 
composed of functives (and which are therefore functions of functions), or 
may not be composed of functives (in which case Hjelmslev calls them 
'entities'). He provides a tripartite model for the types of interrelations that 
can occur between functions of a system in terms of constants and 
variables, where 
constant functive whose presence is a necessary condition for the 
presence of the functive to which it has function 
variable: functive whose presence is not a necessary condition for the 
presence of the functive to which it has function (PTL 131) 
The three types of interrelations are determinations, interdepenclences 
and constellations (see Fig. 5 in the section of tables and diagrams at the 
end of the chapter). 
It is only on the basis of these relationships, which clearly have nothing 
intrinsically linguistic about them, that Hjelmslev gets round to talking 
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about signs. 154 As Deleuze-Guattari emphasise, what is special about 
Hjelmslev is his notion of double articulation of these elements into two 
planes, which he names (arbitrarily) content and expression. 155 It is not 
154 His definitions, in summary, are: 
Signs: bearers of meaning, as opposed to words, which may or may not bear meaning, 
or may be composed of several signs: e. g. inactivates= in/actliviatels 
Meaning: purely contextual. The meaning of each individual sign has precisely the 
same relative right (cf. Univocity of Sense in Logic of Sense, ) 
Figurm: non-signs (e. g. V in sell as opposed to V in inactivates). 
He writes: 'Languages, then, cannot be described as pure sign systems. By the aim 
usually attributed to them they are first and foremost sign systems; but by their internal 
structure they are first and foremost something different, namely systems of figurea that 
can be used to construct signs' (PTL 47). Language is only a sign system in relation to 
its outside. One could say that the restricted economy of figurea is used to construct the 
general economy of signs. 
155 The importance of the division into content and expression as regards language, is 
that there are no grounds for positing either plane as prior to the other. The division of 
the text into E-plane and C-plane is the first step of the analysis: these are the most 
inclusive paradigms. This division supersedes less helpful divisions in terms of 
morphology, syntax, semantics, phonetics, lexicography. On both planes, the analysis 
proceeds If you like, from general to restricted economies, e. g.: 
E: Sentences 4 clauses 4 words 4 phonemes 
C: Concepts 4 their components and modifiers. 
Hjelmsle\(s approach demonstrates the futility of the following approaches: 
* Considering only E-forms without the C-forms they reciprocally presuppose 
(dictionary as inventory of E-formIC-form relations in a particular language) 
e Attempting to get at E&C-substances without considering the E&C-forms 
Attempting to get at E&C-purports without seeing them as only existing as formed 
substances (they have no other existence, except by 'bad' abstraction). 
He writes, 'Differences between languages do not rest on different realizations of a type 
of substance, but on different realizations of a principle of formation, or, in other words, 
on a different form in the face of an identical but amorphous purport' (PTL 77). What 
Hjelmslev shores up is the primacy of modes of formation over types of substances: 
'The procedure is purely formal in this sense that it considers the units of language as 
consisting of a number of figurm [the expression-forms which do not convey meaning] 
for which certain rules of transformation hold. These rules are set up without 
consideration of the substance in which the figurse and units are manifested; the 
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immediately clear whether Hjelmslev himself would regard as legitimate 
any applications of double articulation to systems which do not involve 
signification. However, even if (as seems likely) he would reject such a 
possibility, the complexities of his notion of the 'sign-function', the fact that 
it does not entail any one-to-one mapping of the forms of expression onto 
the forms of content, means that it is entirely legitimate to apply this model 
to any system consisting of two isomorphic series which vary 
independently. In other words, while Hjelmslev himself may not have been 
able to see beyond signifying systems, his unflinching rigour has produced 
a system already free of any necessary connection to, or dependence on, 
signification. 
6.5 Why, in spite of all the evidence, Hjelmslev is not just talking 
about language 
The 'Geology of Morals' attempts to provide an account of the 
mechanisms of stratification, where stratification is seen as the process of 
organisation of matter on the Full Body of the Earth; it is responsible for 
everything we see around us, as well as for our own existence as 
organisms, as subjects. No wonder Deleuze-Guattari refer to these 
stratified structures (whether energetic, physico-chemical, geological, 
organic and alloplastic) as the 'Judgements of God', judgements with 
which in the words of Artaud, the aim is to 'have done' - or at the very 
least, to see that'it is an illusion to believe that structure is the earth's last 
word' (TP 41). The other half of the story is matter, the Body without 
Organs of the Earth: 'the unformed, unorganized, nonstratified, or 
destratified body in all its flows: subatomic and submolecular particles, 
pure intensities, prevital and prephysical free singularities' (TP 43). To 
facilitate this massive and perhaps impossible shift in perspective, from 
everyday human concerns to the impersonal, intensive flows from which 
they arise, Deleuze-Guattari concentrate not so much on the question of 
linguistic hierarchy and, consequently, the linguistic deduction as well are independent 
of the physical and physiological, and, in general, of the non-linguistic hierarchies and 
deductions that might lead to a description of the usubstance" (PTL 96). 
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what it would mean to escape the strata, as on that of how the flows of 
the destratified body get imprisoned Within the strata in the first place. 
As might be expected, these mechanisms are far from straightforward; the 
fact that Hjelmslev attempted something similar and almost as ambitious a 
few decades previously is something Deleuze-Guattari were bound to 
make use of. The drawback is, in attempting to provide an alternative to 
conventional, anthropocentric conceptions of matter and life, the last thing 
Deleuze-Guattari want to do is to suggest that language, which 
undoubtedly is the focus of Hjelmslev's enterprise, somehow structures 
matter and organises life. Deleuze-Guattari wam of the imperialism of 
language, 'the illusion that one can grasp and shuffle all the strata 
between one's pincers' (TP 65), and say that 'Despite what Hjelmslev 
himself may have said, the net [of Hjelmslev's apparatus] is not linguistic 
in scope or origin' (TP 43). We now turn to Hjelmslev himself, in order to 
find ways to defend this patently ludicrous claim. 
'Language - human speech', Hjelmslev observes -is an inexhaustible 
abundance of manifold treasures'. In an opening paragraph that more or 
less equates language with everything that is good and great about 
humanity, Hjelmslev concludes by speculating 
So inexorably has language grown inside personality, home, nation, 
mankind, and life itself that we may sometimes be tempted to ask whether 
language is a mere reflexion of, or simply is not all those things - the very 
seed leaf of their growth (PTL 3). 
His linguistic theory, then, sets out to make this inexhaustible abundance 
into the object of 
a systematic, exact, and generalizing science, in the theory of which all 
events (possible combinations of elements) are foreseen and the 
conditions for their realization established (PTL 9). 
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But what exactly does Hjelmslev mean by 'language'? Hjelmslev's 
linguistic theory cannot merely be a combinatory analysis of the Visiecta 
membra of language' - its 'physical and physiological, psychological and 
logical, sociological and historical precipitations' (PTL 5) - but rather an 
analysis of 'language itself. The latter, as worked out by the Theory of 
Language he proposes, is a 'self sufficient totality, a structure sui generis' 
(PTL 6), which is also the very 'means to knowledge' (PTL 5). Hjelmslev 
is confident of the importance of this theory to epistemology, though he 
leaves open the question of whether 'the structure of language be 
equated with that of reality or be taken as a more or less distorted 
reflexion of it' (PTL 6). 
But then, in the following passage, Hjelmslev proposes 'linguistic structure 
as the dominating principle' of 'reality" as an 'organized totality': 
A linguistic theory which searches for the specific structure of language 
through an exclusively formal system of premisses must, while continually 
taking account of the fluctuations and changes of speech, necessarily 
refuse to grant exclusive significance to those changes; must seek a 
constancy, which is not anchored in some *reality" outside language, 
whatever language it may be, and that makes a particular language 
identical with itself in all its various manifestations. When this constancy 
has been found and described, it may then be projected on the "reality" 
outside language, of whatever sort that "reality' may be (physical, 
physiological, psychological, logical, ontological), so that, even in the 
consideration of that 'reality', language as the central point of reference 
remains the chief object - and not as a conglomerate, but as an organized 
totality with linguistic structure as the dominating principle. (PTL 8) 
In light of this, how on earth can Deleuze-Guattari's claims for Hjelmslev 
be defended? The key is that despite his eulogising of all that is good and 
human and calling it language, for Hjelmslev language IS the structure of 
reality as an organised totality (at least insofar as it is amenable to the 
analysis of deductive empiricism), and hence precisely not merely 'human 
speech'. Whereas Ruthrof, as we saw, starts from a linguistic model of 
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meaning, and an impoverished one at that, and moves outwards to what 
he sees as a theory of corporeal realism, Hjelmslev begins with a 
massively intricate apparatus composed of a variety of formal relations of 
both structure and process, and even though he claims always to be 
talking about language, we are deep into the intricacies of his 'net' before 
he has even started talking about meaning. Deleuze-Guaftari, in shifting 
the focus of analysis from language to 'the strata', are talking about the 
same thing: constancies or consistencies which are not anchored in some 
outside "reality", but which generate self-identity, resemblance, continuity 
and stability - which is then projected back onto the areality" outside, be 
it physical, physiological, psychological, logical or ontologicall On all 
these levels, the analysis of the strata is about shoring up the 
mechanisms at work. 
A given stratum retains a unity of composition in spite of the diversity in its 
organisation and development. The unity of composition relates to formal 
traits common to all of the forms or codes of a stratum, and to substantial 
elements, materials common to all of the stratum's substances or milieus 
(TIP 502). 
Where for Hjelmslev this is in order to catch a glimpse of the structure of 
reality itself, to bring out the Judgements of God in all their 'inexhaustible 
abundance', for Deleuze-Guattari it is to open them up to their outside, to 
demonstrate the existence of a beyond to the strata and their orders and 
organisations. Guattari writes 
The issue is not to resume his project of a radical axiomatization of 
language but to start up again from those categories which appear to be 
the result of a truly rigorous examination of the totality of the semiotic 
problematic (GR 145). 156 
156 Hjelmslev would reject Deleuze-Guaftari's various claims (e. g. GR 145, AO 246) that 
his theory is an axiomatic7 'Linguistic theory, then, sovereignly defines its object by an 
arbitrary and appropriate strategy of premisses. The theory consists of a calculation 
from the fewest and most general possible premisses, of which none that is specific to 
the theory seems to be of an axiomatic nature' (PTL 15). 
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6.6 Conclusion: The Formal and the Incorporeal 
In this chapter we have examined what Hjelmslev actually says about 
language and stratification, and have offered an explanation and defence 
of Deleuze-Guattad's appropriation thereof, arguing that their taking-up of 
a few of his terms is not the wholesale importing of a totalising formalism 
of language, but rather the pragmatic deployment of a mobile apparatus 
(form and substance of content, form and substance of expression). 
Rather than form being isolated Platonic realm, it is only distinguishable 
from substance by a move of 'bad' abstraction, since the two are not 
independently variable. The terms 'content and expression' come in when 
there is independent variance between two interlocked series, and in this 
case, it is not an issue of the imposing of form, but one of the expressing 
of functions (with their own form and substance) overcoding material 
components (with their own form and substance). 
The point of the incorporeal transformation, then, is not that it pertains to 
a formal realm as Ruthrof argues. Instead, it is of a piece with Deleuze- 
Guattari's utilisation of Hjelmslev in their attack on signification, 
representation, and other approaches to language which involve 
mysterious relationships of meaning or mediation. . 
The incorporeal 
transformation is the simultaneity of the statementlact and its effects, and 
the archetypal example is the command. As Canetti writes, 'Commands 
are older than speech. If this were not so, dogs could not understand 
them' (CP 351). Though Hjelmsl. -V's apparatus is complex enough to 
allow us, for example, to diagram language change, the relationships 
between different languages, and the interrelations of its different 
components, it also helps us to see that language (as one form of 
expression) can only be understood in relation to the content with which it 
is in reciprocal presupposition and that it is best approached as an entire 
system. 
167 
If we tie this in with our discussions of the order-word from the previous 
chapters, we see that Deleuze-Guattari take this considerably further. 
Rather than simply insisting on the interdependence of content and 
expression, they argue that this very distribution is potentially re- 
established or challenged with every utterance: what is transformed with 
the emission of the order-word is precisely the arrangements of bodies 
and the distribution of symbolic power. There is a continuous variation 
intrinsic to language, and it is not purely linguistic, it bears on matters- 
functions of all kinds. The incorporeal transformation can be entirely 
stratic, it can redundantly reassert the sovereignty of despotic meaning 
and the rigid distinctions between words and things. Alternatively, as 
I component of passage', it can enact 
a transformation of substances and a dissolution of forms, a passage to the 
limit or flight from contours in favour of fluid forces, flows, air, light, and 
matter, such that a body or a word does not end at a precise point. We 
witness the incorporeal power of that intense matter, the material power of 
that language. A matter more immediate, more fluid, more ardent, than 
bodies or words (TP 109). 
Despite this it is in the realm of distinct bodies and words we remain for 
the time being. In the following chapter, from the perspective of our 
Deleuze-Guattarian pragmatics, we confront certain different approaches 
to the science and politics of language. Our particular concern will be to 
examine the charge that might be inspired by passages such as that just 
quoted, that Deleuze-Guattari do not really have anything very useful to 
say about language, in the face, for example, of the growing problem of 
illiteracy. 
On the following pages are diagrams detailing aspects of Hjelmslev's 
apparatus, including his notion of the sign function, and how it compares 
to that of Deleuze-Guaftad. 
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Analysis proceeds in 
terms of both: 
Hjelmslev's Net 
System 
(e. g. Language) 
based on selection 
(eitherlor), i. e. 
correlational hierarchies 
Process 
(e. g. Text) 
based on solidatity 
(both/and) i. e. 
relational hierarchies 
classes: paradigms chains 
components members parts 
(derivatives): 
analysis articulation partition 
Fig. 4 The Analysis Complex 
class 
kU 
first degree derivatives (components) 
WVWU 
second degree derivatives (components of components) 
9U ie U le V 
(continued until derivatives can no longer be partitioned 
- criterion of exhaustiveness) 
Similarly, in relational terms: 
function 
9v 
functive (function of a function) 
le v le v 
Wlk 9V 
functive (not a function: entity) 
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vs. Analysis in terms of Process 
process: 
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(in this case, letters) are 
members of a paradigm and 
parts of a chain. 
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Fig. 7 The Sign Function (take 
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Fig. 8 The Sign Function (take 2) 
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Fia. 9 Comoarin-q Hielmslev to Deleuze-Guaffari (PTL 39/TP 100) 
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7. Linguistic and 
Practices 
Metalinguistic 
7.0 Concepts of language 
The fundamental groundwork of language - the development of a clear- 
cut phonetic system, the specific association of speech elements with 
concepts, and the delicate provision for the formal expression of all manner 
of relations - all this meets us rigidly perfected and systematised in every 
language known to us. 157 
The work of linguists like Edward Sapir played a great role in emphasising 
the sophistication of languages, those previously thought (as had been 
their speakers) to be primitive or infantile in comparison to those of 
Europe. By explaining through vast ranges of examples how what at first 
glance might appear to be unintelligible - can in fact be 
translated/understood, if due attention is paid to differences both internal 
and external to language, Sapir helped undermine the West's 
assumptions about its inherent superiority. This valuable insight has 
nonetheless contributed to two approaches in the study of language 
which, I will argue, both fail to present an adequate picture of how 
language works. The first I raised back in Chapter 3 under the name of 
the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis: the notion that each different language forms 
a hermetically-sealed bubble encoding the flux of reality in a unique way. 
The second, the nativist account of language as a biological property of all 
humans, an innate capacity of the brain, argues that behind all the 
diversity of the world's languages lie the mechanics of an inbuilt Universal 
Grammar. 
These two standpoints each come in many different forms, but there are 
however connections between them: they both reify language, in the 
157 Edward Sapir, Language: An Introductibn to the Study of Speech, New York: 
Harvest, 1949: 22 
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sense that they raise it up as a founding principle of culture - whether 
this is seen as the single culture of all humanity (the differences between 
localities merely accidental) or the mutually equivalent (yet mutually 
incomprehensible) cultures of the world. The way they do this is by 
presenting it (meaning Lang uage-sl ngular for the nativists, or any 
individual language for the relativists) as a totality, a living organism in its 
own right, that is somehow distinct from and independent of the set of all 
actual utterances and inscriptions. ' 58 
Instead of this I propose the Wittgensteinian notion of 'this complicated 
form of life', characterised not by an innate grammar or universals of 
communication, nor by a benign, Ruthrofian 'significatory matrix', but by 
the structure of normativity, Judith Butler's 'highly rigid regulatory frame' 
(to which we will return below). 159 While this will differ from culture to 
culture in its specificities, it will everywhere demonstrates the interplay 
between majoritarian tendencies of control, regularity and habit, and 
minoritarian tendencies of experimentation, rupture and change. These 
two aspects are intertwined and mark a relative difference, a difference in 
point of view rather than of nature: 
Constant is not opposed to variable; it is a treatment of the variable 
opposed to the other kind of treatment or continuous variation. So-called 
obligatory rules correspond to the first kind of treatment, whereas optional 
rules concern the construction of a continuum of variation (TP 103). 
We seek an approach to language that takes this interplay as basic, 
rather than the 'quest for constants' that grounds such traditional 
oppositions as language/speech, synch rony/diach rony, competence/ 
performance. 
158 To use Defeuze-Guaffari's phrase, they each posit 'an Abstract Machine of language 
that does not appeal to any extrinsic factor (TP 85). 
159 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity, New York: 
Routledge, 1990 
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7.1 A Science of Language 
The most monumental contribution to nativist linguistics is almost certainly 
that of Noarn Chomsky, and his immensely thoughtful approach needs to 
be considered in order to establish more precisely the areas of the debate 
with which we are engaging, and those that are outside the remit of the 
present investigation. For Deleuze-Guattari, Chomsky is clearly damned 
from the outset for several reasons: his transformative grammar is 
intrinsically arbourescent and hierarchical; his Universal Grammar would 
seem to be the archetype of language considered as an abstract machine 
in its own right (seemingly isolating linguistics from sociopolitical concerns 
of any kind); his approach demands the abstraction of constants from the 
continuous variation of language use; he seems to regard the idealised 
'competence' of the individual speaker as the focus of linguistics rather 
than any notion of collective assemblages (with the corresponding point 
that the other, machinic aspect of the assemblage is also utterly irrelevant 
to his approach); his goal is to scientifically investigate the human 'faculty 
of language' imagined as an innate capacity or mechanism, the 
description of which is already and for all time a matter of what is 
necessarily true of all humans -a theoretical stance which would appear 
to be utterly at odds with a philosophy based on differencein, Ame-11,11. 
Can these charges amount to substantiated criticisms of Chomsky's 
position, or do they simply miss the point of his enterprise? In the process 
of answering this question, I will examine some criticisms of nativist 
approaches to linguistics, as well as asking whether there are any 
possible points of connection between the project of generative grammar 
and our present concern with order-words. Along the way, we will make 
clearer exactly the aspects of language study and understanding to which 
the pragmatics of the order-word relates, and how, if at all, such an 
approach can communicate with that of Chomsky, or whether (as seems 
likely at the outset of this episode of our investigation) the differences in 
starting point, preferred descriptions and intended aims, are just too far 
apart to be of any use to one another. 
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7.1.1 Chomsky on Skinner 
Noam Chomsky made his name with hisReview of B. F. Skinner's Verbal 
Behaviour', in which he not only demonstrated the many flaws of 
Skinner's attempts to draw analogies between the responses to 
conditioning of various animals in the laboratory to the language use of 
humans, but also laid the groundwork for a brand new type of linguistics 
- generative grammar. 
160 In his review, Chomsky shows Skinners 
attempts to explain language acquisition and use in terms of conditioning 
alone (through the mechanism of stimulus and response), rather than 
through a combination of conditioning and internal structure, to be 
woefully inadequate to explain such phenomena as the successful 
acquisition of language in deprived circumstances, and the capacity to 
master the rules of sentence generation without being taught them 
explicitly. 
The first problem with transposing Skinner's conceptual apparatus of 
stimulus and response from labrats, to humans is the definition of the 
terms. Is everything that impinges on the organism a stimulus, or only that 
which provokes a response? Is every behaviour of the organism a 
response, or only that which is related to a particular stimulus in a lawlike 
manner? This may not pose a particular problem when you are 
concerned with whether a rat learns to press a lever for food, but when 
you are trying to explain (for example) a person's response to a painting, 
you either have to explain whatever her response is (assuming she has 
C0 pli Cd Wi th your request and her response is in some way connected to 
the painting), by a particular property of the painting considered as 
stimulus, or else you have to abandon the schema. 
160 Noam Chomsky, 'Review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behaviour,, in Readings in 
Language and Mind, ed. Heimar Geirsson and Michael Losonsky, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1996 
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Could it be suggested that Chomsky's critique of Skinner could be turned 
on Defeuze-Guattad's notion of the order-word? From a Chomskian 
perspective, they too would seem to propose an account of language 
based on externalised stimulus-response mechanisms rather than paying 
any attention to the innate structures of the mind upon which these 
mechanisms surely depend. In actual fact, I would suggest that in isolating 
the 'faculty of order-words' Deleuze-Guattari are from a certain point of 
view closer to Chomsky than Skinner, in that this faculty is seen to be a 
property of human societies (at least since the age of the Despot, the 
emergence of signification and subjectification, and the conjoining of voice 
and graphism, as we saw in Chapter 5). The profound difference, 
however, is that this faculty is social, collective, rather than individual; it is 
ontologically prior to the notion of the isolated human subject. Its relation 
to postulated 'modules' of the brain is an is-cue we must leave open in this 
account - except to say that it is indeed dependent on the structure of 
the bodymind, but it is equally dependent on the structure of human 
society ('this complicated form of life') and its 'rigid regulatory frame' of 
normativity. Hence, Chomsky's dismissal of Skinner is largely justified, but 
his notions (which we will now explore in more detail) about what for him 
is the only conceivable way of understanding language or examining it are 
much more questionable. 
7.1.2 Competence 
In his Linguistic Theory in America, Frederick Newmeyer states that the 
key contribution of the approach to linguistics that Chomsky inaugurated, 
despite many differences in method and focus, is the notion of 
competence. 161 IMitsou Ronat, in conversation with Chomsky, defines this 
as 
161 Frederick J. Newmeyer, Linguistic Theory in America: First Quarter Century of 
Transformational Generative Grammar, London: Academic Press, 1997. Dwight 
Bolinger notes that despite the approach having been originated by Hjelmslev, no other 
linguist has matched Chomskys success in bringing formal finguistic theory into its own 
- at least in its heyday from 1958 for about ten years (AL 512). 
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that knowledge internalized by a speaker of a language, which, once 
learned and possessed, unconsciously permits him to understand and 
produce an infinite number of new sentences. Generative Grammar is the 
explicit theory proposed to account for that competence. ' 62 
Chomsky argues that psychology (of which linguistics is necessarily a 
subset' 
63 ) must start by 'identifying a cognitive domain [vision, memory, 
language, CtC] [ ... I which can be considered as a system, or a mental 
organ, that is more or less integrated' (LR 49). This is because it is only 
on the basis of such a system that progress can be made in analysing the 
more traditional focus of psychology - namely, behaviour or 
performance. In subordinating performance to competence, Chomsky 
regards himself as laying out a truly rational science of psychology. 
Without this preliminary theoretical understanding of the system no 
understanding of the process - beyond the level of mere observation - 
is possible. Indeed, psychology necessarily has some implicit notion of 
competence, whether it is aware of it or not, even if it is simply the notion 
ge 
is a system of words' (LR 50). What Chomsky offers is the that 'language 
possibility of the 'better psychology' that would result from a 'better model 
of competence' (ibid). 
7.1.3 I-Language and E-Language (part 1) 
In a more recent work, Chomsky has reinscribed the 
competence/performance 
ýIistinction 
as that between internal- or I- 
language and external- or E-language. 164 In presenting this distinction, he 
first brackets off 'the commonsense notion of language' as defined by its 
socitopolitical status (Chinese, English, etc), and mentions the common 
refrain that 'a language is a dialect with an army and a navy (attributed to 
162 Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility, Based on conversations with Mitsou 
Ronat, tr. John Viertel, Susse)c Harvester Press 1979 (hereafter LR): 48-49. 
163 '1 cannot conceive of it in any other way' says Chomsky (LR 43). 
164 Noam Chomsky, Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use (hereafter KL), 
London: Praeger 1986 
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Max Weinrich)' (KL 15) -a notion Deleuze-Guattari phrase as 'There is 
no mother tongue, only a power takeover by a dominant language within 
a political multiplicity' (TP 7). For Chomsky, this attitude cannot hope to 
furnish linguistics with any workable basis from which to examine 
language: 'all scientific approaches have simply abandoned these 
elements of what is called "language" in common usage' (KL 15). Also of 
no interest is the 'normative-teleological' side of the commonsense view, 
from which it makes sense to talk about a foreigner or child's '"partial 
knowledge of English"' (KL 16) - this too must be ruled out of the 
scientific approach, and replaced by an all-or-nothing 'idealized "speech 
community" that is consistent in its linguistic practice' (ibid. ). In what he 
labels a 'theory-internal' point (KL 17), Chomsky then remarks that it 
would be impossible for this community to speak a mixture of languages, 
such as French and Russian, even if they do so uniformly, because 
The language of such a speech community would not be "pure" in the 
relevant sense, because it would not represent a single set of choices 
among the options permitted by UG [Universal Grammar] but rather would 
include Ocontradictory' choices for certain of these options (KL 17) 
Given that Chomsky just stressed the irrelevance of the sociopolitical 
boundaries between languages, there is something peculiar about this 
appeal to "purity", scare-quoted or not. The sympathetic reader has no 
choice but to assume that this kind of "pure" French (for example) is of a 
different order from, for example, the kind of "pure" French jealously 
guarded by the Acad6mie Frangaise. It surely also signposts a problem 
for the notion of a single UG (to which we will return below)! 
7.1.4 Science and Idealisations 
Chomsky confronts the question of the legitimacy of these idealisations, 
and gives the impression of arguing strenuously for their necessity, 
particularly that of 'property of mind F (KL 17). Lest we are misled by the 
dualist implications of 'mind' in this conteA Chomsky shortly makes clear 
he means 'mind/brain', and further remarks that while, for present 
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purposes we 'regard talk of mind as talk about the brain undertaken at a 
certain level of abstraction at which we believe, rightly or wrongly, that 
significant properties and explanatory principles can be discovered' (KL 
22) linguistics and psychology as a whole may ultimately be reducible to 
biology (KL 27). 1 will argue that this abstraction with regard to 'mind' is 
flawed in the same way as Chomsky's other abstractions (UG, 'idealized 
speech community, etc) - it is not nearly abstract enough. 
His 'argument' for the existence of his idealisations runs as follows: 
Surely there is some property of mind P that would enable a person to 
acquire a language under conditions of pure and uniform experience, and 
surely P (characterized by UG) is put to use under the real conditions of 
language acquisition. To deny these assumptions would be bizarre indeed: 
It would be to claim either that language can be learned only under 
conditions of diversity and conflicting evidence, which is absurd, or that the 
property P exists there exists a capacity to learn language in the pure 
and uniform case but the actual learning of language does not involve 
this capacity. In the latter case, we would ask why P exists; is it a "vestigial 
organ" of some sort? The natural approach, and one that I think is tacitly 
adopted even by those who deny the fact, is to attempt to determine the real 
property of mind P. and then ask how P functions under the more complex 
conditions of actual linguistic diversity. It seems clear that any reasonable 
study of the nature, acquisition, and use of language in real life 
circumstances must accept these assumptions and then proceed on the 
basis of some tentative characterization of the property of mind P. In short, 
the idealizations made explicit in more careful work are hardly controversial: 
they isolate for examination a property of the language faculty the existence 
of which is hardly in doubt, and which is surely a crucial element in actual 
language acquisition (KL 17-18). 
In other words, P must exist; P can only be examined on the basis of 
purified idealisations of language, even if normal conditions are those of 
'diversity and conflicting evidence'. This P is, in all likelihood, species- 
specific (i. e. proper to all humans) (KL 18-19) and 'it is difficult to imagine 
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how [studies which do not make these assumptions] might fruitfully 
progress' (KL 19). 
The trouble with the above 'argument' is that it starts with a foregone 
conclusion ('Surely there is some property of mind P... '), the only 
argument for which is the dismissal of its rejection as 'absurd'. One could 
conceivably accept the theoretical possibility that language could be 
acquired under conditions of purity, uniformity and nonconflicting 
evidence, without either allowing that it ever actually is, or that there is 
therefore such a thing as Universal Grammar. In fact, the first assumption 
is not that easy to accept. Supposing a group of adults modified their 
speech in rigid accordance with some theory or other of Universal 
Grammar, and brought up their children in the resulting atmosphere of a 
truly homogeneous speech community. This is not to suggest that 
Chomsky himself conceives of UG as in any way prescriptive, or that 
there is a veiled prescriptive agenda behind the notion, but rather to 
emphasise how odd such a community would be. It is far from obvious 
that the children of such a community would make fewer grammatical 
mistakes in their early years, or become more articulate or imaginative 
speakers, or be less prone to idiosyncratic constructions. What is striking, 
however, is the distasteful nature of such a notion - the amount of 
training these adults would have to undergo to strip them of every 
ungrammatical usage; the sense of artificiality of the resulting 
environment. Why, if the idea of a homogeneous speech community is 
supposed to be indispensable to any serious study of language, does the 
thought of it actually instantiated seem so contrary to the actual diversity 
of everyday language use? This does not amount to an argument that 
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'language can be learned only under conditions of diversity and conflicting 
evidence'; it does, however, cast doubt on Chomsky's insistence that 
such diversity must be considered the exception rather than the rule. 
The second point about property of mind P 'common to all humans' (KL 
19), is that it is one thing to insist (as Chomsky does) that (1) idealisations 
are'the sole means of proceeding rationally [ ... ] You study ideal systems, 
then afterwards you can ask yourself in what manner these ideal systems 
are represented and interact with real individuals' (LR 54). It is quite 
another to go on to insist that (2) the relevant 'ideal system' in the study of 
language is a 'property of mind F rather than, say, a property of material 
systems or (more specifically) a property of sociopolitical assemblages, 
and (3) that this P is therefore 'common to all humans'. In actual fact 
Chomsky takes all three assumptions as read, when in fact all are 
debatable to say the least. As Bolinger writes, 
There is no question that human infants come into the world with vastly 
more preformed capacity for language than used to be thought possible. 
[ ... I But whether or not the genetic design contains elements that are 
explicitly linguistic hinges on the overall question of explicitness. There is 
so much interdependence in the unfolding of our capacities that we cannot 
be sure that the linguistic ones do not start as nonlinguistic, only to be 
made linguistic by features of the environment (AL 284). 
7.1.5 I-Language and E-Language (part 2) 
To return to the distinction between E-language and I-language: the shift 
in focus from former to latter that Generative Grammar enacts (provided 
we accept Chomsky's claims about idealisation and property P) is a move 
in the direction both of realism, and of greater congruence between the 
commonsense notion of language and its linguistic counterpart. E- 
language encompasses most or all traditional approaches to linguistics - 
all those, whether structural, behavioural or what-have-you, which ignore 
the role of the mind/brain, or at least, do not hinge on the eAstence of 
property P. Whether conceived of as 'the totality of utterances that can be 
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made in a speech community' (Bloomfield, quoted by Chomsky, KL1 9), 166 
a system of sounds associated with a system of concepts (Saussure's 
langue), or indeed Deleuze-Guattafi's 'the set of all order-words, implicit 
presuppositions, or speech acts current in a language at a given moment' 
(TIP 79) '167 languages in the sense of E-language are mere 'artefacts' (KL 
26), 'epiphenomenon[al] at best' (KL 25), and 'artificial, somewhat 
arbitrary, and perhaps not very interesting constructs' (KL 26) with 'no 
corresponding real-world objects' (KL 27). In contrast, I-languages, 
conceived of as the "notion of structure' in the mind of the speaker (KL 
23), are precise, real systems to which the test of truth or falsity can 
apply, and hence are in line with the objects of study of any natural 
science. 
It is the role of Universal Grammar in the respective approaches that 
makes this distinction possible. For E-language, it is the corresponding 
grammar which is the semi-arbitrary construct, in that any number of 
grammars could be enumerated that could account for the same 
utterances from the same speaker. If, however, you start from the notion 
of UG, characterised as the initial state (So), the starting point of every 
human by virtue of its genetic endowment, you can then move to 
particular grammars defined as 'theories of various Haqguages' (KL 25), 
and more broadly, to the steady state Ss of knowledge of a language. The 
differences between I-languages in spite of their common basis in UG is 
due to the differences in experiences of speakers of different languages 
(though Chomsky hesitates to call this 'learning' (KL 26)), but it is the 
notion of UG that promises rich rewards to the linguist who compares, 
166 L Bloomfield, 'A Set of Postulates for the Science of Language', Language 2,1928. 
Reprinted in M. Joos, (ed. ). Readings in Linguistics, Washington: American Council of 
Learned Sciences, 1957. 
167 It is difficult to avoid the air of tautology in this definition, though it goes with the 
territory - Chornsky also resorts to similarly awkward formulations, e. g. rrhe I- 
languages that can be attained with So fixed and experience varying are the attainable 
human languages, where by Olanguage" we now mean I-language'(KI- 25-26). 
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say, English and Japanese, with a view to constructing the UG 
necessarily common to both (and all other human languages). 
These, then, are the guiding principles of the investigation: that the focus 
is I-language (the "notion of structure" in the head of the individual 
speaker - or in Chornskys earlier term, his or her 'competence'), which 
consists of innate component (UG) and 'learned' component; that all 
speakers of all languages (excepting the pathological) share UG and 
hence that different I-languages have this shared basis that puts them, 
potentially, in relations of mutual illumination. A more dramatic result of 
this shift is that the things generally referred to as languages (i. e. E- 
languages) are of no interest to linguistics. In comparing the I-languages 
of an English speaker and a Japanese speaker the convergences must 
be conceived of as relating to UG and these individuals' I-language, not 
to any real-world object called English or Japanese, for there is no such 
thing. The notion, therefore, of a power takeover by a dominant language 
(or 'mother tongue'), with or without an army or navy, is nigh-on 
meaningless for this approach. 
This shift serves to protect Chomsky from many criticisms of earlier 
versions of his approach, since when people complain that different 
notions of UG fail to capture what languages are actually like (their 
dependence on context, intonation, gesture and other 'paralinguistic' 
factors) or the differences between them, he can argue that his 
opponents are still thinking about E-languages, the relevance of which 
can only be an eventual outcome of an investigation into I-languages, to 
which any account of E-languages is entirely subordinate. 
Chomsky dismisses the notion that there is anything problematic about 
basing linguistic study on an idealised notion of a homogenous linguistic 
community; indeed he argues that idealisation is necessary for any 
science to proceed, and further, that only idealised systems (such as 
competence, or I-language) 'have interesting properties' (LR 56). To the 
184 
charge that this idealisation in some way removes linguistics from social 
reality, Chomsky states 
Opposition to idealization is simply objection to rationality; it amounts to 
nothing more than an insistence that we shall not have meaningful 
intellectual work. Phenomena that are complicated enough to be worth 
studying generally involve the interaction of several systems. Therefore 
you must abstract some object of study, you must eliminate those factors 
which are not pertinent At least if you want to conduct an investigation 
which is not trivial (LR 57). 
Linguists such as Labov, who pursue the continuous variation of language 
and are not concerned with extracting idealisations, are therefore 
condemned by Chomsky to be mere natural historians, like the collectors 
and cataloguers of rocks or butterflies, as opposed to the natural 
scientists who seek the principles of generative grammar. However, in a 
pithy but crucial footnote, Deleuze-Guattari cite Labov as pinpointing the 
paradox of much linguistics: 
William Labov has clearly shown the contradiction, or at least paradox, 
created by the distinction between language and speech: language is 
defined as the 'social part* of language, and speech is consigned to 
individual variations; but since the social part is self-enclosed, it 
necessarily follows that a single individual would be enough to illustrate the 
principles of language, without reference to any outside data, whereas 
speech could only be studied in a social contexL The same paradox recurs 
from Saussure to Chomsky. OThe social aspect of language is studied by 
observing any one individual, but the individual aspect only by observing 
language in its social context7 UP 524, note 7)168 
As we saw above, Chomsky's later I-language/E-language distinction 
does not mesh with that of language/speech, and since he is uninterested 
in the social aspect of language, he would seem to be released from the 
apparent paradox Labov notes. Nevertheless, from our perspective, the 
lr'a Deleuze-Guattari are quoting William Labov, Socidlinguistfc Pattems, Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1972: 186. 
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project of generative grammar is dramatically limited in its pursuit of the 
deep truths about language, precisely because it neglects language's 
intrinsically social nature, and because it takes as given this common 
property of all individual humans, rather than an unevenly distributed 
property of human society, intimately connected with normativity 
society's relations of command and control. 
7.2 Shibboleth'69 
What I will be examining in this section is the issue of prescriptivism in 
language, the notion of correct usage, and the way linguistics seems to 
distance itself from this arena, leaving it to popular discussions of 
language. An excellent example of this stance can be found in Steven 
Pinker's best-selling The Language Instinct, "10 where he devotes a 
chapter to 'The Language Mavens, those self-appointed arbiters of word- 
use in popular media. 171 Pinker's project is to show that language is 'as 
instinctive as spinning a web [is for a spiderf, that 'every three-year-old is 
a grammatical genius', and that'the design of syntax is coded in our DNA 
and wired into our brains' (371). Hence, the kind of thing the mavens call 
correctness is an irrelevant arena of pedantic hobbyism, of no interest to 
the scientific study of language. Pinker takes pains to show how non- 
standard uses conform to his scientific notion of grammar just as much as 
standard uses, and it is only prejudice to regard the former as inferior to 
the latter when it comes to utility in self-expression. He further shows that 
the bases on which the mavens criticise things like split infinitives, double 
negatives and other no-nos, themselves betray a lack of understanding of 
how language works. In the case of the former example, based on 
169 A'shibboleth', Hebrew for 'torrent. is an offence to 'correct usage' which reveals the 
perpetrator as an ill-educated ignoramus. Popular examples are double negatives, split 
infinitives and non-standard past participles like 'drownded' and 'snuck!. In the Old 
Testament, the Ephraimites who, when challenged, pronounced the word 'sibboletty, 
revealed themselves not to be Gileadites and were duly slain (Judges 12: 5-6; 1-1375). 
IM as cited in Section 3.4 above. 
""'Maven' is Yiddish for expert (LI 373) 
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standard English grammar modelled on Latin, the rule that infinitives 
should not be split misses the point that because of the nature of Latin 
itself (where 'the infinitive is a single word like facere or didere), 'Julius 
Caesar couldn't have split an infinitive if he had wanted to'. On the other 
hand, in English, 'an Isolating' language, building sentences around 
many simple words instead of a few complicated ones', it makes perfect 
sense (LI 374). In the case of the latter, he points out that no one ever 
thought Mick Jagger actually meant that he could in fact get satisfaction, 
since only under the strictures of Standard English is there anything 
problematic about emphasising a negative with another negative just as it 
is commonplace in French's Je ne sais pas, or in English sentences like *1 
didn't buy any lottery tickets, where the *any cannot be used in the 
opposite sentence, *1 bought any lottery tickets because it works only to 
agree with the negated verb (LI 376). 172 
However, by the end of the chapter, Pinker seems to have changed his 
mind, arguing that the written word always benefits from being carefully 
revised in accordance with principles of style. Is there a contradiction 
here? Sociolinguist John Honey certainly thinks so, and strenuously takes 
issue with Pinker's willingness to reassert what Honey calls the "linguistic 
equality' thesis, despite the seemingly indisputable fact that everyone has 
notions of good and bad language use, clear and unclear expression. 173 
For Honey, the 'linguistic equality' thesis is the assumption taken for 
granted by the majority of linguists, that every language, or dialect of a 
language, is as good as every other - that there can be no grounds for 
suggesting that one is morally superior, more advanced or more 'highly 
evolved' than another. There are several contributing factors to the 
success of this doctrine, which Honey sees as having dominated 
linguistics throughout the 201h Century. The first factor is linguistics' 
pretensions to scientific objectivity, and its attempts to distance itself from 
pejorative and discriminatory attitudes both to non-European languages 
172 The asterisk is a convention in linguistics to designate an unacceptable construction. 
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and to supposedly deficient dialects of European ones. Both Honey and 
another sociolinguist Deborah Cameron argue that linguistics has gone 
too far in the quest for disinterested objectivity, and as a result has 
neglected the irreducible role of normativity in language, in the academic 
study of language, and in everyday discussions about language in all 
walks of life. 174 
For Honey, this has resulted in an unwillingness to talk about the relative 
merits of different languages, or more importantly for his purposes, of 
different dialects of the same language. Honey's book is an apologetic for 
Standard English (SE), and the notion of standardised language 
generally, as something that needs to be taught in the schools even if this 
is at the expense of people's pride or fluency in their regional dialect. 
His arguments in favour of actively enforcing SE, in brief, are: 
1. People naturally associate well-spokenness and literacy with education, 
higher social status and power. In this sense people who speak in 
regional dialects will be discriminated against, as assumptions will be 
made about their intelligence. By the same token, enforcing of Standard 
English is necessary to combat discrimination against it from within 
communities of nonstandard English speakers. 
2. Fluency in SE, being the language of government, law, scientific 
research and the great works of literature, is a prerequisite for 
involvement in these spheres. For schools not to give everyone the 
opportunity to speak SE is to emasculate them socially, politically and 
artistically. 
173 John Honey, Language is Power (hereafter LP), London: Faber & Faber, 1997 
1-14 Deborah Cameron, Verbal Hygiene (hereafter VH), London: Routledge, 1995. NB. ' 
'Disinterested' here means impartial, though as both Pinker and Cameron point out, this 
definition is in the process of being superseded by uninterested, a fact Pinker laments 
(despite his insistence that such gripes in the face of inevitable language change are 
futile and ilifounded). Admittedly, my phrase 'disinterested objectivity' is clumsily 
tautologous. 
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3. The maintenance of SE (best done, for Honey, in accordance with the 
judgements of a cross-section of educated speakers) is invaluable for 
communication, wherever English is spoken. Non-standard forms, with 
their less-clearly defined grammar, higher incidence of slang and esoteric 
phrases, are limited by geography, but SE (in both British and American 
versions) is spoken the world over. Without its active promotion, English 
risks dissolving into a vast range of mutually unintelligible dialects, 
whereas with global promotion and support, a consensually formulated 
(and regularly updated) SE could truly be a world language. 
Honey argues that belief in the dogma of linguistic equality has resulted 
in an erosion of English teaching in the UK, with teachers less willing to 
correct non-standard phrases and spellings. This is combined with 
changing attitudes to how grammar should be taught, or whether it should 
be taught at all, and the net result is (supposedly) appallingly high levels 
of illiteracy - especially in deprived areas - and the resultant 
perpetuation of cycles of poverty, rising crime figures and the other 
familiar riffs of the 'hell in a handbasket' deterioration school of social 
commentary. There are two aspects of Honeys stance I would like to 
focus on: his critique of supporters of non-standard English on the basis 
of their role in perpetuating social decline, and his tendency to take as 
inevitable the prevailing attitudes mentioned in point 1 above. The latter I 
will examine in the discussion of verbal hygiene below. The former 
question is particularly relevant to Deleuze-Guaffari's advocacy of 
'becoming-minoe in language, 'making language stuffee, and 'becoming 
a foreigner in your own tongue'. 
7.3 What Is Wrong with Communication? 
The most cursory glance at Deleuze-Guattari's 'Postulates of Linguistics' 
indicates that their stance will be fundamentally opposed to Honey's 
assumptions regarding the superiority of Major or Standardised language, 
which they clearly associate with social control through the transmission 
of order-words. I have dealt above with their equation of grammar with 
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the imposition of the 'semiotic coordinates' by which we are expected to 
naVigate our courses through life, a strict schooling in the language of the 
State being intertwined with the normalising of behaviour through social 
obligation. However, are they perhaps a little quick off the mark in their 
condescension towards official grammar and standardised language? 
This is one aspect of a greater worry Deleuze-Guattari often engender, 
that their valorisation of change and creation over stability is at best 
naive, and at worst, dangerously destructive. Supposing English teaching 
(for example) were to be carried out on the basis of a rejection of the 
strictures of grammar, the fostering of password-creation over order word 
reinforcement, and encouragement of free innovation for its own sake? If 
we take at face value their claims that language is not primarily about 
conveying information, then perhaps a situation where conveying 
information becomes virtually impossible is the situation we should strive 
for? How else are we to take Deleuze's call for the creation of 'vacuoles 
of noncommunication, circuit breakers, so we can elude control' (N 174)? 
In short, a Honeyesque critique of Deleuze-Guattari's stance on language 
would place them as two well-educated intellectuals devaluing everyone 
else's right to join the club of standard language users (an argument he 
uses against critics of SE, Raymond Williams and Roy HarriS175 ) by 
arguing that standardised, State-sanctioned language is the vehicle of 
oppression (rather than, as Honey argues with some force, of liberation). 
While of course Deleuze-Guattad were not setting out to contribute 
directly to debates about education policy, there is nonetheless a worry 
here that their views - if they are supposed to be taken to have any 
practical applications whatsoever, which I assume they are - smack of 
175 LP 114-116, e. g. 'So we have Roy Harris ridiculing those who, when nowadays urging 
the case for "standard Englishe (a term he puts in quotation marks) use the argument 
that Ois the [kind of] English to learn for better job opportunities and improved social 
statu! e [ ... I It is easy for someone who has 
himself moved upwards socially from lesser 
beginnings to a university professorship [ ... I to belittle the ambitions of others who would 
like to do the same' (115). 
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armchair anarchism. 175 What use is minor literature if you have never 
leamed to read? 
The rather distasteful conclusion from this could be that Deleuze- 
Guattari's position is something like 'Of course people have to be taught 
to read and write in accordance with the major language. If they cannot 
give and receive order-words, they can't free up the passwords within; if 
they can't talk like a native in the first place, they cannot learn to talk like 
a "foreigner in their own tongue". We only said 'vacuoles' of 
noncom mu nication - we didn't mean whole housing estates! ' In other 
words, to the extent that Deleuze-Guattari are critical of the Strata they 
are also complicit, and their criticisms only carry weight insofar as they 
assume the continued existence of the Strata regardless. Rather than the 
anarchic revolutionaries that are perhaps suggested by the radical 
educational policy I fancifully extrapolated from them above, they are 
actually interested in 'becoming-minor in language as a literary or artistic 
exercise, an exercise that is only interesting against the backdrop of the 
continued dominance of the Major language of representation. 
This reading of Deleuze-Guattari suggests that affirming passwords over 
order-words amounts to little more than a lifestyle choice, open only to 
those privileged enough to be able to discern the difference, with 
absolutely nothing to say about the problems caused by high levels of 
illiteracy the world over. For example, Goodchild's Deleuze and Guattad 
appears to present their politics in this fashion, where the point is to 
explore your own private becomings and leave politics in the capable 
hands of the social democrats. 176 I hope now to show that their account 
"15 There is a parallel here with feminist criticisms of their notion of 'becoming-woman', 
whereby the assumed starting-point is always that of White Man Face, and the first stage 
is always becoming-woman. How does this apply, how can this be even vaguely relevant, 
to people who have never been in the subject-position of White Man Face? 
176 Philip Goodchild, Deleuze and Guattart An Introduction to the Politics of Desire, 
London: Sage. 11M. I allude also to a response by Goodchild at the Thinking Alien 
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runs much deeper than this in its dissection of the social functioning of 
language, and rather than proposing an aesthetic judgement of password 
over order-word, they do in actual fact have a substantial contribution to 
make to issues of language teaching that surpasses the Honey stance. 
In 'Postulates of Linguistics' they argue that major and minor are not 
opposing categories of language, but the same language from two 
different points of view: that of the institutional grammarian (in the 
prescriptive sense), extracting pseudo-universals from the flows of 
language on the one hand, and on the other, an experimental approach 
focusing on the continuous variation of language, its dependence in any 
given instance on the specifics of the social context in which it arises. As 
far as the teaching of language goes, this could take the form of a shift of 
emphasis (one that has already taken place) from a focus on supposedly 
immutable rules, to a sensitivity to the importance of paralinguistic aspects 
intonation, the interplay of formal and informal registers, body 
language, and perhaps most importantly, the indexes of relative power in 
social interaction. The last thing such an approach would be is blind to the 
kind of prejudices Honey talks about against non-standard forms. Rather 
than seeing standard uses as something of value for their own sake, 
language teaching on a pragmatic basis would equip the student with an 
understanding of the embeddedness of speech and writing in a variety of 
different situations, and that discourses about language are (like 
discourses about anything else) only comprehensible in relation to the 
power relationships of which they are an expression. 
conference at Leeds University (1997) where he said that there was no particular 
correlation to be found between Deleuze's metaphysics and his politics. Compare 
Deleuze's remark that ag philosophy is political, made so by the many things that are 
shameful about being human, from Nazism to "jolly people" gossiping' (N 172), and that 
I'heWs no democratic state that' s not compromised to its very core by its part in 
generating human misey (N 173). 
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In any case, communication has never been as simple as the model of 
'telementation', or the transfer of thoughts from one head to another, 
suggested. As I have tried to show in this thesis, language is not a fixed 
code, and its flexibility also entails what could be seen as its greatest 
weakness - indeterminacy. Exact transfer of ideas from mind to mind is 
a hopeless idealisation, that makes inexplicable the enduring appeal of 
'non-standard' literature from Tristram Shandy to Dr Seuss, and reduces 
language to a transparent medium of communication. As Deborah 
Cameron puts it, 
Non-standard and unconventional uses of language can only be seen as a 
threat to communication if communication itself is conceived in a way that 
negates our whole experience of it (VH 25). 
In the following discussion of 'verbal hygiene', I will explore the 
possibilities of a fundamentally political, pragmatic. understanding of how 
language works, in order to show that these ideas are a much more 
appealing basis for investigating and teaching languages than Honey's 
commitment to standardisation as means, and maximised communication 
as goal. 
7.4 Metalinguistic Practices 
[H]umans do not just use language, they comment on the language they 
use (VH 1). 
In her book Verbal Hygiene, Deborah Cameron, like Honey, argues 
against the supposed objectivity of linguistics - though she is keen not to 
dismiss its insights and innovations. The problem with it is its failure to 
take adequate account of metafinguistic practices, both institutional, 
subcultural and individual. These practices or movements in the 
178 Laurence Steme, The Life and Opinions of Tfistram Shandy, Gentleman, Ware, 
Herts.: Wordsworth Classics, 1996. Dr Seuss, Hooray for Diffendoofer Day!, New York: 
Random House, 1998 (for example). 
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modification of speech and writing, she argues, are as old as language 
itself, predating modern linguistics by millennia. Her point, as we will see, 
is very close to that of Deleuze-Guattarian pragmatics - namely that 
there is no zone of language use that is free of investments in social and 
political concerns; language is never simply about information or 
communication, but always arises in particular social contexts, in 
particular relationships of power: the abstract entity 'Language' does not 
exist beyond its concrete instantiations in particular social contexts. 
It is important for linguists to acknowledge that there is more to people's 
beliefs than the ignorance and prejudice that meet the eye; for in order to 
displace the most powerful ideology there is, namely common sense, it is 
necessary to grasp its hidden principles and to understand the reasons for 
its enduring popular appeal (VH Xiii). 179 
In explaining her choice of the term 'verbal hygiene' to designate the 
practices she is investigating, Cameron contrasts it with the traditional 
distinction in linguistics between the descriptive and the prescriptive, 
arguing that the discipline has tended to distance itself from any 
investment in the latter area. As Steven Pinker was cited as arguing 
above, prescribing 'correct' language use is an activity for people who do 
not know any better - people who have not recognised that everyone 
(barring such exceptions as the mentally subnormal) automatically and 
necessarily has the means to express themselves fully, as language 
necessarily arrives as a totality, differences between idiolects 
notwithstanding. Linguistics is concerned with examining this natural 
phenomenon, in charting its changes and differences through history, 
across continents and through the economic strata of society. Notions of 
scorrectness' are alien to linguistics, since while it recognises that certain 
'" Deleuze-Guaftari reject the notion of ideology-, indeed they deny that there is any such 
thing. Accounts based on ideology relegate oppressive power structures to the realm of 
ideas, as though it were simply a matter of consciousness-raising, rather than one of 
deeper social change. Cameron is drawing on Norman Fairclough, Language and 
Power, Harlow: Longman, 1989. 
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uses may be privileged by certain groups over others, these are simply 
data to be recorded and interpreted in the manner befitting a true 
science. "30 
Cameron argues that while the study of language in accordance with 
scientific practice is clearly possible and productive, such an approach 
cannot escape the fact that language operates on the basis of norms. 
Language is not a phenomenon like gravity or the speed of light; it is 
neither an artefact of culture, nor a living thing in its own right - 'any 
more than swimming, or birdsong, is a living thing"81 (cf. Pinker's 
suggestion that 'language is like the song of the humpback whale' (1-1 
370)). The rules linguistics 'discovers' no doubt capture actual regularities 
in speakers' behaviour, but to say therefore that such rules exist 'in the 
speaker' or indeed 'in the language' conceals the social apparatus giving 
force to such rules and maintaining such regularities, a process in which 
linguistics is itself thoroughly implicated. 
Cameron refuses to allow by unchallenged, any appeals to how'(a) 
language or grammar simply'is'. Such appeals, while more innocuous and 
perhaps unavoidable in the natural sciences, are in linguistics 
mystifications, in that they take for granted the authority of some set of 
facts of past or present usage, to arbitrate in disagreements over new 
formulations. The point is not so much that you cannot derive an 'ought' 
180 As mentioned at the end of Section 4.4, Deleuze-Guattari write: 'Linguistics can 
claim all it wants to be science, nothing but pure science - it wouldn, t be the first time 
that the order of pure science was used to secure the requirements of another order' 
(TP 101). 
181 Here Cameron is quoting James Milroy, whose characterisation of language (as a 
vehicle for communication between living things, namely human beings', the idealisation 
of which as homogenous (the type of characterisation Chomsky dubs E-language) 
wrongly shifts the emphasis away from the activities of individual speakers) she agrees 
with, but whose dismissal of prescriptivism as unnatural, she rejects (VH 5,9). While we 
disagree that language is primarily a 'vehicle for communication', we agree that 'the 
processes affecting it are social processes' (VH 5). 
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from an 'is', but (firstly) that the facts (or 'ises') brought to bear in such 
disputes will always be overdetermined by some already operational set of 
'oughts' left outside the realm of argument, and (secondly) that when it 
comes to language use, there are no mere 'ises', just the 'oughts' that 
successfully took root and became entrenched. ' 82 
For example, in English the masculine third person pronoun has found 
itself on the receiving end of verbal hygienists, on the fairly obvious basis 
that it excludes half of humanity. Traditionalists argued that 'he' actually 
meant 'he or she' all along, or at least that it does now, and that in any 
case it is vastly preferable to such ugly constructions as 'he or she', or 
worse still, the shudder-inducing 'they'-singular. People of this view to this 
day can be heard grudgingly correct themselves ('... sorry, he or she... ') 
making it clear what a terrible imposition this concession is. Nevertheless, 
when I hear 'he' when what is clearly meant is 'he or she', it jars. 
Expressing the same sentiment slightly differently (and using the 
technique of 'experiencer deletion' as listed among Bolinger's list of 
techniques of 'non-neutrality in grammar" 83), it is no longer acceptable to 
say 'he' when you mean 'he or she. Needless to say, if I had been 
brought up to believe that 'he' could be said to apply to both sexes, rather 
than its use being due to the subordination of women, it is likely I would 
strenuously argue that it is both acceptable and correct, and that anyone 
who says otherwise is either a fool or a dangerous extremist. In partial 
1 82 It could be argued that there are biological constraints - lung capacity, the nature of 
the mouth and ear, and so on - that result in languages tending to function in some 
ways rather than others. Following the doubts raised about nativism earlier in the 
chapter, I wish also to suggest that the argument that language has to be thus and so, 
because of the facts of biology, is guilty of a reductionist fallacy that serves to give the 
status quo objective justification, just as those who argue on the basis of 'facts' of 
grammar. The fact that things are how they are is no reason to believe they always 
have been or that they can never change. 
183 AL 260-1. Other examples are It is obvious that.. (obvious to whom? ); It is a known 
fact that.. (known to whom? ), or John seems to be lying rather than It seems to me that 
John is lying. 
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concession to the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, if the way we were taught 
language doesn't actually affect how we think about things in general, it 
certainly affects how we respond to challenges to our verbal hygiene! 
This distinction (fool or extremist) Cameron brings out as evidence of the 
contradictory stance taken by opponents of language change. In such an 
example as the above, they are inclined to say on the one hand that these 
changes are offences against the way language actually is, and on the 
other that it doesn't matter anyway - why do these campaigners think 
that such superficial changes are anything to do with any real plight 
women and racial minorities might actually be in? This translates into two 
equally contradictory responses to changes that have become established 
(e. g. Black (or, if appropriate, African-American) replacing Negro, disabled 
or dysabled replacing handicapped, as well as the more obviously 
pejorative forms nigger and cripple). Either such changes are simply seen 
to be due to geological shifts in language caused by impersonal social 
currents rather than the result of individuals campaigning, or they are 
cosmetic shifts of little consequence that will probably change again 
tomorrow as fashion dictates. Both responses depoliticise language, and 
negate the efforts of the campaigners involved. 
Cameron argues that linguistics cannot keep its hands clean in issues of 
verbal hygiene, because the distinction between what it does and what 
popular (and unpopular) verbal hygienists do is very difficult to maintain: 
both prescriptivism and anti-prescriptivism invoke certain norms and 
circulate particular notions about how language ought to work [... ] 
'description' and 'prescription' turn out to be aspects of a single (and 
normative) activity: a struggle to control language by defining its nature' 
(VH 8). 
Linguistics may purport to merely observe, but the often-unquestioned 
authority of science and the underdetermination of theories by empirical 
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data mean that its objectivity should not be taken for granted. 184 Instead, 
a linguistics that takes the normativity of language as fundamental will be 
better placed to understand its own political roles. 
Verbal hygiene practices' 85 in all their diversity point to two key notions. 
The first is that people constantly talk about talk, and modify the way they 
and each other speak and write. In other words, rather than being 
something we just do, the way we do it is as important (if not more so) 
than whatever it is we are speaking or writing about - and we are 
constantly making (more or less conscious) decisions about this just as 
we are about every other activity. In contrast to this, the disinterested 
stance of the linguist seems ludicrously alien: surely language-use of all 
things has to be investigated with rigorous attention, if not necessarily to 
the inner world of the individual, then at least to the actual situation she is 
acting in (and her effect on it). In Deleuze-Guaftari's terms, utterances can 
only be understood in relation to particular collective assemblages - this 
last phrase marking a distinction both with the speech of the individual 
and the language of the society, and instead focusing on the particular 
milieu on which the utterance occurs. 186 Indeed, collective assemblages, 
the boundaries of which are far from self-evident in A Thousand Plateaus, 
184 Steven Pinker gives an example of the elusiveness of the descriptive/prescriptive 
boundary in the popular imagination, when he writes: 'A linguist's question to an 
informant about some form in his or her speech (say, whether the person uses sneaked 
or snuck) is often lobbed back with the ingenious counterquestion UGee, I better not 
take a chance; which one is correct? "' (1-1371) 
185 examples of which Cameron gives as 'campaigning for the use of plain language on 
official forms; belonging to a spelling reform society, a dialect preservation society or an 
artificial language society; taking courses in 'communication arts' or 'group discussion', 
going for elocution lessons, sending for correspondence courses on 'good English' or 
reading self-improvement literature on how to be a better conversationalist; editing 
prose to conform to a house style; producing guidelines on non-sexist language, or 
opposing such guidelines' (VH 9). 
186 In this regard, the importance of standard usages (as discussed in reference to 
Honey above), whether they are deemed positive or negative, will depend on the 
particular assemblage concerned. 
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can be carved out on the basis of the verbal hygiene practices (along with 
other order-words) in circulation at a given moment. You comprise a 
collective assemblage with the rest of your Plain English pressure group, 
or with your fellow speakers of rural Doric, Jamaican patois or 
poststructuralist philosophy jargon. 
What becomes of the individual in the collective assemblage? 
Cameron's arguments against those approaches which negate the roles 
of individuals in language change could conceivably be turned against 
the notion of the collective assemblage - is this not simply the return of 
the notion that impersonal geological shifts in society facilitate change 
rather than, perhaps, actively campaigning individuals (be they feminists, 
the Acad6mie Frangaise, or whoever)? This point raises the issue of the 
nature of the individual and the acts that can be attributed to it. Arguing 
with Deleuze-Guattari, all utterances are collective, and (as Cameron 
would presumably concede) it is the collective nature of such verbal 
hygiene movements that result in change, rather than their happening to 
consist in groups of particularly influential individuals. The individual is 
constructed from the collective assemblages, rather than the other way 
round, particularly with relation to politics and the politicisation of 
language. We will shortly examine Cameron's account of the construction 
of the individual. 
The second point - why verbal hygiene practices are as relevant as any 
other socio-political campaigns or movements - is that they are never 
simply about language. As I have just suggested they can be defining 
characteristics of particular groups (most obviously in the case of those 
formed with explicitly linguistic aims) and in such cases, what might lie 
behind the ostensive activities is investment in a group of like minds, 
united in their alienation from prevailing attitudes. But more significantly, 
as Cameron points out, verbal hygiene debates are generally the 
symbolic expression of '"deeper" social conflicts' - or rather the two 
levels are in 'complex interaction' to the extent that neither can be 
199 
understood without reference to the other (VH 12). In Deleuze-Guattarian 
terms, the two are in reciprocal presupposition - the collective 
assemblage defined by its utterances (where what is said is not 
separable from the way it is said: medium = message 1117) and the 
machinic assemblage defined by bodies, their actions and passions. On 
both sides, it is a matter of the enforcement or rejection of traditional 
norms and the creation and maintenance of new norms, behaviours and 
social obligations linked through the switching point of the order-word. 
7.5 Subjectif ! cation 
Cameron proposes three zones - authority, identity and agency - in 
which this interaction is played out. Each of these draw their significance 
from the uses of language, and show why disputes over the uses of 
language go 'all the way down' as regards the structuring of the social. 
Crucially, she argues that 
Linguistic conventions are quite possibly the last repository of unquestioned 
authority for educated people in secular society. Tell such people that they 
must dress in a certain way to be admitted to a public building and some at 
least will demand to know why-, they may even reject the purported 
explanation as absurd and campaign for a change in the rules. Tell them, on 
the other hand, that the comma goes outside the quotation marks rather 
than inside (or for that matter vice versa as is conventional in North 
America) and they will meekly obey, though the rule is patently as arbitrary 
as any dress code (VH 12). 
The point is that while the rule itself may be arbitrary, its social function is 
not. As Honey argued, failing to comply with standard usages marks you 
out as legitimately discriminatable-against, where almost nothing else 
would - as Cameron puts it, 'linguistic bigotry is among the last publicly 
expressible prejudices left to members of the western intelligentsia. 
Intellectuals who would find it unthinkable to sneer at a beggar or 
187 7he Medium is the Message': Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The 
Extensions of Man, London: Sphere, 1967 
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someone in a wheelchair will sneer without compunction at linguistic 
asolecisms"' (VH 12). For Cameron, this is prejudice (though she freely 
qelliot3 a; 4 88); admits experiencing the Jarfing' effect of badAgrammar hersele for 
Honey it is natural and legitimate, since he is already convinced of the 
superiority and importance of standard forms. Both agree that 
'correctness' is neither arbitrary or trivial, and that to perpetuate or 
challenge the authority of grammar is to take a stand on far more than just 
language (and hence, will often be an utterly futile and counterproductive 
gesture). For Cameron, this is an indication that verbal hygienists of every 
stripe disingenuously or deliberately confuse the issues by failing to see 
the underlying social processes that are at stake. 
The inexorability of grammar runs as deep as all other social behaviours, 
- we are as likely or unlikely to want to speak or spell incorrectly as we 
are to want to draw attention to ourselves, act aggressively or obscenely, 
or otherwise contravene our internalised codes of acceptable behaviour. 
Take the following excerpt from a conversation about correct and 
nonsensical sentence constructions cited by Bolinger, between a mother 
and her seven-year-old daughter 
M: What's the difference how you say things as long as people understand 
you? 
D: Its a difference because people would stare at you (tifter) [... ] I don't 
want somebody coming around and saying - correcting me. 189 
For Cameron, a major failing of sociolinguistics has been its taking for 
granted of 'people's demonstrable sensitivity to linguistic norms, their fine- 
tuned awareness of prestige and stigma', without paying any attention to 
the actual mechanics of how this sensitivity and awareness comes about 
188 1 can choose to suppress the irritation I feel when I see, for example, a sign that 
reads 0 Potatoe's"; I cannot choose not to feel it' (VH 14). 
189 Bolinger, citing Lila R. Gleitman, Henry Gleitman and Elizabeth F. Shipley, "The 
Emergence of Child as Grammarian, Cognition: International Journal of Cognitive 
Psychology, 1: 137-64,1973 (AL 275). 
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(VH 14-15). Her suggestion is to examine the construction of identity (or in 
terms of the present investigation, subjectification), turning on its head the 
sociolinguistic assumption that linguistic behaviour can be explained in 
reference to a pre-existing identity, and looking instead at how social 
positions and relationships are constructed through linguistic and other 
behaviours. Drawing on Judith Butler's performative account of identity- 
construction, Cameron asks 'if identity pre-exists language, if it is given, 
fixed and taken for granted, then why do language-users have to mark it 
so assiduously and repetitively? ' (VH 17). This continual, performative 
marking of identity is necessary because 'identity does not exist outside of 
the acts that constitute it', each of which are in interaction with the 'highly 
rigid regulatory frame"90 of social norms. 
This frame defines what acts are required to produce an intelligible, 
acceptable or normal identity; its definitions cannot simply be ignored, but 
they can be negotiated, resisted and in some circumstances deliberately 
modified [ ... 
] Debates on verbal hygiene are of particular interest: conflict 
renders visible the processes of norm-making and norm-breaking, bringing 
into the open the arguments that surround rules. Verbal hygiene practices 
that are not the subject of debate are also illuminating: examined closely, 
they show how norms become naturalized and how unquestioned 
('conventional') ways of behaving are implicitly understood by social actors. 
Overall, then, the investigation of normative practices, whether contested 
or taken for granted, has the potential to cast light on the relations between 
language, society and identity (VH 17). 
The third zone of agency brings together problems of authority and 
identity, in the question of agency - that of the extent to which we speak 
language, or, to paraphrase Heidegger, it speaks us. For linguistics, as 
we have seen, language is a natural phenomenon or a living organism 
with its own pattern of evolution and change; for verbal hygienists, it might 
either be something whose decline needs to be prevented, or whose 
outmoded forms need to be brought in line with changing attitudes. It is 
under the banner of agency that Cameron presents her middle path 
190 Cameron (citing Butler, Gender Trouble), VH 16-17. 
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between the notions either that language use (as natural process) cannot 
be made artificially to square with so-called passing whims of the age 
(such as political correctness) - and that attempts to make it do so are 
misguided prescriptivism, or that if changes are seen to take root they are 
merely the gradual evolution of language due to the effects of social 
change. In either case agency is denied and the 'naturalness' of language 
is strategically appealed to - in the first case, because the fact that 
changes can be argued for successfully and can take root as a result is 
denied, and in the second, because linguistic changes are seen as mere 
epiphenomena of social change. 
A high level of conformity need not mean everyone assents to the relevant 
norms; it could mean rather that they live within social relations that make 
deviance and resistance particularly difficult (VH 238n4). 
Because science itself has authority in modem society, while at the same 
time the discourse of value remains a highly salient one for everyday talk 
about language, the absolute distinction between observing norms and 
enforcing them cannot be maintained in practice (VH 8). 
Cameron cites right wing commentator John Marenbon, who argued that 
the linguists who argue for description over prescription have missed the 
point: 191 
'grammar prescribes by describing'. The point of doing a 'descriptive' 
grammatical analysis is precisely to establish what the norms of grammar 
are, so they can be prescribed with confidence to users of the language 
(VH 10). 
But though Cameron agrees with this point, she disagrees with his 
assumption that we are therefore obliged to follow one set of prescriptions 
over another. By accepting that normativity is inescapable in language 
use, you open the very question of which normative strategies to follow at 
191 John Marenbon, English Our English: The New Orthodoxy Examined, London: 
Centre for Policy Studies, 1987 
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any given point -a question that bears directly on the social and political 
investments of each. 
I would argue that there is not the radical distinction Cameron proposes 
between the normative practices of verbal hygiene and normativity in 
other social arenas, in that the latter are often so ingrained as to be 
largely invisible much of the time. Examples of this could be the 
behaviours which mark someone as weird or insane-looking. Making this 
comparison brings up the corresponding argument one might make, to 
the effect that people who break social norms, whether by running 
around naked or by machine-gunning their workmates probably are 
insane, just as the illiterate or inveterately ungrammatical are deficient. 
Just because these norms are in one sense socially constructed, they are 
nonetheless real forces on people's behaviour, and there are real 
consequences for failing to conform to them. 
The analogy can be taken further. Should there be any proponents of 
'grammatical atheism', or the idea that grammar, or the regime of 
signification/subjectification in its entirety, is a set of shackles to be 
thrown off, or radically refigured, they would bear comparison with the 
radical antipsychiatry of someone like Thomas Szasz. 1 92 While the 
present approach is happy to suggest that psychiatry and linguistics alike 
have had roles to play in ordering and controlling society in a rather less 
disinterested way than that in which they like to be presented, it is 
another thing altogether to suggest that either psychiatry (with its not 
infrequent successes in preventing people commit suicide or helping 
them get through difficult and dangerous periods of their lives) or the 
various sciences and proto-sciences of language should be declared our 
enemies. The point is not to criticise the very idea of norms, or to suggest 
that we could do without them, but rather to explore the possibilities of 
192 Thomas S. Szasz, The Myth of Mental Illness: Foundations of a Theory of Personal 
Conduct, London: Paladin, 1972, and Ideology and Insanity: Essays on the Psychiatric 
Dehumanization of Man, London: Marion Boyers Ltd, 1983. 
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modifying or replacing those norms. Having realised that they are there 
and that they are to some extent open to debate, it will not do to appeal to 
them as natural principles, as a covert way of maintaining their power. 
Above, we saw how John Honey appealed to people's ill-dispositions 
towards non-standard forms of English, such as Black English, as 
justification for the active promotion of SE in schools. 'There is, ' retorts 
Cameron, 'a lot of colour prejudice in Britain, but that fact is never invoked 
to suggest that black children should be taught the proper use of skin 
lightening cosmetics' (VH 98). 
7.6 Conclusion 
To sum up the findings of this chapter in contrast to the stance of nativist 
linguistics, grammar is unlikely to be an innate faculty, olle essentially 
devoted to the production and reception of sentences. What we have 
argued for instead, is the faculty of order-words, which is not a biological 
property of human neuroanatomy, but rather, is a contingent social 
property of human societies (at least, all those that have been 
encountered so far). In other words, the behaviours we understand as 
language use, at least on present data, are everywhere accompanied by 
custom, regulation and control - social obligation - though this may take 
radically different forms at different times and places. The implication for 
linguistics is that language can only be separated off from a pragmatic 
examination of its particular context, at the risk of detaching it from life - 
in spite of Chomsky's claim that it is the cataloguers of linguistic variation 
who are the 'butterfly collectors' as opposed to those true scientists of 
language in the schools of generative grammar (LR 57). Our discussion of 
verbal hygiene emphasised that linguistic and metalinguistic practices are 
intertwined with social, political and economic struggles, and that there 
are no mere matters of language: that is, for all the time spent dealing 
about the 'merely linguistic!, one is prevented or distracted from talking 
about the 'bigger picture'. Discussions of verbal hygiene, alongside 
debates about social practices, are vivid examples of the distribution of 
the visible and the articulable being contested and reasserted. 
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8. Conclusion 
The central claim of this thesis has been that in investigating the role of 
language in life, language is best considered in terms of the order-word. 
This concept concentrates our attention on the moment of utterance or 
emission, its circumstances and particular variables, and its effects, the 
transformations in which it results - or rather, of which it simultaneously 
consists. On a sub-personal or preindividual level, order-words were 
shown to populate the constantly changing field of unmediated context- 
fixation or orientation between larval selves and environment. Rather than 
there being an integrated subject that arrives from on high, there is 
instead the precarious 'metastability' of this field of 'contractions- 
contemplations', this Grand Central Station of comings and goings 
between body and world. In this respect at least, there is no difference of 
essence between a single person and a collective; both have shifting 
boundaries which are at each moment traversed by different kinds of 
flows. The order-word/password lies between this field of larval selves 
and preindividual singularities, and the persons and blocky things of the 
strata. 
It is not the grammar of rule-books that is important, so much as the 
grammar of stratification, i. e. the constraints on bodies and on thought 
that are in effect in a particular assemblage. It could well be protested that 
this all-encompassing approach is completely unworkable, and, as 
Chomsky argued, we should instead begin with idealisations (for example, 
a homogenous speech community). But idealisations, whether considered 
as hypotheses to be tested or generalisations to start an investigation 
going, are simplifications from this world, classes of things with their 
differentiating characteristics stripped away. Instead the present method 
abstracts from the strata, from the seen and said, to the level where the 
disparate communicates, where semiotic and energetic components 
circulate on the same Plane - precisely because of their differences. 
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This is not a reduction; it deals with the complexity of how things are 
rather than with a notion of how they should be. For as we have stressed, 
the Plane of Consistency or Abstract Machine is not an object, origin, or 
goal; it is not a common property of things but that which things with no 
property in common have in common. This allows us to see words as 
things, lines or arrows on a multidimensional map, and to speak things (or 
gestures, or roads, trees, stars ... ). It is all real, 
but the interactions and 
outcomes are no longer determined in advance. Instead of simplified 
idealisations, then, our apparatus (machinic and collective assemblage, 
abstract machine, strata, order-word) are, like the terms of Hjelmslev's 
net, ready to interact with concrete situations. 
It is no doubt the case that the pragmatics we have proposed can 
sometimes look like dualism. Each of its pairs of terms (actual/virtual, 
stratified/destratified, order-word/password, extension/intensity and so on) 
at times appears to conform to a respective evaluation of 'bad/good'. But 
what makes this instead a 'monistic pluralism' is that in each case, the 
relations between the paired terms is rooted at different levels in our 
singular, open-ended construal of the Real. A good example is the pair 
content and expression, which as we saw, stand in a noncorresponding 
but mutually presupposing relationship with one another (as, say, non- 
discursive and discursive multiplicities respectively), where the boundaries 
are extremely porous and only the abstract forms (matters and functions 
respectively) are truly distinct. Hence the same bodies are worked upon 
on either level, and it is the cumulative effect of the whole apparatus in 
action that must always be our starting point. Just as Hjelmslev proposed 
a process of division, so we propose the initial pragmatic delimiting of an 
assemblage, which is then subdivided (or analysed) into the various levels 
of content and expression. 
The order-word holds two places in this apparatus; firstly as an entity 
belonging to the plane of expression. The command is a product of the 
collective assemblage of enunciation; emerging from the anonymous 
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murmur to ring out between ordered, disciplined bodies. It both depends 
for its effect on a machinic assemblage, and also serves to reinforce that 
assemblage. Secondly, and more profoundly, the order-word/password 
appears at the very point of division into content and expression, double 
articulation: indeed, it moves or pulls in both directions (as its twin name 
suggests). Rather than simply emerging on the level of expression (as, 
say, a particular utterance, memo or graffito' 93) , and as such both arising 
out of and inserted into the flows of bodies of the machinic assemblage, 
the order-word/password is a decisive moment in the very relation 
between the visible and the articulable - as articulation, it is a moment of 
determination, defining one or many utterers, one or many recipients, and 
their relations to machines, animals, money and so on: in short, it 
stratifies, it creates truth or knowledge, it enforces or reinforces a 
particular regime of power. 
However, this articulation is doubled by the simultaneous pull by the 
password-side in the other direction. Whereas the order or command 
need not be linguistic but is undoubtedly a matter of expression, the 
password throws even content and expression into disarray, making it 
impossible to determine what can and cannot happen. The password 
unleashes difference in itself, which as the continuous immanence of 
production, will have none of the ordered, static homogeneity of the 
Ordered world. For the password all matters and functions circulate and 
interact on the Plane of Consistency: the password breaks open both 
words and things, by being both word and thing, function and matter, 
itself, in the demonstration that nothing was ever really separated from 
anything else in the first place. 
This bears directly on our everyday understanding of and dealings with 
language, because every imaginable human utterance (a category the 
193 e. g. WDEEN SOCCER THUGS KILL ALL VISITING FANS', seen in Aberdeen in the 
early 1980s and immortalised in Duncan McLean's short story of the same name. 
Duncan McLean, Bucket of Tongues, London: Minerva, 1994 
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limits of which could undoubtedly be argued about indefinitely) takes a 
stand, at least one, on the question of the human. The vast majority of 
utterances, no doubt, unquestionably affirm the human world (by which 
here I mean the strata, though the two terms are far from 
interchangeable) by asserting the relevance of some particular aspect of it 
- dinner, sex, television, and so on - and this is so even when they are 
scabarously critical or loudly indifferent. Utterances in the category of 
copinion' are characterised by a position on a scale from 'listen to me, I'm 
right! ' (a wholehearted affirmation of the game of opinions as narcissistic 
medium of self-assertion) to all those positions where one is reluctant or 
unwilling to give an opinion and hence join in the game - hence placing 
the self in relation to the game. However, there are uses of language - 
conversation, writing - where there is something more than 'mere talk' at 
stake, though this phrase is misleading. The sense of 'mere talk' here is 
that of the redundancy of the order-word, where what is being said 
precisely does not matter (where 'to matter is a punning abbreviation of 
'to engage with matter), as the words involved are merely the cover over 
the reinforcing of the machineries of stratification - hence it is not that 
there is any disconnection from the molar real in this chatter, since the 
underlying message in all mere talk, however 'trivial', is THIS IS 
REALITY. This is the ultimate order-word, the underlying message of (the 
stratic side of) every utterance. Similarly, it is certainly not that these 
other uses of language are more 'meaningful', since they may very well be 
utter nonsense from the angle of the strata. Indeed, this may be precisely 
because they dissimulate or underdetermine the REALITY from which 
they emerge/into which they are inserted. 
in other words, the password (be it script that turns into pictures, a 
humorous utterance, a sentence that turns into music, an experiment in 
cut-up or electronic sampling) brings different realms into contact; it 
makes new directions possible (if only for a moment), it throws new light. 
It is not 'mere talk', not because it lacks redundancy but because that 
same redundancy is put to use. Where the order-word exists to 
a- 
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overdetermine the relations of control within the strata, the password is 
the failure, the impossibility of completely harnessing the surplus value to 
that end, with the result that incidents of unprecedented invention break 
out. The attempt to maintain things as they are results in changing them 
more radically than could have been anticipated. The emergence of ever 
more robust tiers of order and control is inevitably coupled with the 
emergence of more possible fracture-points, more distortion in the 
channel, more elements in play and more unanticipatable catastrophe. 
All this exists at once. No one has a monopoly on distinguishing the 
order-words from the passwords. At any given moment, one's responses 
to either order or chaos need be worship or revulsion or anything in 
between; neither abstract extreme can exist without the other. As 
humans we are already entirely dependent on the strata for the bulk of our 
day-to-day needs; we are the stratified. Yet at the same time it is possible 
to 'push the envelope' of what can be seen, felt and said, 
For the question was not how to elude the order-word but how to elude the 
death-sentence it envelops, how to develop its power of escape [... ] There 
are pass-words beneath order-words. Words that pass, words that are 
components of passage, whereas order-words mark stoppages or 
organized, stratified compositions. A single thing or word undoubtedly has 
this twofold nature: it is necessary to extract one from the other - to 
transform the compositions of order into components of passage (TP 110). 
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